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CHAPTER I
TNTRODUGTIOW
A. STATEMENT OP THE PROBLEM
Although psychology is perhaps the oldest of all
the sciences, the psychological study of religion is of
rather recent origin. Only within the last fifty years
has the attempt "been made to apply the critical, empirical
methods of psychology to religion. However, in spite of its
youth, psychology of religion has made rapid strides and
contributed much to our understanding of religious pheno-
mena* The wealth of empirical data acquired through
psychological research and investigation in this area is
sufficient to indicate the importance of psychology of
religion as a branch of psychological and religious study.
Courses in psychology of religion are now offered in most
liberal Protestant theological schools, and a psychological
understanding of religion is coming to be recognized as a
significant part of theological education.
As in other areas of scientific and intellectual
investigation, psychology of religion had its pioneers--
men who blazed new trails into the wilderness, opened up
new regions and discovered new vistas. It was through the
work of such men as G. Stanley Hall, Edwin D. Starbuck,
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J. H. Leuba, William James, E» S. Ames, George A. Coe,
and others, that psychology of religion came into its own
and became a recognized branch of scientific study.
Following these early pioneers came other thinkers, each
making a particular contribution and extending the horizons
of our understanding. But always they were building upon
the foundations laid down by the early pioneers.
Among the pioneers In psychology of religion, George
A. Coe stands out as the one who perhaps made the most
lasting and significant contribution. With the possible
exception of William James, no other thinker in this field
has stood the test of time so well. His influence in the
field of psychology of religion was expressed by Harrison
Elliott at the time of Coe's retirement from Teachers
College, Columbia University, in 1927. He said:
Departments of religious education and psychology
are found now in many colleges and universities.
In all these significant developments of science in
religion we think rightly of Professor Coe as the
pioneer and leading spirit.
Following his early studies in psychology of religion,
Coe branched out into the field of religious education and
later into social ethics. However, it becomes difficult to
separate clearly these areas of his interest. His writings
1. Harrison Elliott, "Science in Religion," Religious
Education , 22 (July, 1927), 422-25, 423.

3in religious education and social ethics are everywhere
permeated with penetrating psychological insight. There
is complete continuity between the main aspects of his
psychology of religion and its specific application to
other areas. Furthermore, it is quite natural that Coe
should have branched out into religious education for he
regarded psychology of religion and religious education as
fundamentally interdependent. He recognized very early
that intelligent religious education needed to be based
upon a good understanding of psychological processes. In
his Inaugural address as the Skinner and McAlpin Professor
of Practical Theology, Union Theological Seminary,
wovember 16, 1909, Coe stated:
Fundamental to any wisely thorough reorganization
of the educational work of a church is the knowledge
of religion in its psychological aspects. Without
this there can be no comprehension of the specific
goal proper to religious instruction and no adequate
test of results .-^
This unbroken continuity between the scientific
study of religion and its specific application further
indicates the importance of Goe's work in psychology of
religion. Although he is perhaps better known for his
contribution to religious education, Goe's prior
2. Coe, "Can Religion be Taught?" Goe's inaugural
address, (wew York: Union Theological Seminary, 1909) , 24.

4investigations in psychology of religion are of fundamen-
tal significant importance, i'he purpose of this study
will be to discover and evaluate Goe's contribution to
psychology of religion as expressed, not only in his
psychological writings as such, but in his work in relig-
ious education and social ethics as well.
Our primary objective is to seek out the unique
and original aspects of Goe's psychology of religion in
order to discover what is most significant in his contri-
bution to the field. We also wish to discover the specific
application of his social and functional approach to
particular problems in psychology of religion, and to
explore his contribution to the development of scientific
tools and techniques for the psychological study of
religion. We will attempt to seek out the various influ-
ences which helped to shape his thinking and to discover
his relationship to his contemporaries in this field.
Finally, we will make a critical evaluation of his psychology
of religion in the light of more recent studies in order
to discover the status of his psychology of religion today
and the nature of his enduring influence. In view of the
extensive nature of his work, and the volume of his
published writings, we will not attempt to make an exhaus-
tive study of every aspect of Goe's psychology of religion,
but only of his significant contributions.

B. RELATED STUDIES
5
To this date, no extensive study has been made of
George A. Coe's contribution to psychology of religion.
Critical evaluations of his psychology and reviews of his
writings have been made, but nothing comparable to the
study which we are undertaking, wor has the history of
psychology of religion been given extensive treatment.
Many books in psychology of religion contain a historical
account of developments in the field. Trout in his
Religious Behavior gives "A Historical Orientation,"
pointing out the general trends and outstanding contribu-
tions in psychology of religion from 1901 to 1930.^ Stolz
in The Psychology of Religious Living gives a rather
fragmentary survey of the first twelve years of the
American School of psychology of religion from Starbuck
4to Leuba. Other books on psychology of religion, such
as those by Ames, Pratt, Selbie, and Johnson, contain some
historical material, but only of a limited nature.^
3. David M. Trout, Religious behavior , {new York:
The Macmillan Company, 1931) , 397 -43T^
4. Karl R. Stolz, The Psychology of Religious
Living
. (Liashvllle: Cokesbury Press, 19377, 122-33.
5. Edward S. Ames, The Psychology of Religious
Experience
.
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1910); W. B.
Selbie, The Psychology of Religion
.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1924); J. B. Pratt, The Religious Consciousness . (iMew York:
The Macmillan Company, 1924); P. E. Johnson, Psychology of
Religion , (i^ew York: Ablngdon-Cokesbury Press, 1945)
.

In addition to the historical chapters and sections
in books on psychology of religion, there are many journal
articles v;hich deal in a limited way with the contributions
of various psychologists of religion. Schaub has made a
survey of the leading investigations up to 1926, and has
given the outstanding theories as to the psychological
sources of religion. An earlier article by Pratt gives
the historical development of the beginnings of the science
Recently, Seward Kiltner has written on the historical
development of psychology of religion showing the various
lines of interest which have been pursued.^ Although there
are many books on the history of psychology as such,
there are none which deal exclusively with the history of
psychology of religion. A recent book by Charles Kemp
deals in a very hasty and general way v/ith psychologists
of religion and pastoral psychologists from a historical
viewpoint,^ Although he gives a broad, sweeping view of
the developments in the field, there is no systematic
6. L. Schaub, "The Psychology of Religion in
America During the Past Quarter Century," Journal of
Religion , 6 (March, 1926), 113-33.
?• James B. Pratt, "The Psychology of Religion,"
Harvard Theological Review , 1 (October, 1908), 435-54.
8. Seward Hiltner, "The Psychological Understanding
of Keligion," Grozer Quarterly , 24 (January, 1947), 3-36.
9» Charles P. Kemp, Physic j.ans of the Soul .
(iMev/ York: The Macmillan Company, 1947) •

7treatment of any one psychologist of religion.
Since William James is probably the most popular
and widely read psychologist of religion, it is not surpris-
ing that more should have been written about him than of
any other investigator in this field. For the most part,
however, such writings deal not only with his contribution
to psychology of religion, but include his contribution to
other fields as well. Pew psychologists of religion, other
than James, have been the subject of any intensive and
systematic treatment.
In view of the early and extensive work which
George A. Coe did in psychology of religion, and in view
of the lack of systematic treatment of his prolific writings
in this field, there is need for such a study as v;e propose.
Since psychology of religion, as compared with other fields
of investigation, is still in its youth, it is understand-
able why so little of a historical nature has been written
about it, and why so few of its leading thinkers and
pioneers have been given intensive study. However, the
time is ripe for a critical evaluation to be made, particu-
larly of those early pioneers, such as Coe, who played such
an important role, and made such an outstanding contribu-
tion to the development of this field. This study is
intended to help meet this need for a critical evaluation
of the early contributors to the psychology of religion.

C. METHODS OF IrJVESTIGATION
8
Coe's major v/ork in psychology of religion did not
appear until 1916, However, he had begun writing in this
field as early as 1899 when he published an article entitled
"A Study in the Dynamics of Personal Religion. "^0 His
first book on the subject. The Spiritual Life
,
appeared in
1900 Since then, Coe has written ten other books and
over one hundred articles dealing v/ith psychology of
religion, religious education, and ethics. Although the
greater part of his writings do not deal with psychology of
religion, as such, they are still valuable as source material
for this study because of his application of psychological
methods and concepts to these other fields of investigation.
These original writings by Coe will be used as the primary
source material for our study. Special attention will be
given to his Psychology of Religion^^ which is the most
complete and systematic presentation of his viev;s. Dr. Coe
v/as kind enough to furnish the v/riter with a complete bibli-
ography of his published writings since 1926. An
10. Coe, "A Study in the Dynamics of Personal
Religion," The Psychological Review , 6 (September, 1899),
484-505.
11. Coe, The Spiritual Life . (j^ew York: Eaton and
Mains, 1900)
.
12. Coe, The Psychology of Religion
.
(Chicago;
The University of Chicago Press, 1916).

9adequate list of Goe's writings up to 1927 is found in
Religious Education for April, 1927 •"''^
In addition to Coe^s own writings it will be
necessary to examine the general literature in psychology
of religion, particularly the writings of his contempo-
raries, in order to discover his relation to other thinkers
in the field* Critical evaluations of Goe's thinking,
such as may be found in book reviews and articles, will be
of special interest, biographical and autobiographical
material, such as is available, will be studied and used.
In order to give a historical perspective it will be
necessary to examine the historical material in this field,
to which mention has already been made* Correspondence
with Dr« Coe himself will be an additional source for
insights into the understanding of his contribution to
psychology of religion.
All of Goe's writings will be given careful and
critical reading, especially those which deal directly with
psychology of religion. His writings in other fields will
be surveyed for new psychological insights, as well as for
the practical application of those already discovered. His
13. See Religious Education, 22 (April, 1927),
443-47. A selected list of Goe's writings up to 1937 is
found in Religion in Transition
, Edited by Vergilius Ferm,
(l^ew York: The kacmillan Company, 1937), 122-25.
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writings will be examined in chronological order so as to
discover the growth and development of his thinking and
the changes which take place in his thought-life.
An important part of this study will be the sifting
of Coe's concepts in order to discover those which are
fundamental to his thinking and form the basis of his
psychology of religion* As we compare his writings with
those of other 'psychologists of religion, we v/ill be able
to distinguish those ideas v/hich are unique and which make
an original contribution. V/e will also uncover the roots
of his psychology and the varying influences which his
predecessors in this field had upon him. As we examine
the writings of psychologists of religion which follow
him, we will discover the nature and extent of his influ-
ence •
Invariably the problem arises in a study of this
kind as to what criteria we shall use as a basis for
evaluation. Contemporary schools of psychology lack common
agreement, and there is also diversity of opinion and
interpretation in matters of religious experience. This
creates a problem in how we are to treat the data. Rather
than attempting to evaluate every aspect of Goe^s psychology
of religion in terms of agreement or disagreement with other
writers, attention will be focused upon his methods and
general conclusions and the extent to which they make a
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significant contribution to the field.
It will become apparent as v/e study the writings of
Goe, that his contribution consists not merely in the
conclusions that emerge from his psychological investigations,
but also his methodology in the application of scientific
tools of research to the study of religious phenomena.
For this reason we will be interested, not only in his
ideas and concepts, but in his methods and procedures as
well.
D. ORGAl^IZATIOlj OF MTERIAL
Attempt has been made to organize the material
presented in this study into a logical order. The arrange-
ment is based primarily upon chronological sequence in the
development of Coe's various interests, as well as upon the
progressive development in the field of psychology of
religion itself.
In order to set the stage for the appearance of Coe
and the role he plays in the new movement of psychology of
religion, we must examine the work done in this field prior
to Coe. V/e must consider such questions as! What is
psychology of religion? What are its tools and methods?
Who were the first psychologists of religion and Coe's
predecessors? To what stage had psychology of religion
developed when Coe began his first studies? These questions
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we will consider in the next chapter in order to lay the
background for a consideration of Coe's first studies in
psychology of religion. Chapter three will be a treat-
ment of Coe's early life and education and those influences
which led him to an interest in this field, as v/ell as a
consideration of his first published writings including The
Spiritual Life . In chapter four we will consider the
functional approach in psychology of religion and how Coe
is intellectually related to other functional psychologists,
such as James, Dewey, and Angell. V/e will also explore his
relation to other functional psychologists of religion. In
chapter five we will give a systematic presentation of Coe's
major work in psychology of religion. The application of
Coe's psychology of religion to religious education and
social ethics v/ill be the subject of chapters six and
seven. In chapter eight we will consider the validity of
Coe's conclusions and the influence of his thinking upon
later psychologists of religion. The final chapter will be
devoted to a summary of the material and a statement of the
conclusions reached in this study.

CHAPTER II
PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGIOi^ BEFORE 1900
If we are fully to appreciate Goe's contribution
to psychology of religion, we must view his work in relation
to other contributions to this field which both preceded and
followed his studies. The historical perspective will en-
able us to see more clearly the significance of his work,
and the extent to which he built upon the foundations laid
down by the earlier investigators.
Although Coe is rightly called a "pioneer" in the
field of psychology of religion,*^ he was by no means the
first to use critical and empirical methods in the study of
religion, or to approach religion from the psychological
point of view. He stands in a long line of thinkers who
have enhanced our understanding of religion through the
use of scientific methods of investigation. To be sure,
psychology of religion, as a distinct and clearly defined
science, was still in its infancy at the time Coe undertook
his first studies in the field, yet its roots reach far
into the past. Y/ithout an adequate understanding of this
historical development, we cannot fully appreciate the
forces which helped to shape Coe's thinking, and which gave
1. Hiltner, "'The Psychological Understanding of
Religion," 9.
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impetus to the movement during the closing years of the
nineteenth century.
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter will be to
give a historical survey of psychology of religion up to
the time of Coe's first work in the field, giving partic-
ular attention to its rapid growth at the turn of the
century, however, before beginning this historical survey,
we should define what we mean by "psychology of religion"
so as to limit the field of our study. I'his can best be
done by distinguishing the psychological approach to
religion from other approaches in terms of methodology.
A. METHODS OP STUDYIJMG RELIGIOiM
For the sake of clarity in distinguishing the method
of psychology of religion from that of other studies of
religion, we will classify the various approaches under
the headings of spe culative methods and scientific methods.
Objection might be raised to this classification on the
grounds that no method is either purely speculative or
purely scientific. It is true that any attempt to pigeon-
hole the various methods of studying religion into exclu-
sive categories would, to a certain extent, be unjust.
Invariably a certain amount of overlapping is bound to
exist, nevertheless, bearing in mind this fact, such a
distinction will be useful in pointing out the unique
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character of the psychological approach to religion.
1. Speculative Methods
^i'heology « It would be impossible to speak
of the method of theology in the study of religion without
first recognizing that there are different types of theology
•
Brightman distinguishes between natural theology and
revealed theology. natural theology is based largely on
reason and experience, without recourse to the authority
of any special revelation. Revealed theology, which is
also called dogmatic theology, relies on divine revelation
as its ultimate authority. Macintosh divides theological
methods into two main types, conservative and radical.
The former is dependent upon external authority; the
latter, upon empirical data. V/hereas revealed theology is
limited in its speculation to a predetermined authorita-
tive statement of truth, natural theology is free to
speculate upon the whole of empirical fact regarding reli-
gious experience.
Macintosh is of the opinion that the trend in
theology is toward a greater recognition of scientific
2. Edgar S. Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion .
(Wew York: Prentice -Kail, Inc., 1940), 25.
5. Douglas C. Macintosh, Theology as an .hinpirical
Science . (i^ew York: The kacmillan Company, 19T9 ) , 7
.
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facts. He states that "from a comparatively early period,
theology has sought to become scientific."^ The attempt
at systematic theology was evidence of this trend. He
finds that in the early stage of history of the greater
religions, and of Christianity in particular, theologians
have been more or less scientific expositors and systema-
tizers of a body of traditional lore. Some sought to
correct theological error through further examination of
the traditional basis, together with a more rigidly logical
attempt at deduction therefrom, naturally, these honest
investigators became the enemies of authoritative religion,
and the Church still clung to the old traditionalistic
dogmatism. However, dogmatic theology based on authori-
tative tradition, could not forever withstand the tide of
scientific investigation. Sooner or later it had to face
the challenge of honest inquiry. The clash came, as
Horton points out, with the advent of the Darwin theory
of evolution which shook the corner stone of traditional
theology, and later with "higher criticism" which focused
the attention of the theologian upon the search for un-
biased truth, wherever it may lead him. Since that time
4. Ibid., 5.
5. Walter M. Horton, A Psychological Approach to
Theology
. (i\iew York: Harper and Brothers, 1951), 10.
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there has "been a gradual transition on the part of theology
from authoritative theories to authoritative fact, and an
attempt to assimilate theology to modern science.
Today, many theologians have come to regard theology
as a science. For example, Singmaster states:
Theology is a science, and must conform to
scientific cannons. It is as truly a science as
astronomy, because It recognizes and organizes
facts. ... It is unfair to contrast the theology
of a dark age with the science of an enlightened
period .°
Richardson defines theology as "the investigation
at the level of empirical science of the facts involved
in the existence of the believing, worshipping and
witnessing Christian community." However, he makes
room for "Christian revelation in history" within the
sphere of scientific theology. Ee says:
Theology as a science stands or falls with the
category of revelation; if there is no distinc-
tively Christian revelation in history, the special
categories of theology will not be needed, and in
the place of theology the scientific study of
religion could be more competently undertaken by
the psychologist, the sociologists and anthropol-
ogists .
Richardson holds that the historic conception of
6. J. A. Singmaster, A Handbook of Christian Theology .
(Philadelphia: The United Lutheran Publication House, 1927),
24.
7. Alan Richardson, Christian Apologetics . (wew
York: Harper and Brothers, 1947 ) , 55.
8. Ibid., 57.
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a given revelation is one of theology's special categories,
which, to surrender, would make theology merely a branch
of psychology of religion. It is interesting, therefore,
that the status of an empirical science should be claimed
for theology, even by those who hold to a theory of divine
revelation*
Leuba, on the other hand, maintains that scientific
theology is really a branch of psychology, since it is
grounded on "inner experience" which is only accessible
by use of psychological methods* He states:
Contemporary Protestant Christianity grounds its
beliefs solely upon so-called 'inner experience,'
which, it is claimed leads directly or through
'faith' to a knov/ledge of God. . • . But to say
that religion is based solely upon 'inner,'
'immediate' experience, really means that theology
is a branch of psychological science.^
The foregoing discussion is sufficient to indicate
that in many theological quarters an attempt is being made
to establish theology firmly on the ground of empirical
fact. There is a growing change in the attitude of many
tov/ard questions of Intellectual authority and the use of
critical methods m studying scriptures. However, in
spite of these changes and attempts at a scientific theology,
the method of traditional theology is distinctly different
from that of psychology of religion and the other sciences
9. James H. Leuba, A Psychological Study of Religion .
(i\iew York: The Macmillan Company, 1912) , 275-76.
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of religion. Theology seeks to support, v/hether by appeal
to authority or to the facts of experience, the claims of
a particular belief or system of beliefs, whereas science
of religion limits Itself solely to what exists in human
experience without attempting to support the claims for
any one system of belief.
The traditional, conservative type of theology is
dependent upon external authority. It begins with the
teachings of its recognized authority, v/hether it be the
Church, the Bible, or some individual teacher. Its aim
is to preserve as fully as possible the whole of the
doctrinal content received. Because of its presuppositions
and dependence upon authority, this type of theology is
clearly distinguished from psychology of religion and the
other sciences of religion, as well as from the new
"scientific" theology. The method of dogmatic theology is
to control the facts of religious experience by its theory
of divine grace, whereas the new theology employs the
facts of experience as data from v/hich to infer a theory
of divine grace. The former proceeds from theory toward
life; the latter, from life toward theory. According
to Goe, this new thought strengthens authority in reli-
gion rather than destroying it, because it transfers it
from the highly disputable grounds of mere intellect to
the more inexorable demands of the moral and spiritual
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nature. 1°
(b) Philosophy of Religion * One of the oldest
ways of studying religion is that of philosophy of religion
which dates back to the very beginning of human thought.
Its approach is different from that of theology in that
theology starts with some particular faith and then pro-
cedes to expound that faith, while philosophy of religion
deals with all types of religion and religious belief with-
out seeking to elevate the position of any particular one.
It is primarily interested in discovering religious truths
through the interpretation of material supplied by the
history, psychology, and sociology of religion*
Philosophy of religion is dependent upon the sciences
of religion for its data* Science gives the facts upon
which a philosophy of religion is based. For this reason,
the v/ork of the philosopher is inseparably bound with that
of the psychologist, historian, and sociologist. J-liey
gather the facts with which the philosopher deals.
However, philosophy cannot be content with the mere
collection and organization of facts. Its unique function
is to seek ultimate explanations, interpreting the analysis
and conclusions of science from a higher and more
10. Goe, "Methods of Studying Religion," Methodist
Review, 17 (July, 1901), 532-47, 538.
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comprehensive point of view. For this reason. Galloway
calls philosophy the "universal science," because it
seeks to organize and elevate all experience in the light
of final principles, completing the work of the special
sciences and connecting them in an organic whole ••^^
The distinction, therefore, between philosophy
of religion and psychology of religion is not so much one
of method, but of standpoint, both science and philosophy
seek connecting and unifying principles in the treatment
of facts. However, the standpoint of the scientist is
restricted in that his work requires that he neglect a
great deal because it is not relevant to his purpose.
Philosophy, on the other hand, seeks ultimate explanations
which transcend the limited sphere of the special sciences.
Because it is dealing in the sphere of ultimate reality,
its standpoint is necessarily broader and more comprehen-
sive than that of science. Galloway emphasizes this point
when he states:
The problem of a Philosophy of Religion is
complicated and difficult. ViThen we rise to the
height of the issues which are involved, we find
ourselves embarking on an arduous speculative
enterprise; for we are setting ourselves to answer
the hard metaphysical questions of the ultimate
nature of reality. A religious philosophy which
11. George Galloway, Ths Philosophy of Religion ,
(wew York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1914), 25.
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Is dumb on this matter has left its work un-
finished,^^
brightman defines philosophy of religion as
"an attempt to discover by rational interpretation of
religion and its relations to other types of experience,
the truth of religious beliefs and the value of religious
attitudes and practices • "1^ Although it makes use of the
data of science, it goes beyond science to interpret the
whole of experience, of which science is but a part. The
methods employed Dy philosophy of religion are those
common to philosophy in general. Brightman clarifies
the difference between philosophy and science in the
following way:
Jjjvery science deals with a specific, delimited
field—some part or aspect of experience—or
raises a specific problem, such as the measure-
ment of motion. Philosophy, however, aims to
understand experience as a whole, and to correlate
all problems •-'^
In spite of the advances which have been made by
the sciences of religion, and their great contribution to
a better understanding of religion, theology and philos-
ophy will always hold an important place in the study of
religion. Because of their broad perspective they serve
12. Ibid., 39.
13. Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion , 22.
14. Ibid., 20.
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to complete the picture by relating the contributions of
these special studies to an organic whole* natural
theology and empirical philosophy are firmly grounded on
the data supplied by the sciences of religion* Although
both may make use of critical and empirical methods in the
selection and organization of their data, their search for
the underlying meaning and truth of religion leads to the
use of speculative methods which a purely scientific
inquiry seeks to avoid*
2« Scientific Methods
Whereas the philosophy of religion is broad in
its scope, the science of religion has been delimited in
a much more restricted field* It is independent of the
typical views of the universe, and also apart from the
presuppositions of theology* The general sciences of
religion includes history of religion, sociology of
religion, and psychology of religion* In general, all
three are descriptive and seek to understand the nature of
all religions, rather than any particular faith or creed*
The basis of all science of religion rests upon
the claim that religious consciousness, no matter how
unique, by the very fact of its existence' as data of
knowledge, is susceptible to scientific treatment. If
this is denied, then a science of religion becomes
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impossible. King makes this clear when he states:
If the content of the religious consciousness
is subject to a different organization from that
of other knov/n psychic states, and if, above all,
it is not susceptible of a complete statement
within itself, but requires the interpolation of
some 'spiritual' elements to fill it out, it
would be clearly vain to seek for more than dis-
connected statements of various isolated or
partially related elements, elements which could
be completely stated only through the speculations
of theologian and philosopher.^^
One of the chief proponents of a scientific study
of religion, Henry i\i . V/ieman, in the preface to his book.
Religious Experience and the Scientific Method, states the
case for science of religion. He says:
The chief purpose of this book is to show that
religious experience is experience of an object,
however undefined, which is as truly external to
the Individual as is any tree or stone he may
experience. ... I am very sure that religion
must plant itself firmly on the data of sense
else it will become the plaything of the senti-
mentalist and nothing more.^^
It has been only in relatively recent times that man
has endeavored to view religion objectively and make use
of scientific methods in the study of religion. Brightman
suggests two reasons for this rather surprising fact.
15. Irving King, The Development of Religion ,
(wew York: The Macmillan Company, 1910) , 9.
16. Henry IM. V/ieman, Religious Experience and the
Scientific Method. (wew York: The Macmillan Company,
1912) , 5.
17. Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion, 53.
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One is the lack of development of the historical sense;
the other, the warfare between science and theology.
During the middle ages, the theological point of view
was elevated to such a position of importance, that any
attempt at a scientific approach to religion was complete-
ly submerged. The temper of the age lacked the fundamen-
tal requisite for a science of religion, namely, an
objective, empirical point of view, without reference
to one's personal belief or an authoritative dogma.
Reference has already been made to tv/o events which
helped to pave the way for a scientific study of religion
—
the Darwinian theory of evolution, and the advent of high-
er criticism. In our treatment of the history of psychology
of religion a more detailed account will be given of the
development of the scientific attitude.
(a) History of Religion
.
History of religion seeks
to understand the nature of religion in general by examin-
ing the origins and development of actually existing or
extinct religions. It goes beyond mere events and aims at
a broad perspective of man's religious development as a
whole. It demands the study of the v/hole historical
growth of religion with the idea of discovering the sum
total of the characteristics common to all religion and
thereby help us to understand the true nature of religion.
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In this ambitious task, the historical study of
religion makes use of data supplied by the other sciences
of religion. It goes to archaeology and anthropology for
ancient documents and records, and for a better understand-
ing of the beginnings of human social interests, customs,
morality, and art. It goes to psychology of religion for
an understanding of the inner religious life, as well as
for the causes for the growth of religion and the secret
of its influence. In this respect, all science is more or
less dependent upon one another and makes use of the other's
data and conclusions.
Since the time when Iviax Mililler edited The Sacred
Books of the East (1876)
,
history of religion as a
scientific study has compiled a wealth of valuable mater-
ial on the growth and development of religion. Among the
outstanding contributions to this field is Sir James G.
Prazer's extensive study of primitive religions. The
Golden Bough (1922); George Foot Moore's two volume work
entitled History of Religions (1915); and G. H. Toy's
Introduction to the History of Religions (1915) . Because
of these and many other extensive works in the field,
history of religion is recognised today as an important
branch of scientific study in religion.
The methods employed by history of religion are
scientific and are the same as for historical research in
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general* It aims to give a sincere and unprejudiced con-
sideration of the entire history of religion through a
study of the objective facts of religion. From the
philosophical point of viev/, the historical method has
certain limitations. History at its best is a record of
events and, while supplying data, contains no principles
of judgment. Furthermore, it is apt to overlook the
universal character of religion and devote itself exclu-
sively to historical detail However, these are limita-
tions only from the philosophical point of view and,
while history of religion as a scientific study must
operate within a circumscribed field of concrete historical
facts, it nevertheless is a necessary discipline for under-
standing religion, and one that supplies basic data for
the philosopher of religion. Moreover, it would be unjust
to limit history of religion to mere isolated facts and
details. \Vhat the history of religion seeks, says Menzies,
is "a knowledge of the religions of the world, not as
isolated systems • • • but as connected with each other
and as forming parts of one Virhole."-^^ It attempts to
18. Archibald A. Bowman, Studies in the Philosophy
of Religion
.
(London: Macm.illan and Company, 1938), 83.
19. Allan kenzies. History of Religion
.
(iMev/ York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1912) ,3.
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understand the "religions of the world" as manifestations
of the "religion of the world." To complete his tasl^ the
historian of religion must do more than merely collect
facts. He must relate the individual facts to the whole,
interpreting his data in such a way as to give as fully
complete a picture as is possible of the religious develop-
ment of the race.
(h) Sociology of Religion . Sociology of religion
seeks to study the interrelationship of religion and
society, and to explore the interaction which takes place
between them. In so doing it supplements the work done in
psychology and history of religion, as well as in theology
and philosophy. Like the other sciences of religion, its
purpose is mainly descriptive. Although it makes use of
theoretical categories in the organization of its material,
it nevertheless uses empirical methods to collect concrete
data on the social manifestations of religion. Through
the examination of the manifold interrelations between
religion and social phenom^ena, sociology of religion seeks,
according to Wach, to:
• • • illustrate the central significance of
religion • • . also to gain new insight into the
relations betv/een the various forms of expression
of religious experience and eventually to understand
better the various aspects of religious experience
Itself ."20
20. Joachim Wach, Sociology of Religion
.
(Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 19¥?) , 5.
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Sociology of religion concerns itself largely with
the practical expression of religion in cultus and forms
of worship, although not completely neglecting such
theoretical forms as myth, doctrine, or dogma. More recent-
ly it has turned its attention to such matters as religious
grouping, religious fellowship and association, the individ-
21
ual, typological, and comparative study. In this the
sociologist of religion must work in close cooperation with
the psychologist of religion. Psychology interprets the
meaning behind these social expressions of religion, while
sociology collects much of the data with v/hich psychology
deals
•
At first, sociology of religion was regarded as a
special "branch of anthropology, but in more recent times
it has come into its own as one of the sciences of religion.
However, it makes extensive use of the material supplied by
anthropology, especially regarding primitive religions and
the development of the totemic system. The first modern
work in sociology of religion was Emile Durkheim's book.
The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1912, English
tr. 1915). He draws heavily upon the results of anthro-
pological investigations in pointing out the social origin
and function of religious beliefs. Such thinkers, who
21. Ibid., 2.
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adopt antiquity as their guiding principle, must, of
necessity, rely upon anthropology for much of their data.
Auguste Comte (1798-1857), the founder of sociology,
had a great interest in religion and sought to interpret
it from a sociological point of view. For this reason, he
may also be regarded as the founder of sociology of religion.
However, the first really systematic sociology of religion
was the work of Max Weber (1864-1920) whose book. The
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1920, English
tr. 1930) , is considered to be one of the greatest contri-
butions to the field. It is an attempt to show the relation
of economics to religion. Although Weber did extensive
pioneering in this field, he left much to be done, for he
neglected to deal with primitive religions as well as
Mohammedanism and other important faiths. The extensive
studies of Ernest 'i'roeltsch (1865-1923), complemented, in
many respects, Weber's work. However, 'I'roeltsch limited
himself exclusively to Christianity and permitted his
personal bias to Interfere v/ith making an objective study.
Although the approach of sociology of religion,
like that of history and psychology, must be based on an
impartial and objective treatment of facts, without
personal bias, stil^ as ViTach points out, certain principles
must be observed. There must be an appreciation of the vast
breadth and variety of religious experience, and also an
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understanding of religious phenomena. Vifhat V/ach maintains
is that "the inquirer must feel an affinity to his subject,
and he must be trained to interpret his material with
sympathetic understanding."
(c) Psychology of Religion * Thus far v/e have
discussed various approaches to religion, all of v/hich have
an important place in the general study of religious life.
Theology, philosophy of religion, history of religion, and
sociology of religion, have, to a certain extent, dealt with
the nature of religious experience, and have produced
valuable psychological insights. Since psychology, as a
distinct branch of scientific research, is of relatively
recent origin, the earliest investigations of a psychological
nature were conducted by philosophers and theologians.
However, none of these other disciplines succeeded in
producing a psychology of religion as we understand the
term "psychology" today. Psychology of religion, according
to Goe, implies "critical systematic methods for ascertain-
ing data and for placing them within the general perspective
of mental life."
The methods of psychology of religion are no
22. Ibid., 10.
23 • Goe, The Psychology of Religion , 5.
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different than those of psychology in general, namely,
careful observation and interpretation of the facts in its
field • Special devices, such as the questionnaire, have
been extensively used in securing its data. It has also
gone to biographical and autobiographical writings as
valuable sources for understanding religious experience
•
Psychometric techniques, such as tests and rating scales
have come into use by psychologists of religion. Archaeo-
logical and anthropological research has produced a wealth
of data on primitive rites and customs which are of help
to the psychologist of religion. However, once the facts
have been collected, the psychologist v/ill proceed as do
other scientists with their data. Pratt describes this
process in the follov/ing statement:
He will group his facts and note general relations
between them, thus seeking a systematic and general
description of the various facts in the religious
consciousness. Vifhenever possible, he will 'explain'
these facts by subsuming them under the lav/s of
general psychology. That is to say, he will proceed
on the assumption that, for the purposes of science,
religious facts are not different in kind from other
psychic facts* Thus he will seek to build up a
scientific view of the religious life, interpret-
ing and explaining it by itself and by the known
facts and laws of the human raind.'^^
The methods used in the earliest investigations in
psychology of religion were, for the most part, crude and
24. James B. Pratt, The Religious Gonscicu sness .
(Nev/ York: The Macmillan Company, 1920) , 35.
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uncritical. However, the methodological faults of these
first studies were promply recognized and attempts made
to use a more scientific approach. As we will see in
later chapters, Coe played an important part in "bringing
about the use of more critical methods in psychology of
religion.^^
The work of George A. Coe lies in the tradition
of all who have approached religion from the scientific
point of viev/. Shortly before 1900, Coe became convinced
that "a new intellectual attitude" was necessary with
respect to the facts of the spiritual life. In his preface
to The Spiritual Life he states:
The religious processes taking place around us
and within us must be observed with all the pre-
cision that modern psychological methods and tools
render possible. For, whatever else religion may
or may not be, it is at least a mass of ascertain-
able states of consciousness; and in the absence
of information to the contrary we must presume that
such states can be analyzed and described, and that
their relations to one another and to the recognized
laws of the mental and bodily life can be to some
extent determined. What is needed is an examination
of the facts as such, without reference to their
possible bearing upon theology and philosophy.
Before concluding this section, we should give at
least brief consideration to the objections which might be
25. For Coe's discussion of method in psychology of
religion see 'I'he Psychology of Religion , 43-58.
2b. Coe, The Spiritual Life, 5.

raised regarding the value of a scientific study of
religion. Mie question might be asked whether psychology,
or any science, is able to penetrate the heart of religion*
Can one understand religion who does not feel it himself,
and can these feelings be put into words? Can religious
experience be understood by ordinary methods of research,
or are they sui generis
,
extra-natural, and Incapable of
analysis?
In the first chapter of The Psychology of Religion
,
Coe considers this question. He concludes that one does
not necessarily need to "enjoy religion" in order to
knov/ something about it. Even a deaf person, he states,
might find out important things about a symphony concert
through observation, and by reading what others write.
He holds that "there is a mechanism of religion as well as
of music. "^''' However, he goes on to state that "to under-
stand either music or religion one must have appreciation,
feeling, and some actual entering into an experience as
distinguished from merely looking on."^^ Whether or not
feelings can be conveyed in words depends upon the nature
of religious experience. If religious experience is a
common phenomena, there can be communication between
27. Coe, The Psychology of Religion
, 8.
28. Ibid., 8.
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persons who share such an experience. But even if this be
not the case, a psychology of religion in the first sense
would still be possible*
Regarding the view that religious experience by its
very nature is outside the scope of psychology, Coe holds
that such a view is based on an authoritative theory of
the supernatural, such as is used by the Catholic Church
to determine what is psychological and v/hat is divine in
the experiences of saints and miracle-workers* It may also
stem from "a theory of intuition as a source of knowledge
in matters of fact—that is, in matters susceptible of
regulated observation--and a habit of assuming that what is
extraordinarily valuable or satisfying has laws of its own,
different from those of nature at large."^^ Coe believes
that such claims are contrary to the very basis of scien-
tific research. However, he is ready to recognize that
there is "something more" to religious experience than the
sum of the part processes to which the psychologist gives
his attention. But this "something more" is not merely
another event in a series, but rather it is "the individ-
30
ual wholeness of self-realization."
29. Ibid., 9.
30. Ibid., 13.
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B, PRESCIEKTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY OP RELIGIOiM
Among the modern sciences, psychology must be
regarded as a new comer, since it was not until the second
half of the nineteenth century that a truly scientific
psychology began to emerge. However, from early times
human beings have been interested in themselves, and have
sought to describe the workings of the mind and to explore
the nature of experience. For the most part, these early
attempts at psychology were of a very primitive and un-
systematic kind, and were often confused by theological,
metaphysical, ethical, epistemological , and even biological
considerations. The old psychology v/as pursued as an adjunct
of philosophy and lacked the methodology and systematic
procedure which characterizes modern science, nevertheless,
the roots of modern psychology are well anchored in antiquity.
Primitive man was deeply interested in the nature
and essence of the soul. He was convinced that not only
humans had souls, but animals, plants, mountains, and stars
as well. Because of this belief in animism they pursued
all other sciences, such as medicine and astronomy, as part
of psychology. The early medicine men and shamans applied
their psychology in the attempt to control reality by
mental means.
Although saturated with mythology, the ancient
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Hindus had a psychology which they used to explore religious
experience. In the Vedanta doctrine we find that the indi-
vidual soul (Atman) is identical with the v/orld soul
(Brahman) , hence they regarded individuality as only an
illusion. This gave rise to a primitive concept of super-
consciousness. In the Sankhya doctrine the "soul" refers
to the Individuality of the particular man. Thus in the
Hindu thought we already find subtle psychological
distinctions .^1
The Greeks were also interested in discussions on
the human soul, and much of their thought influenced
V/estern psychology. Early Greek scholars tried to reduce
the universe to its elements and attempted to trace the
essence of the soul back to material substance, such as
air, fire, water, and earth. Other soul theories also
arose among the Greeks , all of which embraced the field of
psychology ."52 Aristotle viewed the soul as metaphysical
in origin and the creative form of all organisms. Plato
regarded the soul, not only as a principle of earthly life.
51. Richard MtitllerjPreienfels , The Evolution of
Modern Psychology . W. Beran Wolfe, translator, from the
German, Die Hauptrichtungen der Gegenw^rtigen Psychologie .
(1929) . Twev/ Haven: Yale University Press, 1935) , 10.
32. For the relation of Greek thought to modern
psychology see Edna Heidbreder, Seven Psychologies .
(i^ew York: D. Appleton-Gentury Company, 1933) , 21-34.
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but as arising from a divine pre -existence and as Immortal
after death*
In the views of the Stoics and Epicureans we find
a psychology which is primarily concerned with an ethical
way of life. Their vlevrs are interesting to psychology
largely because of the contrasting attitudes they took on
what might be considered a practical application of psy-
chology, 'ihe Stoics stood for suppression; subduing desire
to reason in the interest of virtue. The Epicureans
believed in the expression of natural impulses in order to
achieve happiness and tranquillity. V/e still find these
attitudes reflected today in modern theories about the
control of human nature
.
Among the early Christian thinkers we find the
development of many psychological insights into the nature
of the soul. Since Christian teaching was aimed at the
salvation of the soul, it is easy to understand why they
should seek the deepest possible knowledge of the soul.
In the i'jew Testament we have a record of how the teachings
of Jesus effected the emotional, intellectual, and moral
lives of people. It offers data which is psychologically
significant in trying to obtain a fuller view of the nature
of human personality. Fletcher emphasizes this transform-
ing character of the Christian message and its psychological
significance. He states:
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New psychic experiences, a new type of char-
acter, new moral and social activities emerged.
By its historical records or hy its casual refer-
ences to these facts the Wew Testament affords us
psychological material of the highest value in
understanding human personality and of the ways it
may he modified or developed under fresh conditions
of religious life.
In the writings of Saint Paul we find emphasis on
the sacredness of the human soul and how spiritual influ-
ences enter human personality. His letters are filled
with accounts of his inner struggles and his experience of
a changed life. Augustine's Confessions present an auto-
biographical account of his soul restlessness and his
search for inner peace of mind.^^ Through introspective
analysis he describes his inner states and conflicts, giving
an abundance of useful psychological data. Other writers
in the course of Christian history have given us fragments
of psychological insight as are found in the early discus-
sions on the natural man, creationism and traducianism,
dichotomy and trichotomy, inspiration, regeneration, free
will, the person of Christ, etc.
For the most part, these early attempts to psychol-
ogize various phases of religion made little use of
33. M. Scott Fletcher, The Psychology of the i^ew
Testament . (i\jew York; Hodder and Stoughton, 1912), 10.
34. Augustine, The Confessions of Saint Augustine »
E. B. Pusey, translator (London: J. k. Dent and Sons, Ltd.,
1907, 193b)
.
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critical and empirical methods of investigation. They
usually began, not with questions but v/ith accepted truth
based on authority* Their appeal was not so much to factual
evidence, as to logical validity. However, here and there
among the many scholastic discussions on the nature and
attributes of the soul, we discover insights based on
careful observation and introspective analysis*
Jonathan Edv/ards (1703-58) , the fiery l\lew iiingland
preacher of the early 18th century, gave strong emphasis
to the emotional nature of conversion* He regarded religion
as a matter of the emotion rather than the intellect, and he
became skillful in arousing the necessary emotional state*
In reading his sermons, one is impressed with the psychol-
ogical nature of his appeal *^^ In his small volume, A
'Treatise Concerning the Religious Affections , he gives an
able defense of the methods he employs in revivals •'^S
Davenport in his study of religious revivals shows how
Edwards was able to obtain almost phenomenal control over
his hearers by his skillful appeal to various emotions *'^'^
35* Jonathan Edwards, The Works of President Edwards
»
4 vols*, (wew York: Robert Carter and Brothers, 1864)
*
36. Jonathan Edwards, A Treatise Concerning the
Religious Affections . (Philadelphia: Cressy, 192l) •
37. F. M. Davenport, Primitive Traits in Religious
Revivals. (iNiew York: The Macmlllan Company, T505) .
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In contrast to the scholastic approach of the Middle Ages,
Edwards represents the beginnings of a highly psychological
approach to religion based on a deeper understanding of
religious experience and human emotions.
In Europe, Priedrich Schlelermacher (1768-1834) did
much to overcome the intellectualistic approach to theology
by regarding religion as a matter of feeling. For him,
religion was "a feeling of absolute dependence," True
religion was not so much a matter of belief in som.e author-
itative scriptures, as an immediate experience on the part
of the individual. Schlelermacher writes:
He does not have religion who believes in a
Holy Scripture, but rather he who needs no
Scripture and who could make one himself.*^
The early attempts to psychologize on religion,
although uncritical and unsystematic, helped to pave the
way for a scientific psychology of religion by emphasizing
the importance of the affective life of man. Coe has
given the term "quasi -psychology of religion" to those
attempts "to conceive of religion, or parts of it, in terms
of mental structure or process, but without a method
sufficiently critical to correct erroneous statements of
fact or of law. "39 However, uncritical as these early
38. Priedrich Schlelermacher, Reden iHber die Religion .
(Berlin: Johann Priedrich Unger, 1799) , 122.
39. Coe, The Psychology of Religion , 2.
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attempts may have been, they are important in that they
broke the ground for the establishment of a truly scien-
tific psychology of religion which emerged during the
latter part of the nineteenth century.
C. THE BEGIWWIWGS OP A SGIEWTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION
1. The Work of V/Undt
By the middle of the nineteenth century, psychology
v/as beginning to emerge as a separate and distinct branch
of science* It had come to look upon its subject-matter
as a part of the world of nature and to seek to explain
it in naturalistic terms. It was also beginning to observe
material as well as reflect upon it. More and more it was
using empirical methods and making great advances toward
becoming a science.
The outstanding event in the development of
scientific psychology was the founding of the first psychol-
ogical laboratory by Wilhelm V/undt (1832-1920) in Leipzig
in 1875. Of that event, Keidbreder v/rites:
Its formal establishment at a great German univer-
sity was the outv;ard and visible sign that psychology
had become definitely experimental and that it had
become an independent science, existing in its own
right. ^0
The same year in which V/undt opened his laboratory
40. Heidbreder, Seven Psychologies , 72.
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at Leipzig, V/illiam James opened one at Harvard. However,
Heldbreder claims that James's laboratory had nothing of
the historical importance of YAindt's because James himself
v/as not greatly interested in it. It was not until the
laboratory at Harvard came under the direction of
Mtlnsterberg, a student of Yifundt, that experimental psychol-
41
ogy at Harvard made any real progress.
Years before Wundt established his laboratory at
Leipzig, Ernst Heinrich Weber (1795-1878) conducted exper-
iments on the sense of touch and formulated Weber's Lav/,
a discovery that became the starting point for a series
of psychological experiments. A few years later, Gustav
I'heodor Pechner (1801-1887) explored the relation between
the physical and the psychical. He worked out methods of
investigation which helped to m.ake possible a scientific
psychology and wrote The Elements of Psychophysics (1860),
a book sometimes regarded as making the first definite
contribution to the science of psychology. Hermann von
Helmholtz (1821-1894) also made an important contribution
to the founding of the new science by his work in physi-
ological psychology. Wundt became personally associated
v/ith Helmholtz and Pechner at Heidelberg and v;as strongly
influenced by their thinking. To him lay the task of
41. Ibid., 71
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organizing and integrating early contributions into a
systematic whole. His laboratory at Leipzig became the
Mecca of students seeking to study this "new psychology,"
The psychology developed at Leipzig v/as an attempt to
study mental processes by the experimental and quantita-
tive methods common to all science.
Uot only is Y/undt's work important from the point
of view of general psychology and the establishment of
scientific methods in psychology, but he also made a
significant contribution to psychology of religion. His
exhaustive study of folk psychology produced a wealth of
new material and insights in the nature of primitive
42
religion. In his Elements of Folk Psychology he attempts
to point out what beliefs and practices actually prevailed
at various stages of human experience and also attempts a
psychological explanation of them. As a psychologist, he
treats religious experience as a mental phenomena which
requires, not evaluation, but observation, analysis, and
reduction to mental laws. In so doing he rendered valuable
service to the science of religion, as well as stimulating
a keen empirical interest on the part of philosophy.
42. Wilhelm \?undt. Elements of Folk Psychology .
Edv/ard L. Schaub, translator, from the German, Elemen'te
der Vdlkerpsychologle (1900) . (x^ew York: The Macmillan
Company, 1916)
•

45
Psychology of religion is indebted to V/undt for helping
to develop a method of psychological research with which
to deal v/ith historical material, such as early mythol-
ogical and religious ideas. Goe regards Y/undt as having
made a great contribution to the psychology of early
mythological and religious ideas. Hov/ever, Goe takes
issue with Wundt's position that man's first-developed
functions are more explanatory than his later ones, and
that the group mind can be a source of religion in a
sense in which the individual mind cannot. Goe states:
• • • v/hile Vi\indt adopts a functional point of
view for the first crude impulses that express
themselves in mythology, and there arrests his use
of functional method, there is need that the
method should be applied through the entire
evolution of religion, and to the experiences of
individuals as well as to the thought forms of
early groups. 43
As v;ill be pointed out in chapter four, Goe attempts
to apply the functional point of view to the individual
mind in much the same manner as Wundt has approached the
early religious group.
2. The Work of G. Stanley Hall
In Europe, psychology of religion developed large-
ly through the study of primitive religion and its origin.
43, Goe, The Psychology of Religion
, 58.
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while m America interest centered more around such matters
as revivalism, mysticism, and adolescent conversion exper-
iences. During the latter part of the nineteenth century,
America was a frontier of unusual religious movements
offering opportunity for first hand psychological studies,
not so readily available in countries with more rigid
ecclesiastical norms. It is little wonder that psychology
of religion should find its fullest development in America
where religious phenomena was subjected to first hand
observation and analysis of a most thorough-going nature
It is G. Stanley Plall (1844-1924) who is generally
regarded as the founder of psychology of religion in
America, not only because of his own pioneer work in the
field, but also because of his influence upon his many
pupils in vdaom he stimulated interest in the psychological
study of religion. V/hile president of Clark University
he suggested areas of research which his students pursued,
many of them making valuable contributions to the field.
In 1882 Hall published an article entitled "'ihe
44Moral and Religious Training of Children" in v/hich he
emphasized the importance of adolescent development to
religious growth. He pointed out how sudden changes take
44. G. Stanley Hall, "'jftie Moral and Religious I'rain-
ing of Children," Princeton Review, 9 (January, 1882), 26-
45.
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place between the ages of 12 and 16 in v/hich the individual
receives nev; birth of energy and feeling. A similar
article by Hall entitled "The Moral and Religious Training
45
of Children and Adolescents" appeared in 1891* In this
article. Hall suggests that religious training begin in
the cradle, since sentiments of gratitude, trust, dependence,
and love are learned in infancy. He warns against the
unv;holesome effect of sudden conversion as a prescribed
pattern of religious experience for adolescents. Hall
states:
* • • there is danger lest this change, as
prescribed and formulated by the church, be too
sudden and violent, and the capital of moral force
which should last a lifetime be consumed in a
brief, convulsive effort, like the sudden running
down of a watch if its spring is broken.
In the same article Hall sets forth a theory of
recapitulation regarding childhood development which, to
a certain extent, is adopted by Coe in his early writings
in religious education. Hall maintains that the "pupil
should, and in fact naturally does, in a trite sense, re-
peat the course of the development of the race, and educa-
tion is simply the expediting, shortening, and normaliz-
ing of this course."^'''
45. G. Stanley Hall, "The Moral and Religious
Training of Children and Adolescents," Fed agogical
Seminary , 1 (June, 1891), 196-210.
46. Ibid., 209»
47. Ibid., 198
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In 1904 Hall published his exhaustive two-volume
xiork entitled Adolescence ; Its Psychology and Its Relations
to Physiology
,
Anthropology, Sociology
,
Sex
,
Crime
,
Religion
and Education . 'ITils study, although appearing after
1900, brings together the early research done on adolescence
and has been of great importance to the psychologist of
religion. Of particular interest to psychology of religion
is chapter fourteen on "The Adolescent Psychology of
Conversion." Hall comes to the conclusion that "conversion
is a natural, normal, and necessary process at the stage
when life pivots over from an autocentric to an hetero-
centric basis. "^^
So important has been the work of G. Stanley Hall
and his students at Clark University in the early pioneer-
ing in psychology of religion that the term "the Clark
school of religious psychology" has sometimes been applied
50to it. It is apparent that Coe was greatly stimulated
by the work of Hall and his pupils during the closing years
of the nineteenth century. He shared the current interest
in the phenomena of conversion and enlarged upon this
48. G. Stanley Hall, Adolescence . 2 vols. (i\iew
York: D. Apple ton and Company, 1904)
•
49. Ibid., vol. 11, 301.
50. Pratt, "The Psychology of Religion," 436.
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fruitful area of research which Hall and others had sought
to explore.
3» Other Pioneers
Early in the nineties, two of Hall's students,
William H» Burnham and Arthur H. Daniels, took up the
investigation of adolescent religious experience which
led to the publication of articles on this subject. In
their study of adolescence they make extensive use of anthro
pological data. Burnham, for example, compares the Chris-
tian rite of confirmation with the primitive initiation
ceremonies of ancient tribes .^-^ Daniels in "The wew Life"
points out the psychological significance of initiation
rites and then discusses the characteristic changes which
take place during puberty and adolescence,^^
Much of the material used in the study of adoles-
cence at Clark University was collected by means of the
questionnaire. As early as 1889, a circular was sent out
from the university requesting the co-operation of parents,
teachers, and others, in collecting material for an
anthropological study of adolescence. Information was
51. William H. Burnham, "A Study of Adolescence,"
Pedagogical Seminary , 1 (June, 1891), 174-195, 175.
52. Arthur H. Daniels, "The iMev/ Life," American
Journal of Psychology , 6 (October, 1893), 61-103.
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requested on the following points: sleep, dreams, health,
nervousness, temper, studies, tastes in reading, friend-
ships, self-consciousness
,
dress, conscience and moral
sense, emotional nature, quality of the will, fears,
physical changes. Later Burnham sent out a letter to
some students to get information on religious doubt and
the "stress and strain" period. He quotes his replies at
great length to show the naturalness of this period of
unrest.^^
In 1895, E. H. Lancaster, another of Hall's pupils,
entered the field with an article on "The Psychology and
Pedagogy of Adolescence."^^ His article is an early attempt
to show the relation between psychology and education v/ith
particular reference to the physiological and emotional
changes which take place during adolescence, which involves
religious experience. The following year, James H. Leuba,
also of Clark University, published the first in a long
series of important papers entitled, "The Psychology of
Religious Phenomena"^^ dealing with the phenomena of sudden
conversion. Leuba 's articles on this subject are largely
53. Burnham, "A Study of Adolescence," 182-87.
54. iij. H. Lancaster, "The Psychology and Pedagogy
of Adolescence.," Pedagogical Seminary
, 5 (January, 1895),
61-128.
55. James H. Leuba, "The Psychology of Religious
Phenomena," American Journal of Psychology , 7 (June, 1896),
309-85.
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responsible for the early concentration of interest in
sudden conversion phenomena. He endeavors to be thorough-
ly scientific in his approach, using material collected by
means of questionnaire and also published accounts of
conversion. Hiltner regards Leuba as "the earliest and
most obvious reductionist among the psychologists of
56
religion." Although many of his conclusions regarding
the value of religion are somewhat negative, still his
scholarship is demanding of respect. In his first article,
Leuba analyzed the psychological conditions producing the
conversion experience, as well as the sudden and passive
nature of the transition when it finally comes. He
also attempts to point out the psychological basis for
the Christian doctrines of faith, justification, pardon,
etc. Leuba views the whole process from the naturalistic
point of view, ruling out the possibility of supernatural
intervention. Regarding the naturalistic attitude in
psychology of religion, Pratt states:
This naturalistic attitude dominates in a general
way all the writers in this field, but no others
have carried it so far or emphasized it so strongly
as has Leuba.'^'
in 1897, the year after Leuba 's first article
56. Hiltner, "The Psychological Understanding of
Religion," 8.
57. Pratt, "The Psychology of Religion," 437.
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appeared, another of Hall's pupils, Edwin D« Starbuck,
entered the field. In that yerar he published two articles,
"A Study of Conversion, and "Some Aspects of Religious
Growth, Both articles dealt with adolescent conversion
and religious awakening in its various phases. Like many
of the earlier articles, these also v;ere based on answers
to questionnaires. They were originally presented before
the Harvard Religious Union in 1894 and 1895 respectively.
Starbuck states: "The interest shown in the articles, and
the fact that the subject has since then been steadily
grov/lng, seems to warrant the presentation of the results
in a more permanent and generally accessible form." In
1899 Starbuck' s book. The Psychology of Religion , was
published. It was the first full-length treatise on the
subject to be written by an American psychologist of
religion.
Stolz maintains that Starbuck was "the originator
of a thoroughly psychological approach to religion. "^^
58. Jjiiwln D. Starbuck, "A Study of Conversion,"
American Journal of Psychology , 8 (January, 1897), 268-
59. Mwin D. Starbuck, "Some Aspects of Religious
Growth," American Journal of Psychology , 9 (October, 1897),
70-79.
60. Edwin D. Starbuck, The Psychology of Religion *
(London, 1899; wew York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1903), xi.
61. Karl R. Stolz, The Psychology of Religious
Living. (iNiashville; Cokesbury Press, 19377, 126.
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Unlike Leuba, Starbuck had no naturalistic thesis to
prove. One of the outstanding features of his v;ork is
his falrmlndedness • He is interested simply in getting at
the facts of the religious life in order to discern the
laws of their interaction. Pew psychologists of religion
have made more extensive use of the questionnaire method
than has Starbuck. His Imperfection in the use of this
method v;ill be considered in the next chapter when v/e
compare his work with that of Coe. In appraising Starbuck'
s
work, Uren states:
Starbuck defined the typography of the field for
subsequent workers. He stimulated a host of
investigators to further inquiry along the lines
suggested in his study. It is probable that
Professor V/. James's Varieties of Religious
Experience would never have been written had
Starbuck' s study not appeared .^^
It was s-hortly before 1900 that George A. Coe
definitely entered the field of psychology of religion.
Investigators, such as Hall, Daniels, burnham, Lancaster,
Leuba, and Starbuck, had been successful in arousing
considerable interest in this nev; field of research.
Although their methods of investigation would now be
considered crude, they were successful in amassing con-
siderable data which led to new insights in the psychol-
ogical understanding of religion. For the most part.
62. A. Rudolph Uren, Recent Religious Psychology .
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1928) , 5T^
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early inquiry centered upon problems of adolescent religious
growth and development, particularly the conversion phen-
omena, thus leaving a large area of religious life and
experience yet to be explored. In 1900, psychology of
religion was still in its infancy. But it was a field of
study full of promise for those who sought to approach
religion from the scientific point of view, Coe's first
studios m this new and growing field will be the subject
of the next chapter.

CHAPTER III
COE'S FIRST STUDIES li^ PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION
In the preceding chapter we discussed the various
ways of studying religion in order to distinguish the
particular approach and method of psychology of religion,
and also traced its development prior to 1900. Our purpose
in devoting a chapter in this paper to methodology and
history was to give the reader an understanding of the
nature of the field and the extent of its development at
the time Coe began his work. Having laid the foundation,
we are now ready to examine Coe's first studies in an
attempt to discover what contribution, if any, he made to
the work already done in the field, and what influence his
early investigations had upon other writers and the general
development of psychology of religion.
In 1899 Coe published an article in The Psychological
Review entitled "A Study in the Dynamics of Personal Religion."
It was Coe's first significant investigation in the field of
psychology of religion. The following year his first volume.
The Spiritual Life , was published. These two writings con-
stitute Coe's first studies in psychology of religion which
we will consider in this chapter.
At the outset, one might inquire what it was that led
Coe to a psychological investigation of religion. What
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aroused his Interest in this new field of investigation?
To pursue this question should give us a basis for a better
understanding of his work.
A. DEVELOPMJiwT OF CUE'S II^iTiCREST THE FIELD
1. Early Background
George Albert Coe was born at Mend on, Monroe County,
wew York, on March 26, 1862. His father was a Methodist
minister, and so at a very early age Coe became familiar
with what he calls "conventional formulas for Christian
belief and conventional practices of piety. Although
his parents exerted no pressure to make him conform to these
beliefs and practices, he willingly accepted them and took
them for granted. He became, as he says, "a young Conform-
ist" even though his childhood was free from a sense of
restraint. However, young Coe was by no means passive with
regard to religion. At an early age he began to take an
interest in thought-structures. He states, for example,
that when eight years old he had been introduced to Aristotle's
theory of a "prime mover" in a sermon on the existence of
God, so that later in a college course on the history of
philosophy when Aristotle's argument was discussed, this
1. Coe, "My Own Little Theatre," Religion in
Transition , Edited by Vergilius Ferm, (i>jew York: ITie
Macmillan Company, 1937), 90-125, 90.
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line of reasoning was not new to him*
Although a conformist in his early youth, Coe was
soon to undergo a series of experiences which altered his
views regarding traditional beliefs and practices. In
those years Methodist piety laid great emphasis upon such
matters as personal experience and conversion. It regarded
the feeling of assurance of God's pardon and acceptance as
being of fundamental importance. Eowever, being raised in
a Christian home and subject to continual Christian influ-
ence and nurture, he never experienced a climactic conver-
sion, even though he attended numerous revivals. He found
it impossible to interpret his past as that of a sinner.
Because of this, he experienced a period of stress which
lasted until the middle of his college work at the Univer-
sity of Rochester. Regarding this experience and its out-
come, Coe states;
Too clear-headed either to interpret my past as
that of a sinner outside the gate, or to undergo
'conversion' in any of the numerous revivals, I
suffered a period of stress^ i\iothing that I could
find in my father's library helped. But when I
was already more than half-way through my college
course I cut the knot by a rational and ethical
act. Assuming that my part in the matter was to
continue to commit myself to the Christian way of
life, and that internal 'witness' or 'assurance'
was not my affair, I resolved that never again
v/ould I seek it. This ended the turmoil.^
2. Ibid., 93.
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This experience not only relieved his emotional
tension, but it started Goe on the habit of "looking for
3
the core of religious experience in the ethical will."
Later, as a college teacher, he observed many cases similar
to his own, where young people religiously devoted were
still in religious darkness. His own experience during
adolescence, as well as these later observations, helped
to lead him in the direction of a psychological study of
adolescence and conversion.
The second experience which strongly influenced Goe's
thinking was concerned with the controversy over evolution.
Goe was born only three years after Darwin wrote The Origin
of Species , and when a student at the University of
Rochester (1880-84) the matter was one of great controversy
m theological and Ghurch circles. Goe confronted the
problem during his senior year in a course in zoology being
taught by Harrison E. ViTebster. Professor Webster was an
intellectual inspiration to Goe, and stimulated him to
read Darv/in for himself in order to discover what the method
and spirit of science are. In his studies he faced the
conflict between the method of science and that of revealed
theology, whose authoritative conclusions he had come to
accept in childhood. This led him to Inquire regarding the
5. Ibid., 93.
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validity of certain methods and the way in which truth is
discovered. His solution of this conflict is most signif-
icant and has a direct bearing on his interest in the
scientific method in religion. He v/rites the following:
I settled the question, as far as I was concerned,
on a Sunday morning by solemnly espousing the scien-
tific method, and resolving to follow it wherever
It should lead. Of course, I did not realize what
a revolutionary step this was for one reared in a
dogmatic Christianity; I merely knew that for me to
live either intellectually or spiritually I must
follow the scientific gleam.
^
This determination to "follow the scientific gleam,"
as well as the result of his experience of religion during
adolescence, had a profound effect upon Goe's life and aire
clearly apparent In the nature of his work. Still other
influences which helped to shape and mold his thinking
came during his years of theological training.
2. Theological Training
Upon receiving the A.B. degree from the University
of Rochester in 1884, Coe decided to pursue a theological
education, and so in September of that year he enrolled in
Boston University School of Theology. His decision to
study theology did not lie in any deep conviction that he
was "called" to the ministry, but he gravitated m that
4. Ibid., 95-96.
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direction out of his constant association with Church life
and its problems, and his habit of thinking about them.
Although when he entered he fully expected to go into the
parish ministry and become a pastor, by the end of his
first yesir he had decided to enter the teaching field instead.
Largely thj?ough the influence of his professors, Coe decided
to prepare for a career as a professor of systematic theology,
and he studied hard with that aim in mind.
During his years at the School of Theology, Coe studied
Hebrew, Greek, Church History, History of Doctrine, Didactic
Theology, Homiletics, Pastoral Theology, Religions, and
Elocution.^ Although awarded the S.T.B. degree in June 1887,
Coe remained at Boston University a fourth year to pursue
graduate stuay under Dr. William F. Warren, who was then
President of Boston University and Dean of the School of
Theology. Dr. Warren also taught courses in comparative
theology and the history and philosophy of religion. Under
his guidance, Coe began to read extensively on the religions
of the world, as well as in other subjects of special interest.
The follov/ing note was written in his academic record at the
School of I'heology, indicating the breadth and extensiveness
of his study:
In 1887-8 Mr. Coe read eighty-four volumes in
Comparative Religion, Theism, Systematic Theology,
5. Record of Studies , School of Theology , Boston
University
, vol. TJ 24.
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Ethics, Psychology and other branches. He made
notes of his reading and wrote largely on some
of the subjects, lie taught Latin and other
branches three evenings per week,^
V/hile at Boston University, Goe was influenced by
many of his professors. His theological interest was aroused
by Professor Plinckley G. Mitchell who taught Hebrew and Old
Testament Exegesis. At that time "higher criticism" was a
matter of great controversy, and Mitchell, honest and coura-
geous, expounded the nev/ view, even though his type of
criticism was exceedingly mild. Goe states that "for a time
reverence for the spirit of science ... lived in the same
young breast with systematic theology."'^ However, he soon
found them to be incompatible and became convinced that
theology "required a metaphysical basis that it did not
possess."^ His theological interest soon became super-
seded by Interest in philosophy, largely through the work
and influence of Professor Borden P. Bowne.
This shift of interest from, theology to philosophy
did not mean a rejection or indifference to Ghristian doctrine.
Goe explains this move in the follov/ing way:
To move out from under the theological roof did
not imply, however, rejection of all the doctrines
6. ' Ibid., 24.
7. Goe, "ky Ovm Little Theatre," 97,
8. Ibid., 97.
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that it housed, much less indifference to the
experienced values that v/ere more or less associa-
ted with them. These doctrines and values required
examination, each by itself. As there could be no
v/holesale acceptance, so there could be no wholesale
re jectlon.9
Just as Coe rejected theological orthodoxy on the
ground that it depends upon a fallacious view of authority,
he also came to see something of the same thing in philosophy.
He describes Professor Bowne as a man in whom "diverse
interests and meithods mingled without being able to fuse."-^^
Although regarded as a radical thinker in some Church circles
because of his opposition to ignorant orthodoxy and his
appeal to experienced values as a final ground of belief, Coe
claims that Bowne was inspired and guided by a theological
purpose, and that his central interest v/as "to provide an
epistemological and metaphysical basis for the main theses
of orthodoxy . "'••'- Although for awhile Coe v/as absorbed in
Bovme's epistemology and metaphysics, it tended to streng-
then his belief that empirical methods in the study of man
were of fundam.ental importance.
iTie association which Coe had v/ith ViTarren, Mitchell,
and Bowne during his years of theological training undoubted-
ly had a great influence upon him, for it was during those
9. Ibid., 98.
10. Ibid., 100.
11. Ibid., 100.
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years that he became fully convinced of the value of the
scientific approach to religion, a conviction wdiich led him
into the field of psychology of religion*
3. Psychology at iMorthwestern University
Coe's first years of teaching were spent at the
University of Southern California where he was Professor of
Philosophy from 1888 to 1890. In 1891, Goe went to Worth-
western University where he remained until 1909 as head of
the Department of Philosophy, It was during those years at
Northwestern that Goe did his first studies in psychology of
religion. At that time, psychology was still included in
the Department of Philosophy, and one of the first steps
which Goe took as head of the department was to introduce
a course which he called "physiological psychology." In
time he brought about the establishment of Northwestern'
s
psychological laboratory with an experimenter in charge
.
About the time Goe took up his v/ork at W or thv;e stern,
the study of adolescence was gaining considerable interest
and attention, largely through the Investigations made by
G. Stanley Eall and his students at Glark University. Coe's
interest was aroused by these studies and he undertook to
make investigations of his own. Regarding his interest in
this new field of study, Goe states:
By this time I was moved in such matters as much,
perhaps, by scientific curiosity and the immediate
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satisfactions of scientific inquiry as by interest
in religion; yet it must have been a continuing
sense of the importance of religion that caused my
curiosity to center where it did.-*-^
By 1899, Coe had become actively engaged in the
psychological study of religion and in that year published
an important article entitled "A Study in the Dynamics of
Personal Religion."
B. DYI^AMXCS OP PERSONAL RELIGION
1. Nature of the Study
As already pointed out, during adolescence Coe passed
through a period of stress due to his inability to experience
a definite conversion, yet throughout this period he remained
a religiously devout person. It is not surprising, therefore,
that his first writings in psychology of religion should be
a study of the conversion phenomena in its dynamic aspects.
Coe was primarily interested in discovering why it was that
of "two persons brought up in the same manner, and apparently
meeting the same conditions, one may experience a brilliant
conversion, while the other may experience no such states at
all."^^
Coe was not the first to seek an explanation of the
12, Ibid., 94.
13. Coe, "A Study in the Dynamics of Personal
Religion," 488.
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differences in religious development, but his treatment of
the matter goes much deeper than did earlier studies. Leuba,
for example, writing on the conversion of John Wesley, points
out the influence of suggestion.!^ Ke also remarks that
"the particular forms in which affective states dress them-
selves are functions of the intellectual atmosphere of the
time."-^^ Starbuck, in his studies on conversion, shows
that something more than a conscious exercise of either
intellect or will is central in adolescent conversion .-^^
Although at one point Starbuck states that "much depends
upon temperaments , "-^"^ he does not follow this assumption
up v;ith systematic investigation. Coe's study represents
a more complete analysis of individual cases of conversion
than had been previously attempted. He is interested in
showing the importance of temperament in religious develop-
ment, a factor ignored, for the most part, by earlier
writers on the subject.
Why is It that "one person reaches a higher plane of
religious life by a process of development scarcely ruffled
14. James H. Leuba, "Studies in the Psychology of
Religious Phenomena," American Journal of Psychology , 7
(April, 1896), 309-85,
15. Ibid., 557.
16. Starbuck, "A Study of Conversion," 292.
17. Starbuck, "Some Aspects of Religious Growth," 75.

by excitement," and that another should attain the same
18
state "by passing through a mental cataclysm," 'SJhls is
Goe's problem and he seeks to solve it by looking for co-
ordinations between specific inner states and tendencies
and specific external circumstances. He feels that if he
can discover the factors involved in a few cases that are
fully accessible, the Information thus acquired may be
helpful in understanding and interpreting the broader dif-
ferences of sects and religions.
2, Method of Investigation
At the time when Goe undertook this study the question
naire method of obtaining data had come into prominent use,
and a great deal of reliance was being placed upon this
method. It consisted of securing written answers to print-
ed questions upon various phases of religious experience.
Although Goe uses the questionnaire as one of his methods,
he constructs it in such a v;ay as to involve, not only a
record of certain facts, but also a reflection of the per-
sonality of the writer as well. He constructs his question-
naire so as to obtain information on a person's "likes and
dislikes, laughter and v/eeping, anger and moods, habits of
18. Goe, "A Study in the Dynamics of Personal
Religion," 488.

introspection, moods, promptness or its opposite in
decisions, ideals, the effects of excitement, habits with
respect to physical activity, etc."-*-^
ITie answers which he received to his questionnaire
were supplemented in four v/ays: First, personal interviews
were held with many of his subjects in order to clear up
doubtful points in the papers, and also to elicit many new
and Important facts. Second, many of the subjects were
placed under observation in order to secure objective
evidence as to temperament. iTiird, interviews were held
with friends and acquaintances of certain of the persons
being examined. Fourth, hypnotic experiments were conducted
upon all the important cases in order to obtain facts regard
ing suggestibility.
The next step was to discover v/hether sensibility,
intellect, or will was the most predominant faculty, and
then to discover v/hich came second and third in order of
importance. Finally, estimating the place of each of the
three faculties in respect to promptness and Intensity.
For each subject, therefore, three descriptive designations
were given, for example: prompt -intense intellect, prompt-
weak sensibility, prompt-weak will. These three were then
arranged in the order of prominence. This arrangement Coe
19. Ibid., 491.
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calls "a scheme of the constituents of temperament."*^^
With regard to method, it is interesting to note that
Coe does not rely solely upon the questionnaire, but makes
use of experimentation and observation as well. 'Ihis gives
his study a much higher degree of certainty than is found
m those studies which rely exclusively upon the use of a
questionnaire. Starbuck in his book, 'I'he Psychology of
Religion
,
quotes extensively from Goe's study, which was
then still in manuscript form. He recognizes the importance
of Goe's study for psychology of religion, for he states:
Prof. Geo. A. Goe, of Northwestern University,
has taken up specifically the question of the
relation betv/een temperament and the nature of
religious experience. He has, happily, reduced
the matter to a high degree of certainty, and in so
doing has made a permanent contribution to the
psychology of religion.^-'-
3. Significant Conclusions
Coe found that striking transformations are frequent
among persons in whom sensibility is predominant, but rare
among persons of predominant will and intellect. "Where
expectation [of conversion] is satisfied," says Goe, "there
sensibility is distinctly predominant; but where expectation
Is disappointed, there intellect is just as distinctly
20. iDld., 491.
21. Starbuck, The Psychology of Religion , 71.
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predominant . "^^
Another important discovery was that persons of
sanguine (prompt-weak) and melancholic (slow-intense) tem-
peraments are much more likely to experience conversions
than those of choleric (prompt-intense) or phlegmatic
(slow-weak) temperaments,
'fhe results of Goe's hypnotic experiments are very
interesting. The two groups with which he worked were
placed under the influence of hypnotic suggestion in order
to discover the relative susceptibility to suggestion on
the part of the two groups of subjects. Coe discovered
that those who expected and experienced a striking conver-
sion, 13 out of 14 v/ere passive subjects, with a great
degree of suggestibility, but shov/ing little spontaneity.
On the other hand, he found that 11 out of 12 persons v/ho
expected but failed to experience conversion, were not very
suggestible, but belonged more to the spontaneous type.
The result of the hypnotic experiments, therefore, v/as to
establish a correlation between religious experiences and
suggestibility, and to indicate that susceptibility to
suggestion is an important factor m cases of striking
religious conversion.
A general statement of the outcome of Goe's
22 # Coe,. Ma Study in the Dynamics of Personal
Religion," 493.
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experiment might be that given these three factors, (1)
a temperament of extreme sensibility, (2) a tendency to
automatisms, expectation, and (3) passive suggestibility,
a striking religious transformation can be predicted.
This study served to convince Goe that, to a large
extent, the physiological and psychical make-up of a man
determines the nature and mode of his religious experiences.
In concluding his study, Goe makes the following statement:
Y/ould you understand the emotional aspects of
religious experience? Do not ascribe them to the
Inscrutable ways of God, but to ascertainable
differences in men^s mental constitutions; do not
theorize about divine grace, but study the hidden
workings of the human mind .23
This article by Goe, which became a chapter in his
first volume. The Spiritual Life, made a valuable contri-
bution to psychology of religion both in terms of methods
and results. In the light of later advancements in experi-
mental psychology, Goe's methods may appear somewhat crude.
Yet, at the time of his study, they vceve the best which
psychology had to offer. Goe was one of the first American
psychologists of religion to make use of experimental and
truly scientific methods in the study of religion. iTie
results of this study, although now superseded by more
dynamic studies of personality, were, at that time, most
23. Ibid., 505.
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enlightening and explored an area relatively untouched by
earlier investigators.
C. THE SPIRITUAL LIFE
1, iNiature of the Study
Having definitely entered the field of psychology
of religion with his article "A Study in the Dynamics of
Personal Religion," published in 1899, Coe now undertook a
more extensive investigation of religious experience which
appeared the following year under the title. The Spiritual
Life . Although a small and unpretentious volume, Coe's
study represents one of the pioneer works in psychology of
religion, and it is significant in terms of its agreement
and contrast with other studies, notably Starbuck's work,
'i'he Psychology of Religion , which had appeared the previous
year •
Coe*s first book is by no means a complete and
systematic study of the general psychology of religion, but
rather an attempt to group under psychological laws a fev/
of the observable facts regarding religious life and exper-
ience. Although Coe attempts to approach these facts "in
the spirit and by the methods of science, "^'^ he nevertheless
has a desire to make the results and methods of psychology of
24. Coe, The Spiritual Life, 8.
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religion available for the religious worker. Throughout
the study Coe's practical interests are clearly evident.
In almost every chapter some practical suggestions are made,
showing how the results of psychology of religion can be
applied to specific problems m religious education and
church work in general.
The major portion of The Spiritual Life is devoted
to a study of conversion, which was the focal point of
interest among religious psychologists of that period. The
work of G. Stanley Hall and his pupils at Clark University,
to which reference v/as made in the preceding chapter, had
aroused considerable interest in the subject and a number
of studies had been made, largely with the use of the
questionnaire method. Starbuck's book had been devoted
largely to the matter of conversion and religious growth.
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Goe should have
been interested in the subject which had created so much
enthusiasm among psychologists of religion.
Coe begins by pointing out some of the established
facts of psychology of religion based on earlier investi-
gations, such as the co-ordination between religious
development and the chief periods of physical and mental
growth. He accepts the generalization that "conversion,
or some equivalent personalizing of religion, is
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a normal part of adolescent growth. "^^ As his own
contribution, Goe makes a questionnaire study of 99 men
as to their age at each marked religious awakening. He
discovers that for 84 of his subjects the average age of
decisive religious awakening was 15.4, which is only .3
of a year below Starbuck^s average. Through an examination
of carefully compiled statistics concerning 1,784 men, Goe
finds an average age of conversion of 16*4. On the basis
of this result, Goe states:
If, now, this average age of greatest religious
av/akening be compared with the age of accession to
puberty, the conclusion will be sufficiently con-
vincing that the mental upturning that accompanies
the physical transformation is peculiarly favorable
to a life decision in the matter of religion.
Since Goe places the age of puberty at twelve years,'
it is difficult to understand v/hy he should conclude that
puberty and religious awakening are so closely related.
However, there seem.s to be general agreement among psychol-
ogists of religion thjat the physical changes accompanying
accession to puberty have a direct bearing upon adolescent
religious experience.
In a study of the feelings accompanying adolescent
religious awakening, Goe found that his results compared
25. Ibid., 40.
26. Ibid., 45.
27. Ibid., 33.
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favorably with those of Starbuok. Fear of death, hell, etc.,
were evident in only a fevi cases, Coe finds "the soil of
adolescent religiousness, as far as feeling is concerned,
is an undefined sense of incompleteness, a tantalizing
awareness of something as belonging to one's true self,
but not yet realized in one's self."^^ Coe emphasizes the
physiological causes of the characteristic feelings of
adolescence, such as vague unrest, dissatisfactions with
self, and general discontent. For example, Coe states that -
adolescent doubt is not merely "a perplexed process of
reasoning, not merely a v/eakening of trust or of obedience,
but rather a symptom of the entire psychical, yes, physical,
condition at the time. "29 Coe points out that during
adolescence the strain of the nervous system is very great,
and that worry, despondency, bad temper, indecision, morbid
introspection, and susceptibility to sexual temptations, all
of which characterize adolescence, are the effects of nerve
fatigue. He maintains that the morbid states of adolescence
are due to the general "yeastiness" of the mind at the time
of the change from childhood to adulthood, as well as to
unwise teaching, and an overburdened nervous system. In
discussing these adolescent difficulties, Coe takes a
28. Ibid., 52.
29. Ibid., 59.
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decidedly practical view. He protests against the mode of
religious training which leaves out of its reckoning the
relation of physiology and psychology to the spiritual life.
In emphasizing the close relationship between mind and body,
Coe is quite up-to-date in view of our present knowledge of
psychosomatic medicine. Regarding this relationship, Coe
states
:
If I have seemed to place religious and moral
difficulties in unusually close proximity to
physiology, it is because of a conviction that
untold spiritual treasure is slipping from our
hands simply because we forget that religious
states, as well as other states of mind, stand
in reciprocal relation v/ith states of the brain
and nervous system,*^^
Probably the most unique and original portion of
Coe's book Is the chapter on religious dynamics which is
an enlargement of his article published in The Psychological
Review and discussed in the preceding chapter, Coe looks
for an explanation of the various modes of religious
expression in the physiological and psychical make-up of
man. Els emphasis on temperament as one of the determining
factors in religious life is an Important contribution
which Coe makes to psychology of religion, Uren regards
It as being "Coe^s special contribution," He states:
This discovery of temperament as the prime
factor In determining modes of expression of the
religious life is Coe's special contribution to
50, Ibid,, 86,
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the psychology of religion.
Perhaps even more significant than the results of
Coe's study of temperament is the method of investigation
which he uses. Instead of relying solely upon the question-
naire, he employed actual experimentation as well as direct
observation and personal interviev/s. This not only enhances
the reliability of his results, but demonstrates methods,
other than the questionnaire, which psychologists of religion
might employ*
In a chapter on divine healing, Goe anticipates the
present-day emphasis on the therapeutic aspects of religion,
and again indicates the practical and dynamic nature of his
psychology. He seems to regard suggestion as the key which
will unlock the mystery of divine healing and the miraculous
element in the lives of the saints. With regard to trances
and visions, Goe takes the position that such cases can be
explained by natural lav/s, and should be so explained.
Suggestion, he claims, is the clue to the miraculous element
in the lives of the saints, in the life of Christ, and in
the v/onders of religions other than the Christian. In
emphasizing the importance of suggestion, Goe has, from a
31. Uren, Recent Religious Psychology
, 53.
32. Goe, The Spiritual Life , 200.
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psychological point of view, given a suitable explanation
for much that takes place in mental healing. hov;ever, he
might be open to the criticism of oversimplification at this
point for he ignores other factors v;hich may also be involved,
such as growing insight, catharsis through confession, attitudes
of confidence and trust, the power of love, etc* However,
toward the close of his discussion, he does seem to suggest
that religious therapy may involve more than merely sugges-
tion. He points out that the Christian attitude toward life,
an attitude of love rather than hate, has definite hygienic
and therapeutic value, and that "the Christian mode of life
tends direotly toward physical health."
Coe*s approach to this problem tends to be somewhat
psychosomatic. He points out how emotion affects the
appetite, the circulation of the blood, and the functions
of nutrition and secretion. He clearly indicates the tole
of the physician in the following statement:
It is a matter of common knowledge that many
physicians, either through natural endowment of
disposition, through their unconscious manners, or
through a deliberately cultivated art, have a
wholesome influence upon their patients entirely
apart from any physical treatment that may be
administered. In fact, no physician can avoid
administering much more than his medicines, whether
that something be helpful or deleterious.*^^
33. Ibid., 203.
34. Ibid., 157.
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The last chapter of Goe's book is "A Study of
Spirituality" in which he again brings out the close rela-
tion between temperament and religious expression. He
carefully examines the traditional concepts of sainthood,
contemporary hymnology, and spiritual exercises, as well
as popular current ideas of spirituality. As a result of
his analysis, Coe concludes that the feminine element un-
duly predominates over all others in worship and the
religious life* He states:
If we view the problem psychologically we shall
feel perfectly safe in assuming that any large and
persistent excess of women in the Churches is chief-
ly due to a superior adaptation of Church life to
the female nature • - It is because the Church looks
at things with feminine eyes, and calls chiefly
into exercise the faculties in which women excel
men. 35
Coe seems to feel that Christ's universally human
conception of spiritual life has been warped by organized
Christianity into a narrov; temperamental form, v/hereby
the more active temperament is subordinated in the interests
of the passive. It is his position that Churches fail to
offer the kind of spiritual refreshment and modes of activ-
ity adapted to many-sided human personality. As a practical
solution, Coe suggests that we "broaden the psychological
basis of Church life and ideals" so as to meet the needs of
35. Ibid., 247.
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all the various temperaments of men.^^ He claims that the
Church must cease to look at things merely through feminine
eyes, and must also emphasize the more rugged, active, in-
tellectual, and social virtues.
Although one must admit the degree of truth contained
in Coe's analysis of spirituality, it nevertheless appears
to he a somewhat hasty generalization. Certainly there is
ample evidence that historic Christianity has not contained
a one-sided emphasis upon feminine qualities, but has also
called forth that which is rugged, active, and manly.
Although self-surrender
,
sacrifice, humility, etc., are
usually associated with Christian devotion, it v/ould he a
mistake to regard these qualities as purely feminine or as
representing the total picture. It should be noted also
that qualities generally regarded as feminine virtues fifty
years ago are not so regarded today, since the place and
status of v/om.en in society has undergone considerable
change. As v/ill be pointed out later, Coe has rendered a
service to organized Christianity in calling for a greater
interest and an active participation in social issues, but
at the same time he has tended to overlook possible values
in the more subjective, mystical, and passive aspects of reli-
gion. This v;ill become increasingly apparent as 7/e proceed.
36. roid., 151-52.

2» Relation of Coe to Starbuck
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Coming only a year after Starbuck's book, 'fhe
Psychology of Religion , Goe's treatment presents several
points of agreement with and differences from that work.
Since both deal chiefly with conversion and religious feel-
ing it is of interest to compare the two studies.
In the matter of the age at which religious av/aken-
ing or conversion takes place, both Starbuck and Coe give
substantially the same results. Although in his own study,
Coe arrives at an average age of 15.4 years, when he makes
his analysis of 1,784 subjects, he gives an average age of
16.4 years, which is Identical with that given by Starbuck.
Regarding the feelings that accompany the conversion
experience, investigations by both Coe and Starbuck show
that the predominant feelings are those of a sense of incom-
pleteness and imperfection, while fears, such as of death
and hell, rarely occur. Also, regarding the nature of
adolescent doubt, Coe and Starbuck are in essential agree-
ment •
Another point of striking similarity is the emphasis
37. Coe, The Spiritual Life
, 45; Starbuck, 'Jhe
Psychology of Religion , 51.
58. Coe, The Spiritual Life
, 50; Starbuck, Ihe
Psychology of Religion
, 220.
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which both investigators give to the physiological and
psychological basis of religious conversion. However,
while Starbuck holds that conversion and puberty are sup-
plemental rather than coincidental,"^^ Coe maintains that
the two events synchronize and are vitally connected •^'-^
However, on this point, neither Coe nor Starbuck presents
sufficient evidence to prove their theory.
It is interesting to note the manner in which the
two investigators classify religious types in conversion.
Starbuck* s classification of religious types is based on
41
the attitude of the will, while Coe's classification is
42based on temperament. However, in Coe's treament of
temperament he includes will, or volition, as one of his
categories
•
As to method of investigation, both Goe and Starbuck
make use of the questionnaire as a means of gathering data.
However, v/hile Starbuck relies solely on the questionnaire
without safeguards of any kind, Coe employs numerous safe-
guards. Coe carefully cross-examines his subjects in per-
sonal interviews, then with the aid of his students, he
39. Starbuck, The Psychology of Religion , 41.
40. Coe, aiie Spiritual Life
, 45.
41. Starbuck, The Psychology of Religion , 111.
42. Coe, The Spiritual Life, 114.
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kept his subjects under observation for objective evidence
with regard to temperament. He also subjected certain of
his subjects to hypnotic experiments in order to discover
degree of suggestibility.
One criticism which might be applied to both Coe and
Starbuck is that they tend to generalize on the basis of
insufficient data, 'iliis is more or less characteristic of
early investigators in general. The reports upon which
Starbuck bases his conclusions come almost entirely from
evangelical Protestants of the Methodist branch, which places
considerable emphasis upon conversion. Likewise, Goe's
respondents were intellectually, socially, and religiously
a special class. They were university men and women, with
a Methodist background. Therefore, their generalizations
are not necessarily true of religious persons in general,
but only apply to a special group or class.
3. Significance of Goe's Study
Goe's volume. The Spiritual Life, as a pioneer work in
psychology of religion, is deserving of recognition for
many reasons, some of which have already been pointed out.
First, it emphasizes the practical application of
psychology of religion to specific religious problems. Prom
the very first, Goe seeks to create a functional psychology
of religion, and one that will have more than mere literary
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or theoretical value. 'iTiis is particularly evident in the
sections dealing with adolescent difficulties, divine heal-
ing, and spirituality. The point is made in each case that
if the religious worker is to be effective in his work, he
must understand the physical and psychical make-up of the
individual. At times Coe becomes almost homiletic in point-
ing out the vast possibilities for greater spiritual values,
if the religious leader v/ould only obtain a deeper under-
standing of human personality. For example, Coe states:
It is necessary to perceive that the problems
here suggested do not concern matters of mere
temporary expediency. They go to. the bottom of
life; they concern the very essence of religion,
of religious forces, and of the mind in v/hlch
religion lives and through which it works for the
healing of nations. If this be true there is not
a ray of reasonable hope for the solution of these
problems unless in some way—either by a happy hit
of uninstructed zeal or else by definite knowledge
of tlie psychical factors involved—v/e manage to
put ourselves into line v;ith the mind of man as it
is. 43
Second, it presents new methods for use by the psychol
ogist of religion. As already pointed out, Coe supplemented
the use of the questionnaire v/ith personal interviews,
observations, and experimentations. This represents an
advance over other investigators, such as Starbuck, who
placed an almost nai've confidence in data obtained through
the questionnaire alone, without adequate safeguards to
43. Ibid., 7.
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check the reliability of the answers. Coe demonstrates how
the questionnaire, when used with these safeguards and
supplements, can become a valuable method for psychology of
religion. He also demonstrates the possibility of maintain-
ing an impartial and scientific attitude, and at the same
time being decidedly Christian and reverential.
Third, it calls attention to temperament as an
important factor in religious experience, and as a most
influential determinant of types of religious expression.
Prior to Coe's study, little was known about the role of
temperament in religious life. The practical issue of Coe's
study of temperament was the realization of the futility of
expecting all persons to undergo the same type of religious
conversion. Since the type of religious experience is large-
ly a matter of temperament, it would be futile to expect an
entire elimination of the radical type or to demand it of
every person v/ho seeks to enter the Christian v/ay of life.
Also, by emphasizing the variety of temperaments, Coe makes
an effective appeal for the Church to adapt its program to
meet the needs of a wider variety of personality types.
Fourth, it emphasizes the therapeutic value of religion
and the pov/er of suggestion. Although the subject of divine
healing and the relation betv^een religion and health had
been a matter of interest to psychologists since the time of
kesmer's performances at the close of the 18th century, it
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had not yet been given systematic treatment by psychologists
of religion. In spite of the fact that Coe's analysis of
divine healing is only partial and incomplete, he does bring
the subject definitely within the scope of psychology of
religion.

CtiAPTER IV
THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH IN PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION
Shortly before Goe \vrote The Spiritual Life , a nev;
movement v/as getting underway in psychological circles known
as "functionalism. " As the name implies, this new school in
psychology was primarily interested in activities and viewed
mental processes not so much as contents hut as operations.
It sought to study mental processes in their natural setting
with a view to their utility. Growing up in opposition to
the more theoretical and abstract structuralism of Tltchener
and V/undt, the new school v/as destined to give a new direction
to American psychology. Punctlonalism asked practical ques-
tions regarding mental processes, such as: "What are they
for?" "How do they v/ork?" In answering such questions, the
psychologist is led beyond the processes themselves, and is
forced to consider their relation to antecedents and conse-
quences, and to take into account their whole complex setting.
Such an undertaking logically resulted in a nev; emphasis upon
the applied aspects of psychology.
Although Goe makes no direct reference to the new
functlonallsm m his early studies, the practical nature of
his work and point of view show a fundamental agreement.
However, by 1916 v/hen he wrote his Psychology of Religion
,
functlonallsm had become an influential school, and his
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psychology is a definite expression of his adherence to
Its hasic principles.
A. TTili: DSVELOPIvTEIvlT OP FUNCTIOIUL PSYCHOLOGY
!• The Work of John Dewey
In 1894, John Dewey and James Rowland Angell accepted
teaching positions at the nev;ly organized University of
Chicago, the former as professor of philosophy, and the
latter as head of the department of psychology. Although
Dewey was essentially a philosopher, he had worked under
G. Stanley Hall in his first psychological laboratory at
Johns Hopkins, while Angell had been a student of V/illiam
James at Harvard. It was largely under the influence of
these two scholars that the new school of functionalism was
developed at the University of Chicago
•
Punctionalism as a definite movement dates from the
appearance of Dewey's article, "The Reflex Arc Concept m
Psychology," published in 1896."^ In this article, Dewey
launched an attack upon atomistic and structural psychology.
The structuralists held that consciousness is directly
observable and is composed of simple, definitely describable
elements. To discover and describe each of these elements.
1. John Dewey, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology,"
The Psychological Review, 3 (July, 1896), 357-70.
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and to determine how they combine to produce more compli-
cated structures was the task of the structuralists* Dewey,
on the other hand, maintained that the task of psychology
was not only to deal with the contents of consciousness, but
also to deal with the "whys" and "hows" of these contents
and to study their relation to the context of which they
are a part. For him, this context, in its widest and most
inclusive sense, is the biological process of adjustment*
The thesis of his important article was that psychological
activity cannot be broken into parts or elements, but must
be considered as a continuous whole. He maintained that
distinctions like that between stimulus and response are
merely functional, or teleological distinctions* They are
parts played by the organism with reference to reaching or
maintaining an end or goal* Rather than being based on
actual differences existing in reality, they are merely
aspects of a total process*
Dewey regarded the ordinary reflex arc concept as
"a survival of the m.etaphysical dualism, first formulated by
Plato* "^ The older dualism of body and mind, he claims,
finds a distinct echo in the current dualism of stimulus
2* Ibid*, 358*
3. Ibid*, 365.
4* Ibid., 367.

89
and response. Such a concept Dewey regarded as defective
because it assumed sensory and motor responses as distinct
from psychical existences, while in reality they are always
inside a co-ordination and have their significance purely
from the part played in maintaining or reconstituting the
co-ordination.^ It is this total co-ordination, not just
a part of it, that the psychologist must take into consider-
ation. Ke claims:
V/hat Is needed is that the principle underlying
the idea of the reflex arc as the fundamental
psychical unity shall react into and determine the
values of its constitutive factors, iviore specifi-
cally, what is wanted is that sensory stimulus,
central connections and motor responses shall be
viewed, not as separate and complete entities in
themselves, but as divisions of labor, functioning
factors, within the single concrete whole, now
designated the reflex arc.^
The main argument which Dewey stresses is that mental
events must be viewed from a total perspective, that is,
from the standpoint of their relation to the environmental
v;orld. This point of viev; is everywhere expressed through-
7
out Dewey's Psychology , v/hich was also published in 1896.
In his systematic treatment of psychology, Dewey constantly
stresses "the unity of the psychical processes." This unity
he explains by the fact that man is a self, and must be
5. Ibid., 367.
6. Ibid., 358.
7. John Dewey, Psychology
. (wew York: Harper and
Brothers, 1896)
.
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treated as a totality.^
Prom Dewey's discussion it is easy to see that
functional psychology is practical and utilitarian in spirit
and interest. It studies the uses and utilities of conscious
processes, and it is naturally interested in developing the
various applied fields, such as abnormal psychology, educa-
tional psychology, industrial psychology, mental hygiene,
etc.^ It was the natural outcome of his position that
mental processes cannot be disengaged from their conditions
and consequences v/hich led Dewey into the field of education.
In 1900 he made his presidential address before the American
Psychological Association on the subject "Psychology and
Social Practice: A Plea and a Program for Educational Psychol-
ogy." It was published later m The Psy chological Review. ^'-^
In 1902, Dewey became director of the School of Education
at the University of Chicago, and two years later he v;as
called to Teachers College, Columbia University, as professor
of philosophy. IfJhen we discuss the application of Coe's
psychology to religious education, it will be interesting to
note how he follows an almost identical course as an expres-
sion of his functional point of view.
9. Harvey Carr, "Punctionalism, " Psychologies of 1950
,
Edited by Carl kurchlson, (Viforcester : Clark University Press,
1930), 59-78, 61.
10. John Dewey, "Psychology and Social Practice,"
The Psychological Review , 7 (November, 1900), 105-24.

2» 'The TiVork of James Angell
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In December, 1906, James R, Angell delivered his
presidential address before the American Psychological
Association entitled, "'The Province of Functional Psychology."
The following year it appeared as an article in The Psychol -
ogical Review . '^"'^ Like Dewey's article on the'reflex arc,
Angell 's address is one of the classic statements of the
principles of functionalism. He pictured this new approach
as a "broad and flexible and organic point of view in
psychology . "•^'^ He begins by contrasting functionalism with
structuralism, and then shows how the various conceptions of
functionalism converge upon a common point of view. Speaking
of the various ways in which functionalism might be consider-
ed, Angell states:
We have to consider (1) functionalism conceived
as the psychology of mental elements; or, expressed
otherwise, the how and why of consciousness as
distinguished from the psychology of the what of
consciousness. ViTe have (2) the functionalism which
deals with the problem of mind conceived as primar-
ily engaged in mediating betv;een the environment
and the needs of the organism. This is the psychol-
ogy of the fundamental utilities of consciousness;
(3) and lastly we have functionalism described as
psychophysical psychology, that is the psychology
which constantly recognizes and insists upon the
essential significance of mind-body relationship
11. James R. Angell, "The Province of Functional
Psychology," The Psychological Review
, 14 (March, 1907), 61-91.
12. Ibid., 91.
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for any Just and comprehensive appreciation of
mental life itself .lo
In discussing these various functional points of
view, Angell points out that mental content cannot be dealt
with as something independent and isolated, as the structur-
alists at'tempt to do. The various states of consciousness,
such as sensation, are always dependent upon the particular
situation in which it occurs, both in the experiencing
subject and in the objective environment. The "what," accord-
ing to Angell, is not really independent from the "hov/" and
the "why,""^'^ Angell regards mental activity as a part of
the whole world of biological activity and as related to
the whole movem.ent of organic evolution. Consciousness, he
claims, is no exception to the rule that the structures and
functions of a living organism are for the purpose of
environmental adaptation.-^^ The problem of functionalism
becomes one of discovering the fundamental utilities of
conscious activity, or, in other words, how this activity
helps the organism adapt itself to the environment, and
thus to survive. He goes on to stress the organism as a
unit, including both body and mind, and suggests that
13. Ibid., 85-86.
14. Ibid., 63.
15. Ibid., 70.
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psychology might study the psychophysical organism as a
totality. He points out how functionalism does away with
the old dualism which distinguishes the physical and the
1 n
mental as tv/o different orders of events.
Angell, like Dewey, recognized the broad implications
of the functional point of view, particularly for philosophy
and education. Angell believed that once you enter upon
statements of function "you cannot, save by purely arbi-
trary limitation, stop short of a logic, an ethics, and an
ae sthe tics ' In the preface to his Psychology , he expres-
ses the hope that the functional point of view v;ill find
practical expression in other fields:
Inasmuch as it is m.ental activity, rather than
mental structure, v/hich has immediate significance
for thought and conduct, it is hoped that students
of philosophy, as v/ell as students of education,
may find the book especially useful .18
If it is true, as Angell claim.s, that mental activity
is of greater significance for thought and conduct than
mental structure, then it is easy to understand why Coe
should find this point of viev/ so fruitful in psychology
of religion.
16 • Ibid., 81.
17. James R. Angell, "The Relations of Structural
and Functional Psychology to Philosophy," Philosophical
Review, 12 (May, 1903), 245-71, 245.
18. James R. Angell, Psychology
. (wew York: Henry
Kolt and Company, 1904), ill.
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3. Pragmatism and Instrumentalisra
The philosophical point of view most closely related
to functionalism Is that of pragmatism and instrumentalism.
Although William James is regarded as being the founder of
pragmatism, it was from Charles Peirce, his lifelong friend,
that James took the fundamental propositions of pragmatism,
or "pragma ticism" as Peirce called it. However, James had
already found the spirit of it in many earlier philosophers,
especially the English empiricists, Locke, Berkeley, Hume,
and particularly John Stewart Mill.^^ It was undoubtedly
in view of this that James called his book on the subject
Pragmatism: A I'jew i\iame for Some Old Ways of Thinking
Simply stated, pragmatism seeks for the truth of a
doctrine or theory in its practical corroboration. It is
neither in formal logic, nor in an intuitive consciousness
of truth, but only in action that truth is determined. Since
action is always related to telic conceptions such as use,
utility, adaptation, purpose, and means, the relation of
pragmatism to functionalism is obvious. James was opposed
to "mosaic" or "atomistic" psychology and always favored
19. 'Theodore Flournoy, The Philosophy of VJilliam
James . Edwin B. Holt and V/illiam. James, Jr., translators
,
(IJev; York: Henry Holt and Company, 1917), 61.
20. William James, Pragmatism
. {l\lew York: Longmans,
Green and Company, 1907)
•
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totalitarian conceptions, such as are found in functional-
ism. Milller-Preienfels states that "the American School of
functional psychology was Inspired by James, although not
founded by him."^"''
For James, the practical utility of an idea alone
determines its truth. His pragmatism represents a struggle
against rationalistic epistemology
,
just as functionalism
represents a struggle against the one-sided doctrine of
consciousness as composed of simple, separately describable
elements. Both seek to discover truth through total per-
ceptions, involving purposive action in the attainment of
values. It is a purposive psychology which lies at the
basis of James's pragmatic philosophy.
Dewey was greatly influenced by James's pragmatic
views, although his own position was much more naturalistic.
Dewey carried over the principle teachings of pragmatism
into his philosophy knov;n as "instrumentalism. For him,
ideas are instruments for use in dealing with specific situ-
ations. Since they are responses to situations, their
business is not to indulge in abstract generalities. In
21. IViT^ller-Freienfels , The J^ivolution of Modern
Psychology , 240.
22. Ralph B. Perry, The Thought and Character of
William James
. Briefer Version"^! (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1935), 309.
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so far as they prove to be effective instruirients in dealing
with the situation that evokes them they are true of it.
According to Dewey, there can he no hard and fast, universal
way of dealing with experience, and therefore no universal
truths* Man is m the midst of an evolving, changing
experience to which knowledge is an act of adaptation.
Knowledge like experience, is in constant flux, because it
involves a constant readjustment to changing circumstances.
Although an idea may signify adaptation at one moment, it
may mean quite the reverse at the next. The basic viev; of
instrumentalism is v/ell expressed by Dewey in the following
words:
If ideas, meanings, conceptions, notions, theories,
systems are instrumental to an active reorganization
of the given environment, to a removal of some
specific trouble and perplexity, then the test of
the ir validity and value lies in accomplishing this
v/ork. If they succeed in their office they are
reliable, sound, valid, good, true. If they fail
to clear up confusion, to eliminate defects, if
thsy increase confusion, uncertainty and evil when
they are acted upon, then they are false.
Regarding religion and religious experience, Dev/ey's
view is naturalistic. He maintains that the religious
element in life has been hampered by conceptions of the
supernatural that have been carried over from cultures
wherein man had little control over outer nature and lacked
23. John Dev/ey, Reconstruction in Philosophy ,
(wev/ York: Henry Holt and Company, 1920T, 156.
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sclentiflo methods of inquiry and test.^^ Dewey's view
Is that the empirical approach rather than destroying
religious value enhances it by placing it on the firm
foundation of objective truth which can be used and shared
by society as a whole. The truth v/hich really interests
Dev/ey is the social truth, that is, the truth that emerges
from the co-operative search of mankind for ideas that all
individuals can handle together as instruments for promoting
the v/elfare of the race. In this respect, as we will see
later, his view is similar to Coe's. Dewey states:
A one-sided psychology, a reflex of eighteenthr
century "individualism," treated knowledge as as
an accomplishment of a lonely mind. We should
now be aware that it is a product of the co-oper-
ative and communicative operations of human beings
living together. Its communal origin is an
indication of its rightful communal use. 'Ihe
unification of what is known at any given time,
not upon an impossible eternal and abstract basis
but upon that of its bearing upon the unification
of human desire and purpose, furnishes a sufficient
creed for human acceptance, one that would provide
a religious release and reinforcement of knowledge
B. FITNGTIONALISM IN PSYCEOLOGY OP RELIGION
!• Coe's Point of View
One of the outstanding features of Coe's psychology
24. John Dewey, A Common Faith . (l^ew Haven: Yale
.University Press, 1934), 56.
25. Ibid., 86.
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of religion, and one that is apparent in all of his
writings, is his strong emphasis of consciousness as
personal, functional, and social. There is no mistaking
the fact that he is definitely in the camp of the functional-
ists. However, since "there is no functional psychology;
rather there are many functional psychologies , "^^ It is
necessary to distinguish the various aspects of his psychology
from that of other functionalists. His position is clearly
stated in chapter two of his Psychology of Religion
,
entitled,
"The Psychology of Mental Mechanisms and the Psychology of
Persons."^''' Appended to the chapter is an article by Coe
which was first published in The Psychological Review
,
March,
1915, under the title, "A Proposed Classification of Mental
Functions , "^Q in which he outlines the specific nature of
mental functions and hov; they are distinguished from other
functions
•
Coe begins by pointing out the truth and the fallacy
in both the structuralist's and the behaviorist ' s position.
He agrees with James that "states of consciousness them-
selves are not verifiable facts."^^ Sensations, like atoms,
26. Carr, "Punctionalism , " 60.
27. Coe, The Psychology of Religion , 14-42.
28. Coe, "A Proposed Classification of Mental
Functions," The Psychological Review , 12 (March, 1915), 87-98»
29 • William James, Psychology . Briefer Course
(J^ev/ York: Henry Holt and Company, 1890) , 467.
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are not facts of experience, but constructs from experience.'
Recognizing this fact, Goe says that we can go on analyzing
states of consciousness as such, "but we must then recognize
that the material in v±Llch we work (sensations, feelings,
etc.) is not mental life in its concreteness , but rather
certain abstracted aspects of this life,"*^-^ However, Goe
is quick to point out that such constructs, even though they
may be abstractions, have theoretical and practical value,
and there is little likelihood that psychology v/ill ever
completely dispense with this method of approach to mental
life. Their value corresponds to that which constructs have
in physics and chemistry, nevertheless, Coe recognizes that
the structuralist's position is one-sided and does not give
the total picture. He states:
If, however, anyone speaking in the name of
psychology should suggest that mental mechanisms
is all th^t there is to mental life, he would be
convincing only to those whose analysis stops
short of primary empirical data.""^
Although behaviorism challenges the structuralist's
view regarding states of consciousness, it too is rejected
by Goe as giving an incomplete and partial picture. It
represents simply a nev; division of labor within the field
30. Goe, 'fhe Psychology of Religion , 16,
31. Ibid., 17.
32. Ibid., 17.
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of psychology, and while its influence is wholesome, in
that it challenges the psychologist to exhibit actual data,
it attempts to crowd out consciousness. By ignoring function
and meaning, it has little to say except regarding bodily
movements and physiological change .^"^ Qoe gives the follov/-
ing example of the inadequacy of the behaviorist point of
view:
Prom one point of view conversation, for example,
is just behavior, that is, a set of co-ordinated
movements of lips, tongue, vocal cords, diaphragm
and intercostal muscles, facial muscles, eyes,
hands, etc. Analysis of these movements will very
likely help us to understand what happens when two
men converse. But to ignore everything in conver-
sation except such movements is to leave out the
function of it, which is the interchange of mean-
ings between persons.34
The inadequacjr of both the structuralist and the
behaviorist position calls for a third point of view. 'ITiis
is that of functional psychology. Coe maintains that the
dynamic functioning point of view alone is profitable, and
that therefore the psychology of religion must viev/ its data
from the functionalist's viewpoint .^^
Coe defines mental function as "mental action
directed toward furtherance of life," but he always stresses
33. Ibid., 18.
34. Ibid., 18.
35. Ibid., 21.
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the "preferential" nature of psychological, as contrasted
with biological, functions, "A function," he says, "is to
be defined by reference to the advantage or value toward
which the process in question moves ."^^ VJhereas the bio-
logical "object under investigation" does not seek the end
which ths investigator attributes to it, "mind as we know
it best may be described as seeking preferred things and
experiencing success or failure."'^''' The object of this
preferential function is "value," which Coe defines as
"anything experienced or thought of as satisfying or the
contrary. "'^^
Such a personalis tic
,
preferential conception of
psychological function, as distinguished from merely bio-
logical function, Coe regards as the most useful approach
for psychology of religion, because it is impossible to
understand the nature of religious experience by simply re-
ducing the complex to its elements. Coe maintains that we
need to go from analysis, vjhloh yields us the elements of
the complex, on to a psychology of values and functions, if
we are to get at its meaning.
3b. Ibid., 23.
37. Ibid., 22.
38. Ibid., 20.
39. Ibid., 20.
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vniat is needed, according to Goe, is "an empirical
science of self-realizations, or, in short, a psychology
40
of selves." The life-seeking, functioning self becomes
the subject of Coe's psychology. He maintains that human
life cannot be construed by purely biological categories in
terms of food and sex, for while man does have an instinctive
outfit in common with the brutes, these instincts, which in
animals have only biological function, in man acquire new
functions and fresh values. For example, Goe says:
The idealizations of affection are not merely
subtle glorifications of sexual acts or reproduc-
tive results. 'In thine eyes, my darling,' said
a dying man to his wife, 'have l beheld the Eternal.'
More than this: affection between one and one be-
comes an important factor in solidifying the mono-
gamic family and the v/hole ethical order of which
it is a part. Here instinct is taken up into a
larger scheme of things than appeared at earlier
stages of life, and a different scheme .^^
Regarding adjustment, Goe takes a view that is
dynamic and personal. He regards as "shortsighted" the
idea that the function of the mind is simply that of adjust-
ment to the physical environment. It is prim.arily social
adjustment, for only by "abstract afterthought" do things
become merely physical, completely dissociated from persons.
Goe maintains that if the notion of adjustment is to be
40. Ibid., 19.
41. Ibid., 25.

103
used concerning the individual's relations with his environ-
ment, physical and social, it cannot be in the merely "bio-
logical, sense of the term. It must include the thought of
mutual, reciprocal adjustment of others to ourselves as well
as ourselves to others; a reciprocal accommodation v/hich
leads ourselves and others to full-orbed personality. Adjust-
ment must not be interpreted merely as adaptation to other
persons of the social group, but an adjustment to an ideal
of personality to which they and v/e alike move»^^
Goe makes a careful distinction between the concept
of "process" and the concept of "function." "Iviental function,"
he says, "implies such things as need, want, desire, purpose,
ideal; and these lead away from states, thought of as merely
compounded, toward self-realizing personality." Process,
on the other hand, has to do with mere change per se , but
function means that "something in the end is better off ."'^'^
Goe prefers to use the expression "situation and
response," rather than "stimulus and response" v/hen dealing
v/lth functions. He states:
If we attempt to get below such situations to
mere stimuli, v;e think of each item thereof as
stimulus of a particular sensation. l\low, inasmuch
as sensations are not concretely existing things
but only aspects of a total experience, a stimulus
42. Ibid, 26-27.
43. Ibid., 28.
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of a sensation is itself only an aspect of a total
situation. Our responses are made to situations
rather than to stimuli ."^^
The conclusion v;hich Coe reaches In this important
chapter is that if psychology is to have anything signifi-
cant to say about religion, it must view its data from the
functional point of view. Lierely to describe mental states
as static entitles, v/ill, according to Coe, give no real
knowledge of religion. Religion is found only v/hen mental
states function and become organic in the lives of individ-
uals and societies. For this reason, psychology of religion
must advance beyond mental states and mental mechanisms and
deal with persons. The importance of this functional,
personalistlc point of view for the whole working out of
his psychology of religion is stated by Coe himself:
The conclusions that I reached in this article ['^A
Proposed Classification of Mental Functions'!] are
basic to my Psychology of Religion . For the main
significance of this volume lies m its endeavor to
trace out, in religious phenomena, the working of
preferences that characterize the mind as such. 'ITiis
is the sense in v/hich I treated religion as a
natural phenomena •'^^
2. Coe's Criticism of Angell and Dev/ey
Since Coe's particular type of functionalism is
44. Ibid., 29.
45. Coe, "My Own Little 'Theatre," 105.
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dynainic, personal, and social, he stands in disagreement
at many points with those functionalists who tend to empha-
size a mechanistic and biological point of view* For example,
he regarded Angell's functional analysis of consciousness as
"an engineer's drawing of mind as an adjusting mechanism, "^^
Although Goe borrows freely from Angell's classification of
mental functions when dealing v/ith biological functions, he
finds it necessary to supplement his analysis, particularly
with regard to preferential functions. Angell merely finds
and describes a function for each element of structure, but
does not take into account similarities and differences
among the functions themselves. Coe also criticizes Angell's
position in that he does not give sufficient attention to
the interests of the developed mind, but is primarily occupied
v/ith the earliest mental reactions. On this point Goe
states
;
. • . his genetic method keeps his eyes fixed
upon the earliest mental reactions, the terminus
quo , whereas our problem--the direction of mental
movement--requires us to consider also the most
developed reaction as a terminus ad quern . I find
no fault with Angell for not answering questions
that he does not raise, but functional psychology
must surely incorporate into itself a fuller
description of the interests of the developed mmd.'^'''
For Goe, Angell's analysis did not go far enough to
46. Goe, The Psychology of Religion
, 33.
47. Ibid., 33.
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suit the needs of his psychology as an "empirical science
of self-realizations." "After we have named early utili-
ties," says Goe, "and even after we have made such general!
zatlons as that mind extends the control and organization
of movements, something in the nature of function still
4ft
remains over." V/hat interested Goe, more than Angell,
was the terminal meaning of the v/hole.
Goe had much the same criticism for Dewey as he did
for Angell. Goe regards as "oversimplification" Dewey's
assumption that the genesis of a thing explains the whole
of Its development. This appears to be characteristic of
those who emphasize the biological aspects of function.
Regarding Dewey, Goe states:
The claim of Dewey that a thing is fully explained
as soon as its genesis is described is true on
condition that 'genesis' is made sufficiently
broad to cover the whole evolution of function. i3ut
if 'genesis' refers merely to the earliest functions,
and if genetic explanations consist in classifying
the later -developed functions under the earlier ones,
then we have the kind of oversimplification that
reveals similarities but conceals differences."*^
Probably the point of greatest difference betv/een
Dewey's point of view and that of Goe, is that Dev/ey is
a humanist, and Goe, a personalist. Goe regards the cosmos
48. Ibid., 33.
49. Ibid., 25, footnote.
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as personal, and views reality as a society of persons
50having their being in and through one supreme person,*^
This personal idealism always lies back of Coe's psychology
and rejects any concept of mental function which reduces It
to the level of mere biological adaptation or adjustment to
environment
•
C. COE'S RELATION TO OTHER PUI^CTIONAL
PSYCHOLOGISTS OP RELIGION
The functional approach in psychology of religion
was nothing new at the time when Coe wrote The Psychology
of Religion * It had already found expression in the writings
of other religious psychologists, notably King and Ames.
Hiclcman regards the functional approach as one of the main
lines of development in psychology of religion. He states:
One of the mam lines of development m psychol-
ogy of" religion has been in the direction of social
psychology interfused with the spirit of functional-
isra. • • Perhaps the outstanding volumes of this
type are two books by Irving King: The Differentia -
tion of the Religious Consciousness (1905) and The
Development of Religion (1910) > Edward Sdribner
Ames' PsychoTogy of Religious Experience (1910); and
Coe's The Psychology of Religion (1916) . Stratton's
The Psychology of the Religious Life might be char-
acterized as a social study of religion but it is
built more along structural than functional lines.
50. Coe, "The Philosophy of the Movement for Religious
Education," American Journal of Theology , 8 (April, 1904),
225-39, 228.
51. Frank S. Hiclonan, Introduction to the Psychology
of Religion
.
(wew York: The Abingdon Press, T9^6) , 23.
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Coe's personalistic conception of the psychological
function will be clarified and sharpened as we consider the
points of similarity and difference which he has with other
functional psychologists of religion.
!• Irving King
Although King's work is largely in the field of
sociology of religion, he also attempts to view his data
from a psychological point of view. Like Dewey, King has
a strong biological emphasis. He tends to regard human
functions as merely "complex cases of subhuman functions . "^^
His tendency, according to Coe, is "to construe mental
life m terms of combinations within a mechanically con-
trolled system. "^^ 'I'his is a position which Goe feels
endangers the functional point of view altogether. Although
' Coe recognizes the importance of evolutionary theory, his
concept of values leads him to make more careful distinctions
between the biological instincts of lower animals and the
higher forms of human life. Mechanistic drives, even in
highly com.plex form, are not adequate, according to Coe, to
explain the psychology of persons.
2 m Jidv/ard Scribner Ames
52. King, iTie Development of Religion , 39.
53. Coe, I'he Psychology of Religion
,
30, footnote.
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Coe gives credit to Ames for having written the
"clearest, most systematic discussion of the functional
standpoint in psychology of religion ."^^ i^Jevertheless
,
Coe finds himself in disagreement with many points in
Ames's psychology of religion.
Ames's hook. The Psychology of Religious Experience
,
published six years before Coe's principle work in psychol-
ogy of religion, Is marked by its fidelity to the bio-
logical conception of the mind, which characterized the
view of Angell and Dewey, In the second chapter of his
book, entitled, "The Psychological Standpoint," Ames states
his position:
The conception of the mind as an instrument of
adjustment and adaptation is a biological concep-
tion and marks the radical transformation which
psychology has undergone through the influence
of the science of biology. This implies the
general doctrine of evolution, r.iind is the means
by vihich adaptations occur in novel and complex
situations, and is therefore the most important
factor in the survival of the highest organisms.
With Ames, everything in human life, whether ancient
or modern, is explained in terms of adaptive biological
activities of the "psychophysical" organism to its environ-
ment. Coe points out, however, that human activity is
54. Ibid., 21.
55. iiiiv^ard S. Ames, The Psychology of Religious
Experience. (Boston: Houghton kifflin Company, 1910)
.
5e. Ibid., 15-16.
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characterized "by the pursuit of ideals which are self-
imposed. Animals, it is true, may seek food and other
tolological necessities, however, "the processes with which
the psychologist has to do tend to define their own functions
or ends, as merely biological processes do not."^''' Goe
makes it clear that human activity, especially in the
experience of religion, is guided, not only by biological
needs, but includes the search for higher values which are
self -im.pos ed •
V/hile Ames points out that our environment acts upon
us and we adapt ourselves to it, he fails to include the
fact that we also act upon our environment and make
transformations in it to suit our human ends.^^ Goe points
out that Ames's treatment of religious experience is most
objective when he deals with lov/er forms of religion, but
such biological concepts as Ames uses, tend to break down
when applied to higher forms ,59
The fact that Ames brings in the mind as a mere
instrument of adjustment again illustrates the inadequacy
of the biological conception of function. Mind, as Ames
views it, is merely a valuable variation which gives the
57. Goe, The Psychology of Religion
, 22.
58. Ames, The Psychology of Religious Experience
, 15.
59. Goe, The Psy chology of Religion
, 31, footnote.
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himan species a tremendous advantage over lov/er forms in
the struggle for survival; "it is the most important
factor in the survival of the highest organisms." In
this connection, Coe maintains:
When functional ism is taken to mean th^at the
mind is a mere instrument, it is as natural as
can be that somev/here as we proceed we shall
smuggle in the mind, no longer as a mere instru-
ment, but as that which is being adjusted • . .^^
In general, Ames work seem.s to illustrate the fact
that the biological conception of function, while it aids
som.ewhat in our understanding of much that occurs in the
primitive life of mankind at the level of appetite and
instinct, is of little use v/hen we attempt to apply it
to developed religious consciousness of cultured peoples.
Furthermore, the concept of adjustment when applied to the
human mind in its relation with either its physical or
social environment, is inadequate in itself fully to ex-
plain the activity of a developed mind.
3. Francis L. Strickland
Strickland in his Psychology of Religious Experience ,^
60. Ames, The Psychology of Religicu s Experience , 15.
61. Goe, "Religion from the Standpoint of Functional
Psychology," American Journal of Theology
, 15 (April, 1911),
62. Francis L. Strickland, Psychology of Religious
Experience . (iNiew York: The Abingdon Press, 19247"^!

112
published in 1924, presents a functional psychology of
religion, which, like Coe's, is also personalistic • In
the preface of his hook, Strickland states that he seeks
to write a personalistic psychology of religion, and he
gives credit to Ooe and Pratt, as v/ell as McDougall, whose
Outline of Psychology he regards as "a convincing exposi-
tion of the inadequacy of the 'mosaic' and mechanistic
psychology of organisms, and a vindication of purpose as a
necessary principle of interpretation of human experience*
Strickland adopts Coe ' s use of the v/ord "function"
in the sense of value. He rejects the biological use of
the term v/hich so characterized the work of Ames. On this
point, Strickland says:
• • • when experiences of the personal life are
under consideration we need a larger meaning for
the v/ord 'function' than the sense in which the
biologist uses the term. Here 'function' is used
in reference to the satisfaction of desires
—
desires not simply of a physical nature like food,
sex, safety, etc, but desires born on a higher
level—the desire for fellov/ship, sympathy, the
desire to help and serve others, the desires born
of moral love. Thus the v/ord 'function,' when
it rises above the biological levels of the organ-
ism, comes to mean 'value. '^'^
Value, when taken on the plane of the physical, may
according to Strickland, refer to anything through which
63. Ibid., 13,
64. Ibid., 70.
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elemental desires are satisfied, "but on the personal and
moral levels, the concept of value takes on a higher mean-
ing. On this level, value has reference "not merely to
gratification of physical impulses and needs hut to the
satisfaction of all desires and longings of the moral life
which are characteristic of man as a social, personal
being. "65
This concept of function, v/hich includes a search
for higher values, is in fundamental agreement with Coe's
view, Coe refuses to place on the same level, or to regard
of the same order, "our socially communicable desires and
purposes" and "animal life that lacks means of communica-
tion. "^^ For this reason, both Coe and Strickland would
agree that "functional psychology should be first and fore-
most, a psychology of personal self-realizations," and
that "functional psychology of religion must be this above
all things else."67
4» Paul E. Johnson
In Paul E. Johnson's recent book. Psychology of
65. Ibid., 70.
66. Coe, The Psychology of Religion , 30.
67. Ibid., 30.
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Religion
,
68 we are presented with a point of view that is
both dynamic and interpersonal, and which shows a reflec-
tion of many of Goe's fundamental tenets. Yfln.at Johnson
terms "dynamic Psychology" appears to be much the same as
Goe's functional ism., although quite different than that of
Ames. For example, Johnson aims "to study religious
experience as a spontaneous process in time motivated by
value goals. Purpose rather than cause is the fundamental
category. "^^ The emphasis here is teleological , but it
goes "beyond instinct and stimulus -response to purpose and
goal-tensions."'''*^ Johnson shows how psychology is coming
to reject atomistic elements, which so characterized the
structuralists, and is emphasizing organic wholes. Dynamic
processes are coming to replace static elements.'''^ The
manner in whiclp. Johnson views human activity as a dynamic
process of value or goal seeking suggests the influence of
functionalism, as well as of the hormic psychologies.
Like Goe, he goes beyond mere biological adaptation and
regards mental function as directed primarily in the
Interest of personal and social self-realization. For
68. Paul E. Johnson, Psycholo,
York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press , 1945
(New
69. Ibid 8.
70. Ibid 23.
71. Ibid 23.
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Johnson, personality is "the organizing unity of experience
directed by insight and purpose. "'^2
Johnson, like Coe, seems to regard adjustment as
something mutual and reciprocal, never merely a one-v/ay
process of environmental adaptation, hence his use of the
term "interpersonal," Johnson states:
Responses are to be seen as intra-activities of
personality, even as society is the interactivity
of personalities. This may be called interpersonal
psychology, for the person is the essential unit of
interaction in a social order. '''^
I^ote the similarity between the above statement and
the way in which Coe speaks of responses as functions:
Our responses are made to situations rather than
to stimuli. Further, since responses are functions,
they have a predetermined tendency. • . In the
functions best known to us persons are adjusting
themselves to the ideals or standards of personal-
social life .74
The fundamental agreement between Coe and Johnson
is that both reject atomistic and mechanistic interpreta-
tions of personality and human activity; both attempt to
view man from a holistic viewpoint which takes in the
social environment; both regard man as seeking values and
goals in terms of purposive behavior, above the level of
mere satisfaction of biological needs.
72. Ibid., 32.
73. Ibid., 32.
74. Coe, The Psychology of Religion , 29-30.

CHAPTER V
COE'S MAJOR WORK li^ PSYCHOLOGY OP RELIGION
betv/een 1900, when Coe's first book. The Spiritual
Life, was published, and 1916, when his major work in
psychology of religion appeared, many notable contributions
were made to the psychological understanding of religion.
One year after the appearance of 'The Spiritual Life
,
Professor V/illiam James of Harvard delivered the Gifford
Lectures at Edinburgh University, during the years 1901-
1902. These lectures were published in 1902 under the
title The Varieties of Religious Experience * James's
Varieties attracted immediate and wide -spread attention.
It remains to this day one of the great foundation studies
in the psychology of religion, and Is still the most widely
read work in the field.
An early treatment of the broad social aspects of
religious experience was Davenport's Primitive Traits in
Religious Revivals
,
published in 1905. Davenport, a
sociologist, through his study of religious revivals makes
a special contribution to crowd psychology.
The next contribution to the now rapidly growing
literature on the subject was made by Professor James B.
Pratt, then of Williams College. His first book in
psychology of religion was called The Psychology of
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Religious belief
,
published in 1907. In this book, Pratt
makes a strong case for mysticism.
In 1908, George B. Cutten's book, 'fhe Psychological
Phenomena of Christianity
,
appeared.^ Although this book
is interesting, its appeal is to the popular mind, and has
not been influential as a technical contribution to the
field.
In 1910, Professor Edward S. Ames made a notable
contribution with his book, 'Jhe Psychology of Keligious
Experience . 'I'his book is of special interest for the
present study since Ames's approach, like Goe's, is both
functional and social.
The Psychology of the Religious Life by George M*
Stratton, appearing in 1911, was the next important work
in psychology of religion. Stratton' s book is based almost
entirely on sacred scriptures and ethnic records, and is
catholic in its range of instances.
Since 1896, Professor James H. Leuba had been a
most prolific writer of articles on the psychology of
1. James B. Pratt, The Psychology of Religious Belief .
(iJew York: 'The Macmillan Company," 1907) .
2. George B. Cutten, The Psychological Phenomena of
Christianity
.
(i\ew York: Charles Scrlbner's Sons, 1908).
3. George M. Stratton, The Psychology of the
Religious Life . (London: The kacmillan Company, 1911)
.
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religion which had been published in various scientific
journals in both Prance and America. His first book, A
Psychological Study of Religion , was published in 1912*
It is one of the most interesting and important books on
the. subject.
In 1916, Coe , who sixteen years before had done an
Important piece of pioneering work in the field, published
his book The Psychology of Religion which represents the
most systematic presentation of his views on the subject.
At that time it was regarded as the most complete text-
book m psychology of religion for it runs the whole gamut
of the religious life, and attempts a co-ordination of the
results of previous investigations.
The Psychology of Religion , Goe • s major work in the
field, was written "primarily as a handbook for beginners
in the psychological analysis of religion." Much of the
content of the book is a restatement of ideas and investi-
gations previously published in various articles. As we
will see in later chapters, many of the ideas which he
presents in this book are further developed and applied in
his writings in religious education and social ethics. The
purpose of this chapter will not be to examine all of Goe's
views on psychology of religion in every detail, but rather
4. Coe, 'Ihe Psychology of Religion , ix.
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to present and- analyze such ideas as are fundamental to
his psychology of religion, and significant in terras of
his contribution to the field.
For the purpose of organization, we will consider
Goe's Psychology of Religion under the following headings:
(1) Coe's social theory of religion; (2) The origin and
development of religion; (5) Special problems in the
psychology of religion*
A. COE'S SOCIAL THEORY OP RELIGION
1. Religious Consciousness
In analyzing religious consciousness, Coe takes a
dynamic or functional point of view, seeking to treat the
phenomena in terms of value. He regards as unfruitful the
attempt to define religion by reference to certain content
of belief because such a view assumes that religious ideas
are self-sustaining entitles, the product of intellectual
leisure, while in reality, they develop out of "the grind
of existence."^ Equally unfruitful, according to Coe, is
the. attempt to reduce religion to feeling, for religion
involves both feeling and intellect. He states that
"religious feelings themselves demand to be understood by
5. Ibid., 60.
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reference to the situations in which they arise and the
part they play in the total adjustment process."^
Religious consciousness, according to Goe's view,
is primarily a consciousness of ends or values. This he
regards as the most fruitful point of view for the study of
religion as a v/hole« Considered functionally, Coe maintains
that probably the chief thing in religion is "the progres-
sive discovery and reorganization of values.""^ Ends,
therefore, become more important than means so far as the
central function of religion is concerned. Leuba defined
religion as "that part of human experience in which man
feels himself in relation with powers of psychic nature,
usually personal powers, and makes use of tbem." Here the
divine beings of religion appear as mere ends to means.
Elsewhere, Leuba states: "It is not the needs which are
distinctive of religion, but the methods whereby they are
gratified."^ Such a view, says Coe, presupposes a certain
constancy of needs, while the methods employed to supply
them vary. Vi/hen viewed from the standpoint of the evolving
human mind, however, "needs evolve, values are discovered.
6. Ibid., 60,
7. Ibid., 65.
8. Leuba, A Psychological Study of Religion , 52.
9. Ibid., 8.
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and thus man gradually comes to himself and not merely to
fresh means for static ends."-^0 Man is constantly discover-
ing new values. The process of discovery, reorganization,
and revaluation of values Goe believes to be the distinguish-
ing aspect of religion. Needs change, and new values are
discovered as a matter of fact and history. He gives the
following five propositions to justify his position:
First, human desire is not extinguished when its
immediate satisfaction is attained. • .
Secondly, human desires undergo a process of
organization toward unity of the individual. . .
Thirdly, human desires come thus to include a
desire to have desires. . •
Fourthly, human desires undergo a process of
organization toward social as v/ell as individual
unity. . .
Fifthly, human desire, growing by what it feeds
on, refining itself, judging itself, organizing
itself, becomes also desire for the conservation
of the human desire-and -satisfaction type of
experience
The first of these propositions is clearly illustra-
ted in the case of our higher values. Knowledge, for
example, once attained usually increases the desire for
knowledge. Coe claims that desires are not static; we are
constantly objectifying them, comparing them, and organiz-
ing them in scales more or less refined. The desire to
have desires is illustrated in the way men mold themselves
and desire not only objects but to become a certain type of
10. Goe, The Psychology of Religion , 66.
11. Ibid., 66-68.
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person. The fourth point Coe finds demonstrated in education
as socially organized desire, and in the fact that individu-
ality has social reference* Finally, Coe states that "we
desire to endow our values with the added value of time-
defiance."-'-^
Although Coe avoids giving a formal definition of
religion, certain statements make his position unmistakably
clear. He gives the name "religion" to "this whole desire-
v/ithin-desire , this v/hole revaluation of values that both
m-akes us individuals and organizes us into society." Coe
claim-s that in its descriptive sense religion is usually
found "wherever m.en intensely identify themselves with some-
thing as their very life.""''^ From a psychological point of
view, Coe believes that "any reaction may then be considered
as religious to the extent that it seeks 'life' in the sense
of completion, unification, and conservation of values—any
values whatever.""'-^ In a later section he states that
religion is a law of mental evolution in accordance with
which wants tend to be reintegrated in terms of personal-
social self-realization;"-^^ and again, "the modern social
12. Ibid., 68.
13. Ibid., 68.
14. Ibid
.
,
69.
15. Ibid
.
70.
16. Ibid., 235.
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movement, where it is most reflective, is religious • "'•'^
It seems to be at this point, that of defining religion
in terms of valuation, that Coe is m.ost strongly criticized.
It might be said that Coe makes no hard and fast distinction
betv;een religious consciousness and ethical consciousness,
or between religious values and other values. This Coe
virtually concedes when he states: "If the question be asked
wherein, then, religious value is distinct from ethical value,
the answer is that it is not distinct from ethical or any
other value." By this, however, Coe does not mean that all
values are Identical. In an earlier article on "Religious
Value," Coe states that ethical value and religious value
are of the same kind, but "one climbs only part way up the
19ladder which the other essays to mount to the very top."
Coe further states:
Any kind of value may be a religious value, but
only on condition of a certain inner self-transcendence
whereby the particular value demands complete organiza-
tion of itself with other values, and ideally com.plete
realization of the unitary whole.
This close identification of ethics v/ith religion,
morality with spirituality, runs through the whole of Coe's
17. Ibid., 243.
18. Ibid., 74.
19. Coe, "Religious Value," Journal of Philosophy
,
5 (May, 1908), 253-56, 256.
20. Ibid., 255.
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writings. In his second book. The Religion of A Mature
Kind
,
published in 1902, Coe has a chapter entitled "Moral
Foundations of Spirituality," in \*iich he argues for a
closer identification of religion v/ith morality.^-^ Coe
regards as one-sided any attempt to separate religious and
spiritual values from the values of the common life.
Pratt is one of Coe's chief critics on this point.
Ee regards Coe's position as "a natural tendency to define
religion in terms of what one v/ould like it to express. "^^
Pratt regards Coe's failure to see any real difference
between religion and morality as the natural consequence of
his complete acceptance of the social view of the individual
which the work of Baldwin and Royce has made familiar.
Leuba's feeling on the matter is much the same as
Pratt's. He maintains that Coe has arbitrarily extended the
historical meaning of the word "religion" until it becomes
synonymous with the central tendency of social life itself.
He regards this as an attempt to defend religion by reducing
it to the commonplace. Leuba states:
The present tendency to resolve religion into
something which v/ould claim the entire approval of
all, is highly significant of the defensive position
21. Coe, The Religion of a Mature Mind. (Chicago:
Fleming H. Revell Com.pany, 1902) , 135-56.
22. James B. Pratt, Review of Coe's Psychology of
Religion , Journal of Philosophy , 14 (August, 1917}
,
44?-46,
445.
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into which existing religions have "been forced.
Who v/ould not wish to be called religious if
religion were adequately described, as some claim
it is, as 'the consciousness of the higher social
values? • 23
In view of such criticism it should be pointed out
that early in his book Coe states that his present problem
is not so much to say "what men ought to mean v/hen they use
the term 'religion,' but rather to indicate the direction of
attention or the organizing idea that is at present most
useful in the psychology of religion. "^^ The point is that
Coe does not attempt to adequately distinguish religion from
the rest of life, but rather to draw attention to the creative
force manifested in social life, both within and without
religion. He is not primarily concerned with that which
characterizes religion as a separate type of human activity,
but rather with considering a significant factor common to
all forms of social life. Nevertheless, since Coe is writ-
ing as a psychologist of religion, it would perhaps appear
important that he should have made a closer distinction
betv/een religion in its narrower, as well as in its broader
sense
.
To define religion in terms of value is not original
25. James H. Leuba, Review of Coe's Psychology of
Religion
,
Psychological Bulletin , 14 (Novemxber, 1917),
397-401, 40DT
24. Coe, The Psychology of Religion , 62.
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v;ith Coe, although his view differs somev/hat from that of
H^ffding, King, and Ames who had already defined religion
from the point of viev/ of values. Hflffding regards
religion as "the conservation of values. "^^ According to
Coe, Hfiffding's definition is the first instance of a
definition of religion constructed wholly from the concep-
tion of values • .Hov/ever , Coe believes that conservation
of values is only one phase of religion, and such a
definition does not take into account the "immanent criti-
cism whereby what v/.ould otherv;lse be merely a serial order
of desires and satisfactions is organized into the unity
of personal and social lives, so that they, and they only,
in the end, have value." °
Ames's definition of religion as "the consciousness
of the highest social values, "^'7 is criticized by Coe for
tv;o reasons. First, Coe feels that in limiting religion
to purely social values, Ames fails to take into account
the fact that purely private communion is "functionally
continuous with experiences in which salvation is conceived
socially." Second, Ames fails to differentiate between
25. Harald Kfiffding, The Philosophy of Religion .
E. B. Meyer, translator, ( Lond on : The MacmllTan ComDany,
1906, 1914) ,107.
26. Coe, The Psychology of Religion
, 71.
27. Ames, The Psychology of Religious Experience , viii.
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religious consciousness and social consciousness as such,'^^
Coe v;ould be more ready to agree v/ith Ames if the word
"highest" in his definition were made to refer to a law of
social valuation whereby men criticize and reconstruct their
standards. However, since Ames gives specific content to
the word "highest," Coe regards his definition as too narrow.
2, Religious Revaluation of Values
In dealing with Goe's concept of revaluation of
values we are dealing with one of the more unique aspects
of his psychology of religion. It is at this point, that
of the dynamic evolution of values through the process of
critical evaluation, that Coe differs most from other psychol-
ogists of religion who also define religion in terms of value.
Although this concept of revaluation of values is found to
p'ervade almost the v/hole of Goe's published v/ritings, its
fullest and clearest exposition is found in chapter thir-
teen of The Psychology of Religion entitled "The Religious
Revaluation of Values." Just how this concept influences
his thinking in religious education and social ethics v/lll
be discussed later.
The basis of Goe's viev/ that religion involves the
revaluation of values, stems from his belief that evolution
28. Coe, 'The Psychology of Religion , 72.
'j VL
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applies just as much to religious experience as it does to
every other aspect of human experience • According to
Coe, the proposition that human nature is always the same,
is true only when applied to the structure of the mind and
not to functions. That there is an evolution of functions,
Goe makes clear in the follov/ing statement:
We may properly speak of an evolution of mental
functions because preferences actually change.
Human development does not consist merely in find-
ing new varieties of food with which to satisfy
primordial appetites, hut also in achieving new
wants, genuinely new wants •^'-^
Because Darwin in The Descent of Man emphasizes the
likeness between the human and the subhuman mind, mental
evolution has habitually come to m.ean mental continuity.
But Coe strongly maintains that differences and change are
just as fundamental. "Y/e know far better v;hat we have in
common with the brutes and savages," says Goe, than what
it is that separates us from them."*^-^ Goe feels that
Freud's psychoanalysis emphasizes mental continuity v/hile
it tends to overlook mental change. It always assumes that
out of several possible motives for conduct, the real one
is that which most closely corresponds to savage or pre-moral
29. Ibid., 215.
30. Ibid., 217.
31. Ibid., 219.
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conduct. This is a view v/hlch Coe shares v/ith Morton
Prince who has studied religion from the psychoanalytic
32point of view. Coe maintains that desires can he changed
and redirected as one achieves purpose and insight. Primary
impulses can be redirected and channeled through purpose and
the increasing reorganization of life through ideas. Coe
makes his point clear with the follov/ing analogy: "Hviman
nature, then, is not merely a current that flows by reason
of the lav; of gravity; it has also the peculiar property
of resisting and redirecting its own flovir."'^^ In Coe's
thinking, mental evolution of functions takes place v;hen v/e
discover new values in life, and when we criticize, re-
organize, and revalue our present standards and values.
This process Coe regards as closely akin to religion.
V/ith regard to the mental evolution of function, Coe
is influenced by Thorndike, so this concept cannot be re-
garded as original. Vfiiat is original, hov/ever, is the
manner in v;hich Coe has incorporated this viev; into religion
as its very essence, 'i'he germ of Thorndike 's view on this
matter v/e find in the following statement:
Man is now as civilized, rational, and human as
he is because man in the past has changed things
32 • Korton Prince, i'he Unconscious . (wew York:
The Macmillan Company, 1914) , 214.
33. Coe, The Psychology of Religion ^ 221.
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into shapes more satisfying, and changed parts of
hl3 ov/n nature into traits more satisfying, to
man as a whole • Man is thus eternally altering
himself. His nature is not right in his own eyes.
Only one thing In it, indeed, is unreservedly
good, the pov/er to make it better .^"^
'The viev/ that human functions evolve has, in Goe's
eyes, an important bearing for psychology of religion.
Religion seeks to change men's desires and to make them
want the right values. Religious consciousness Is most acute
at the point of sharpest conflict betv/een new and old func-
tions. Goe states that here "the religious experience it-
self is a revaluation of values, a reconstruction of life's
enterprise, a change in desire and in the ends of conduct. "35
Goe points out the evolutionary significance of the
prophetic spirit of the ethical type. The prophet challen-
ges the people to change, and although the prophet may be
stoned by his ov/n generation, a later generation builds a
monument to him because it lias changed its desires and come
to appreciate true values. Goe cites Zarasthustra, Gautama,
Jesus, and Mohammed as examples of groat reformers who took
the hard road which leads to change, he concludes that
"mental evolution is not motion in the line of least resis-
tance; it is the creation of problems and of difficulties
—
34. E. L. 'Thorndlke, Educational Psychology . (i-Jev/
York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1913), I, 281.
35. Coe, iTie Psychology of Religion , 222.
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It is the clearest sort of creative evolution. "^^
According to Coe, the sense of sin plays an impor-
tant role in this process of revalution of values. The
sense of sm, for Coe, has a definite social relevance. It
is, in large measure, "a realization on the part of indi-
viduals that they participate in a social order that is in
large measure unjust . "•'5*'' Coe further states:
Our sinfulness is conjoint, co-operative, and
our salvation accordingly must he wrought out in
a reconstruction of society. We are in the act
of achieving a social consciousness "by revaluation
of our value s.^^
As we will see more clearly in subsequent chapters,
Coe is here working out in psychology of religion what later
becomes the basis for his social theory of religious educa-
tion and his social ethics.
Coe shows that there is a great difference betv/een
the wants and desires of civilized men and those of the
savage. Over and above mere instinctive appetite, civilized
man acquires new wants through contemplation, reflection
and judgment. It is this process of achieving freedom from
impulsive states and the demand for nev; and larger self-
realizations which makes us persons. Such a process is
36. Ibid., 224.
37. Ibid., 226.
38. Ibid., 226.
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most clearly revealed in ethical conflict and achievement
in which man overcomes hatred and indifference to others.
V/hat religion seeks to do, according to Coe, is to complete,
unify, and conserve these values which have arisen in the
course of human development*^^
In contrast to Leuba, Coe maintains that religion
is not only insistence upon having enough of what is desired,
but also criticism of desires, or revaluation of values.
The direction of this revaluation and its central tendency
Is, according to Coe, the placing of increased value upon
40persons
•
Coe, to some extent, reflects Stratton's thesis that
tension and conflict are of the very essence of the v/hole
religious movem.ent.^^ This thesis, Stratton supports with
numerous citations from the religious literature of the
world. Plowever, since his method is purely objective, he
makes no attempt to interpret his data in terms of the
dynamic evolution of m.ental functions, as Coe does.
Stratton's v;ork seems to illustrate from a historical view-
point the very thing that Coe discovers through deeper and
more psychological analysis. T/hat Stratton fails to see.
39. Ibid., 227.
40. Ibid., 228.
41. See Stratton's The Psychology of the Religious
Life , 3.
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however, is that conflicts are only one aspect of religious
development, 'i'he end product is often a greater complete-
ness and unification. Goe thinks that Stratton's attitude
toward religion Is like that of a music critic who dis-
criminates the harmonies, discords, rhythmic contrasts,
4.0
etc., and then describes v;hat he has observed.
3. Religion as Discovery
In holding that the essence of religion is reval-
uation of values, Goe does not intend to imply that religious
experience is mere subjectivity. To make this clear, he goes
on to speak of religion as discovery or realization. In
religious experience, as in other experiences, Goe believes
that "some sort of reality reveals itself as present. "^^
Goe points out that in psychology intellectualism
has been replaced by dynamic views of the whole mental life.
Psychology has come to see that interest, satisfaction-
dissatisfaction, desire, action, enterprise, are just as
much a part of the mind as idea, memory, judgment, and
44thought system. In other words, both facts and values
42. Goe, Review of Stratton's The Psychology of the
Religious Life
,
Philosophical Review , 21 (September, 1912)
,
676-83.
43. Goe, The Psychology of Religion , 229.
44. Ibid., 231.
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are a part of the datum of experience. Furthermore, the
mind, as Coe views it, lies v/holly withm the objectively
real v/orld order. "kental process is process of the real
in relation to the real," Or, in other words, mm^ is
reality.
It v/as William KcDougall who appears to have had
the greatest influence upon Goe's thinking at this point.
He is one of many psychologists who have sought to point out
the continuity between biology and psychology, and to place
AC
the mind within the sphere of biological dynamics. Coe
takes this dynamic concept of the mind and applies it to
religious functions. He states:
The mind lives, moves, and has its being within
reality; it is reality . . . This general conception
of mind applies to religious functions exactly as
to others. Like commerce, government, or education,
religion is a process in which the real produces
definition of itself .^'7
Coe objects to the view that the work of discovery
is rightfully a monopoly of science. He states:
Mind as a whole is enterprise, and enterprise
is discovery. The sciences are a part of this
enterprise, and they do experimentally uncover
fresh data, but they also accept, and work with-
in, data uncovered by interests other than scien-
tific. Valuational changes that are going on
45. Ibid., 231
46. V/illlam McDougall, Body and Mind . (l\lew York;
The Macmillan Company, 1911)
•
47. Coe, The Psychology of Religion , 252.
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even in this day of ours are transforming the
very foundations of much scientific thought
As an Illustration of this valuational change, Goe
cites the modern recognition or discovery of persons.
Such discovery, Goe points out, has given new emphasis to
social values in many areas of investigation, such as in
history, economics, psychology, general logic, and theory
of the sciences. Goe feels ti^t the growth of social
points of view in the sciences Indicates a movement in our
sense of reality. Social values are being blended with the
special sciences in the discovery of man. It is in this
sense that Goe regards religion as discovery. He says:
It [religion] does not, indeed, establish any
body of doctrine that is immune to the ordinary
norms of judgment; rat'ier, it is a root that goes
on living v/hen criticism v;ithers our systems of
doctrine. Religion survives religious doctrines
because the adventure of life is large, and
because in its very largeness as adventure, it is
an original acquaintance v/ith the real. 49
Goe maintains that ideas such as the sacredness of
life, the rights of man, and the worth of the individual,
have been a recent discovery arising out of new social
contacts and relationships. Religion reintegrates this
discovery of the value of persons in terms of personal-
social self-realization. Religion then becomes the
48. Ibid., 233.
49. Ibid., 235.
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discoverer and organizer of values, as well as desire for
value and the revaluation of valuation of values. I'he
supreme value which religion has discovered is, according
to Goe, the worth of persons*
Goe's treatment of religion as discovery Is really
another instance of his argument that there is no funda-
mental separation between religious consciousness and other
forms of consciousness. As this concept is applied here,
the conclusion is that v/hile scientific discovery and
religious discovery are not identical, they are continuous.
Both science and religion are regarded as a part of a total
adjustment process which, in its totality, is discovery.
'I'he reality of mental processes is one of the axioms
of functional and dynamic psychology, to which Goe adheres.
Ames, as a functional psychologist, also holds to this
basic point of view. However, Goe's treatment is unique
in the manner in which he relates religious discovery with
scientific discovery, and in the emphasis v/hich he gives to
religion as the discovery of the worth of persons.
4. Religion as Social Immediacy
In dealing with the problem of social immediacy, or
how it is that persons are present to one another and have
50. Ames, 'I'he Psychology of Religious iilxperlence , 18-19.
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experiences in common, Coe delves into a matter v/hicli pre-
viously had be^n more a subject for philosophical specula-
tion, than psychological investigation. Coe states that
"psychology, keeping its eyes upon states of mind and laws
of mind, and assuming that there are individual minds to
which these laws apply, has rarely taken into account the
fact that these minds converse with one another. "^^ Yet
every psychological experiment assumes that the experimen-
ter and his subject can be mutually present to each other,
that they can converse and have meanings in common. In fact,
all science, as Coe views it, is based on the presupposition
of the real existence of a community of individual experien-
cers . In this respect, Coe believes that "science, as well
as religion, is a social affair."^^ The social immediacy
of science is not an isolated thing but is continuous v;ith
the ethical consciousness of being bound with others of
one's own kind under a common law, and it is also contin-
uous with religion. Here is Coe's thesis of the unity of
all life as he applies it to the problem of social immediacy.
He states:
All this social immediacy is continuous, too,
v/ith v;hat v/e have found to be most remarkable in
religion, nam.ely, the resolution of strains and
51. Coe, The Psychology of Religion, 246.
52. Ibid., 248.

140
crises, which make self-consciousness acute, by
spontaneous recognition of the experience as a
shared one, a social experience .^"^
• • • all our mediated knowledge rests upon--
Is made possible by—social Immediacy, which is
common to science, art, morals, and religion.^^
How, according to Coe, is the presence of another
realized? Coe begins by an examination of the self. Here
he cites Professor Calkins' study in experimental intro-
spection^^ to throw light on the conditions under which a
person experiences himself as immediately present. She
found that the self of each introspect or was always pre-
supposed by both the experimenter and his subject. The
point vi^hich Coe makes is that "my self-consciousness is
all one v/ith the consciousness of other like myself—my
self-consciousness is social consciousness."^^ According
to Coe, we cannot know ourselves without reference to
other minds. "The ego phase and the alter phase of experi-
ence grow up together and reciprocally."^*^
Many psychologists and philosophers before Coe have
va'estled v;ith the problem of hov/ one can knov; that other
53. Ibid., 249.
54. Ibid., 250.
55. Mary W. Calkins, "The Self in Scientific
Psychology," American Journal of Psychology , 26 (October,
1915) , 495-524.
56. Coe, The Psychology of Religion , 252.
57. Ibid., 254.
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minds exist. Leuba's ansv/er to the problem is as follov/s:
Human beings are objects of sense to me: I
touch, see, hear, them, 'fhej behave exactly as
I do and respond obviously to my presence. These
beings meet every scientific test to my belief
that they think and feel as I do.^^
Goe objects to Leuba's ansv/er because it uses
bodies as a bridge betv;een m.inds. Hocking's view is more
closely akin to Coe's since he holds that the bridge be-
tv/een minds is not physical but spiritual.'"^ Stratton also
believes that on the evidence of the physical alone, there
is no basis for believing in the existence of other minds.
But the social and moral instincts in man demands that
"ours must be a v/orld wherein there is mutual recognition,
mutual regard ."^"^ J. ii. Boodin agrees with Goe that minds
are continuous and that bodies do not come between. ^-^
Similar also is Royce's view: "Individuals may be included
v/ithin other individuals."
This viev/ of social immediacy is basic to Goe's
social theory of religion and his view of values generally.
58. James E. Leuba, "Religion and the Discovery of
Truth," Journal of Philosophy , 9 (July, 1912), 406-11, 409.
59. V/illiam E» Hocking, ITie Meaning of God in Human
Experience . (wew Haven; Yale University Press, 191^, 297.
60. Stratton, The Psychology of the Religious Life , 365.
61. John E. Boodin, "Individual and Social liinds,"
Journal of Philosophy , 10 (karch, 1913), 169-180.
62. Josiah Royce, The ?;orld and the Individual . (iMew
York: The Iviacmillan Company, 1904)
,
II,"^8.
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In an earlier article. He develops this vlev/ by citing a
particular experience of social immediacy, that of having
a friend. His conclusion is that the experience of having
a friend involves valuing an object as experiencing, and
that such valuing includes, and is the source of, our
certainty of other minds .^3
Coe believes tliat it is the immediate social dynamic
that constitutes the basis for the Christian's experience
of the love of God. Here again we see a basis for his
social ethics. Coe maintains that the self-manifestation
of God to us lies in the love that v;e experience toward
one another. 'J?he point he makes is that "our communion
with him lies in the attitude that we take toward the social
motive Itself. "^^ The whole heart of the matter is v;ell
expressed in the following wo3?ds:
It is perfectly possible for us to depersonalize
our world. We can go on v;ith such depersonalization
until our fellov/s seem, to be little more than things.
On the other hand, by exercising social impulses,
by forming, criticizing, and reforming social pur-
poses, by sharing in the joys and woes of others,
and by self-sacrifice for thB " neighbor , we can focal-
ize and intensify our consciousness of social reals.
V/e can intensify it until our real world is
63. Coe, "On Having Friends: A Study of Social Values,"
Journal of Philosophy , 12 ( March, 1915), 155-61, 161.
64. Coe, The Psychology of Religion, 260,
65. Ibid., 261-62.
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pre-eminently the v/orld of persons. With the grov/th
of intense devotion to the neighbor v;hom we have
seen--one's own devotion, and the devotion of others
it becomes easier and easier to believe in God.^S
The case for social immediacy, as Coe presents it,
becomes an important part of the foundation upon which his
whole structure of social theory rests. It is in his deal-
ing with this subject, perhaps more than with any other,
that Coe's personalism becomes clearly apparent. In
chapter eight we v/ill see hov/ Coe's viev/ is related to
that of other personalists
.
B. THE ORIGIK AND DEVEL0PME1\TT OP RELIGION
1« Racial Beginnings
Coe looks for the beginnings of religion in the
primitive social group, because he maintains that religion
is first a public matter, rather than a private one. It
is custom which completely dominates the early group, and
to this body of custom the individual gives blind obedience.
The interests which underlie the beginnings of religion as
well as other customs are emotional rather than intellectual,
and concern such activities as food -getting
,
marriage, birth,
sickness, death, initiation, war, protection from beasts
65. Ibid., 261-62
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and from the weather. At this stage, Coe Claims that
religion, morality, and law are still undivided, for life
has not yet become departmentalized. Coe states that the
whole of primitive life is to be thought of as "instinct
action passing up through group consciousness (custom)
toward personal experience and reflection . "^^ The instinc-
tive impulses are restrained and organized by group pressure
rather than by individual reflection.
Coe points out certain phenomena of early tribal
life which has obvious religious significance. Tribal cere-
monies and rites, such as those connected with f ood -getting
,
war, initiation, marriage, etc., represent both social
organization and ideas as to how the values of life are to
be secured. Such values, however, for the primitive man,
are primarily utilitarian. Totem.ism, mana, taboo, magic,
spiritism, myth, and fetishism are all discussed by Coe in
terms of how they help to shape primitive social order and
secure the values of life. Coe attempts a functional char-
acterization of primitive life by showing how primitive man
seeks to complete, unify, and conserve the values which are
recognized. In this way he shows how religion as the
completion, unification, and conservation of value is appar-
ent in primitive life. Coe states:
66. Ibid., 78.
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To complete their values, men here seek plenty ;
to conserve them, men seek to produce a stable
social order that shall be continuously in favor-
able touch with the powers upon which food and
other goods depend; to unify values, the measure
is again a social one, namely, the production in
the individual of v/illing, or rather automatic,
subordination of desires to social standards
(customs)
,
v/hicH in turn the group shares v;ith a
larger social or quasi -social order (the totem
species, mana
,
spirits of ancestors) .^"^
The conclusion which Coe reaches regarding the
beginnings of religion is that it grows out of social
instincts which are also back of custom and social organ-
ization.
Coe maintains that although religion and magic are
common in origin, there is a real difference between them.
He states that "religion organizes life's values and seeks
them socially," while "magic fixes upon any particular
value and seeks it individually, or at least independently
of the larger social order ."^^ This position is essential-
ly the same as that of King.^^ Coe rejects the position of
Prazier that religion arose because of the failure of
magic, '''0 and also that of Leuba who claims that religion
and magic are separate, not only m origin, but also in
67. Ibid., 88.
68. Ibid., 91.
69. King, The Development of Religion
,
Chapter vli.
70. James G. Prazer, The Golden Bough
.
Abridged
edition, (i\iev/ York: The Kacmillan Company, 1947) , 61.
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inner principle ."^^ Coe's position is based largely on the
fact that magic and religion seek much the same values,
namely, health, protection, and various sorts of success,
and that both religion and magic employ methods that have
a common root.'''^ The difference, therefore, I3 not one of
origin but of use. Objections to Coe's view, such as those
offered by Ames and Frazer, will be considered In chapter
e ight
•
In an appendix to his chapter on racial beginnings
of religion, Goe considers the theory that the psychical
origin of religion is found in the sexual life* His con-
clusion is that if the sexual instinct v;as the sole source
of religion, prim.itive religion would not be primarily a
group experience. Furthermore, the instinctive basis of
the social group is of such a complex nature th^t sex must
be regarded as being only one factor."^^
In discussing the origin of the idea of God, Goe
finds that it roots in concepts regarding mana and spirits,
as v;ell as in still more inchoate conceptions.'''^ He points
out that the thinking of the savage is emotional, and for
71. Leuba, A Psychological Study of Religion
,
Ghapter ix.
72. Goe, The Psychology of Religion , 90.
73. Ibid., 93.
74. Ibid., 96.
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him objects become living things, friendly or unfriendly.
Also, there is no absolute dividing line between gods and
spirits. Both are projections of what men felt in them-
selves when they were excited, and both have human quali-
ties. '^5 Goe maintains that in time certain spirits became
associated with the larger and more stable interests of
society and thus became objects of v/orship, v/hile other
spirits became associated v;lth less social and" more indi-
vidualistic interests. These "inferior spirits," as Coe
calls them, were controlled by individuals rather than
worshipped by the group. It is for this reason that magic
becomes identified with spiritism, and religion with the
gods. Coe holds that the source of the god-idea is organic
and social need--a spontaneous, underived conviction that
an extra-human power exists which can help secure and main-
tain those values which are regarded as most precious.
"For the early man," says Goe, "the v/orld of values is the
real v/orld . ""^"^
Ames also believes that the idea of a god arises
out of our social experience. Ke states: "'The growth and
ob jectification of the gods goes hand in hand v;ith the
75. Ibid., 104.
76. Ibid., 105.
77. Ibid., 106.
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social experiences and achievements of the nation,"'''^ iTie
greatest controversy over the origin of the god-idea among
psychologists of religion seem.s to be in the matter of the
relation of magic to religion. This will be discussed
further when v/e consider the validity of Coe's conclusions.
In dealing with the development of religion into
various religions, Goe maintains that the differentiation is
primarily functional rather than structural. He denies that
religion is a separate interest with a unique character
which is always the same* Rather, he believes it to be a
principle which organizes the values which are recognized
at any given stage of culture. In other v/ords, it is a way
of dealing with values or interests. Goe maintains:
. . . religion is not a thing by itself; it
has no springs other than the impulse to live, to
live v/eli, to live a diversified yet organized
life, and especially to live socially, 'i'o explain
the rise of religions, then, we must study the par-
ticular factors in the experience of any people
that led to specialization of interests. At the
same time we must bear in m.ind tendencies toward
organization and systematlzatlon that are common
to mankind.'''^
Goe lists seven factors which condition the interests
of a people, and therefore influence the development of
religions: (1) Geographic situation; (2) Economic develop-
ment; (5) Social and political organization; (4) Interaction
78. Ames, The Psychology of Religious Experience , 113.
79, Coo, /The Psychology of Religion , 108.

149
of people; (5) Cultural influences, as philosophy, science,
art; (6) The institutionalizing of religion; (8) The influ-
ence of individuals .Q*^
Coe sees no reason for attempting to account for the
development of different religions m terms of racial
temperament, because he maintains that racial differences
are the result of long continued influence of special habi-
tats. Coe also rejects the idea that racial mental traits
are passed on by the procreative process, because few if
any wide differences in primary instincts exists. Although
Coe does not dogmatically deny the possibility of inborn
racial temperaments, he does feel that they are not a
sufficient explanation of differences in religion. ^-^
2, Religion as Group Conduct
Having stressed the point that religion is a social
phenomena, Coe finds it fruitful to distinguish various
species within the sociality of religion. He distinguishes
three types or species within the social group: (1) The
religious crowd; (2) The sacerdotal group; and (5) The
deliberative group. These he treats according to their
type, structure, and function.
80. Ibid., 108-16.
81. Ibid., 116-17.
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According to Coe, the crowd represents the earliest
type of religious group conduct, and Is of the excited, un-
reflective type. In its technical sense, crowd action is
"co-operation produced by suggestion, that Is, the suppres-
sion of inhibitions." Coe cites the action of a group of
people at a football game as a typical example of orovjd
action; "a mass of minds with attention narrowed to a single
interest, and consequently acting as one . "^"^ The same is
usually true of people at a revival meeting. Certain satis-
factions arise out of crov/d activity, such as satisfaction
of the gregarious instinct, release from monotomy and
routine, pleasurable sensations of elation and freedom, loss
of the feeling of responsibility, opportunity of indulgence
of Instinctive impulses, and the feeling of enhanced
efficiency through the massing together of human energy.
In spite of these advantages, Coe points out that
the crowd has certain limitations. While the crowd can
enforce standards, it can never construct them, for such
activity requires thought and deliberation lacking In the
crowd. Furthermore, Coe points out that "the fact that men
act together Is no guaranty that their acts are social rather
82. Ibid., 121.
83. Ibid., 122.
84. Ibid., 124-25.
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than unsocial in motive and end . "^^ Coe concludes that the
evolution of social standards requires the supplanting of
the crowd form of organization v/ith some other principle of
integration.
The second type, the sacerdotal group, represents
specialized control of group conduct. 'I'his type of group-
ing, Coe states, rests upon authority and is organized in
such forms as priesthoods, traditions, sacred scriptures,
authoritative dogma, etc. Organized tribal religions,
national religions, and churches with a particular form of
doctrine, worship, or polity, are of this sacerdotal type.
In such a group, unity is "brought about by "systematized
suggestion through sacrifice and sacrament, ritual, a code
of commands and prohibitions, and religious education of a
particular type . "^^ Coe states that although the sacerdo-
tal group recognizes the individuality of its members, it
nevertheless seeks to control them and bring them into sub-
jection to its authority. It is this recognition of the
individual that distinguishes the sacerdotal group from the
crowd
•
llie third type of group conduct which Coe considers
is that of the deliberative group. This group exhibits
85. Ibid., 125.
86. Ibid., 126
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conduct which is vastly different from that of the other
two types. Such a group invites individual expression,
does not suppress Inhibitions, takes time for reflection
before common action, considers alternatives, etc. Accord-
ing to Coe, this group has important functions in that it
brings the advantages of weighing and criticizing satisfac-
tions, Coe believes that the distinctive function of this
group is the criticism and reconstruction of society itself
through free acts of its members. He states:
Crov/d action may assist social reconstruction
but only incidentally. . Sacerdotal authority also
may assist, but v/ith equal right (which it fails
not to exercise) it m.ay also close the doors of
social criticism. But in the deliberative group
we have a structure that arises and maintains it-
self precisely by inviting criticism and proposals
for reconstruction. 2'''
Coe states that in the deliberative group the aim
of worship is to stimulate the individual v/orshiper to
have his ov/n thoughts and to realize himself as an individual.
Also in religious education, this group seeks to stimulate
individual experience, rather than to pass on an existing
body of ideas .^^
Coe's presentation of religion as group conduct
appears to be unique and original. Although social
87. Ibid., 134.
88. Ibid., 135.
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psychologists had for some time focused attention upon the
psychology of group action, few psychologists of religion
have given such a clear and Illuminating presentation of
group dynamics in religion. Although only a single chapter
in his Psychology of Religion , Coe makes a unique contri-
bution to the psychology of religion by his distinguishing
the various characteristics of these three types of religious
groups. Reference is made to the work of Le Bon, Tawney,
V/allis, Gardner, and Trotter as background studies for his
treatment of group activity.
3. Religion as Individual Conduct
l?/hen Coe speaks of religion as a social phenomenon,
he does not wish to imply that the evolution of the indi-
vidual is not equally involved. Ee v/ishes it clearly
understood that "self-consciousness is per se social con-
sciousness, and that individuality itself is a social fact."^
Coe's point of view is dynam.ic. Both the individual and
society are together in the process of becoming. As Coe
sees it, the danger arises v/hen v/e try to think of either
society or the individual in static terms. In his think-
ing they are complementary phases of the same movem.ent.
Vihereas the earliest forms of social-religious order tended
89. Ibid., 143.
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to control and restrain the individual through rigid custom,
later developments assure individual liberty, such as free-
dom of belief and v/orship, and also stimulate variations
whereby men become more conscious of themselves as individuals.
As Goe pointed out in his treatment of social imme-
diacy, not only does individual self-consciousness arise out
of social consciousness, but society itself, as distinguish-
ed from the herd, develops by means of an individuating
process, that is, "through the increasing notice that one
takes of another as an experiencing self,"^*^
Coe rejects the view held by Marshall that religion
is a governing instinct or an inner control which forces
the individual to conform to social standards when external
social pressure is absent. Ke also rejects Kidd's viev/
that religion is essentially restraint of individual
variation. Kidd maintains that religion resists reason
because reason is individual and tends toward variation.^^
Coe observes that those who believe that religion is
primarily a mode of inner control over the individual, base
their view largely on the prevalence of asceticism in
90. Ibid., 143.
91. H. K. Marshall, Instinct and Reason . (iMew York:
The Macmillan Company, 1898) , 330.
92. Benjamin Kidd, Social ji'volution . (wev/ York:
The Macmillan Company, 1894) , Chapter v.
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religion, as well as on v/orship practices, such as bov/lng,
kneeling, closing the eyes, and other forms of muscular retrac
tions. The general principle is that states of satisfaction
are more often expressed by the expansor muscles, v/hile states
of dissatisfaction usually involve the flexor muscles.
Coe gives abundant evidence to show that such a
position fails to take into account the joyous and pleasur-
able aspects of religious experience. From earliest times,
religious rites have been largely joyous; the strain of fear,
sin, and incompleteness is usually followed by release from
such repression; many religious reactions use the expansor
muscles, such as in processions and dances, songs and
laughter; the posture of prayer may signify joyful thanks-
giving as well as abasement; postures of meditation and
prayer may help to produce muscular relaxation and release.
"In other words," says Coe, "postures that may have origina-
ted in repression are nov; means for releasing the individual
and increasing his capacity for self-assertion."^'^ Coe
concludes that the facts are over-simplified when religion
is viewed as an instrument whereby society controls the
individual
•
In discussing the psychological significance of
93. Coe, The Psychology of Religion , 140.
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asceticism, Coe points out that thwarting of natural func-
tions may yield satisfactions which are compensatory, and
may in itself "be a means whereby the individual gains
significance • Here he follows Thorndike v/ho maintains that
there is an instinct of submission that brings satisfaction
through surrender to a more pov;erful being. Coe finds
a social aspect even in asceticism. God may become a
substitute for human fellowship because the ascetic is un-
able to abandon completely the social basis of the good
and therefore seeks intimacy with the divine being. Coe
states
:
... asceticism finally supports itself upon
the very wants and satisfactions, rooted largely
in bodily functions, that were at first denied in
the interest of something supposedly more sacred."^
Like James, 9^ Coe does not overlook the positive
values in asceticism. lie appears to be the only early
writer in psychology of religion, however, v;ho gives any
attention to the social qualities v/hich may be found in
asceticism. Coe's general view seems to be that man is
incurably social
•
94. Thorndike, Educational Psychology
,
I, 92.
95. Coe, The Psychology of Religion , 151.
96. James, The Varieties of Religious Experience
,
342-57.
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C. SPECIAL PROBLWiS IN PSYCPIOLOGY OP RELIGION
1. Conversion
In the preceding section it was pointed out that Coe
regards self-realization as taking place within a social
medium. Conversion, he states, takes place "when this
religious self-realization is intense, and is attained with
some abruptness."^''' Coe sets forth the following four
features which he claims characterize the conversion exper-
ience :
(1) The subject's very self seems to be pro-
foundly changed. (2) This change seems not to be
wrought by the subject but upon him; the control
seems not to be self-control, the outcome not a
result of mere grov/th. (3) The sphere of change
is the attitude that constitutes one's character
or mode of life. . . (4) The change includes a
sense of attaining to a higher life, or to eman-
cipation or enlargement of the self .^^
Coe maintains that the change v/hlch takes place in
conversion is paralleled by experiences in other spheres
of human experience, and that it is continuous with religious
growth both in process and content. The rapidity of change
may be of various degrees and yet reach the same general
result. Coe also shov;s that conversion is not coextensive
with religion, for, "the conversion of parents tends, by
97. Coe, The Psychology of Religion , 152.
98. Ibid., 153.

158
bringing religion into the home, to produce in their
children a natural religious growth, and therefore to pre-
vent conversion* "^^ Coe finds support for this view in the
studies made by Dike on Lievj England revivals. Dike found
that an increased rate of church membership at the time of
revivals is off -set by a decreased rate afterv/ards .'^^'^
In examining the structure of abrupt conversion, Coe
finds the following four aspects:
(1) traces of mental reproduction of the indi-
vidual's own earlier experiences; (2) fresh sensory
elements; (3) certain instinctive impulses; and
(4) a law under which these elements are character-
istically combined
Regarding the traces of earlier experiences, Coe takes
the same point of view here as he does with regard to
mystical experiences. He firmly maintains that revivalism
actually does nothing more than reinforce earlier educative
processes
•
According to Goe, the fresh sensory elements in
conversion involve such things as the tone of the preacher's
voice, rhythm, melody, revival songs, organic sensations
such as muscular rigidity followed by relaxation. In an
99. Ibid., 155.
100. Samuel W. Dike, "A Study of wew England
Revivals," American Journal of Sociology , 15 (l\iovember,
1909) , 361-78.
101. Coe, The Psychology of Religion
, 156.
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earlier article, Coe had pointed out how relief from tension,
v/hlch often accompanies mystical experiences, is similar to
the experience of one under an anesthetic. James also
found this to be true.103
Among the various instinctive impulses which play
a part in conversion, Coe lists the gregarious instinct,
the instinct of self-abasement, and the sexual instinct.
He points out that the sexual instinct is particularly strong
in adolescent conversion experience. I'his connection between
adolescent conversion and the sexual instinct is both direct
and indirect. Coe states:
The physiological change has an indirect effect
because the general state of restlessness or ex-
citement induced by the intrusion of a nev/ (or
largely new) set of organic sensations makes it
easy for the youth to acquire new interests of
almost any kind. 'J?he sexual instinct plays a
. direct part also in that it increases attention
tb persons (both one's self and others), and in
that it extends and deepens tender emotion.^04
The characteristic lav/s under which the above elements
of conversion are combined, Coe states to be the law of
suggestion, the lav/ of subconscious incubation, and the lav/
of habit formation.
102. Coe, "The Sources of the Mystical Revelation,"
Hibbert Journal, 6 (January, 1908), 359-72, 366.
103. James, The Varieties of Religious Experience
,
387-93.
104. Coe, The Psychology of Religion , 165.
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In analyzing conversion from the functional point
of view, Coe seeks to discover what It Is that makes conver-
sion satisfying to the human v/ho finds it so, without pass-
ing any ethical judgment on its values. Pxe observes that
four values are obtained by the subject experiencing conver-
sion: (1) new satisfactions measured upon a nev; scale of
values; (2) a changed attitude toward life, and a fresh
self-realization; (3) a new desire for mutual self -emanci-
pation and fellowship with men; (4) the world and God take
on a neviT and fresh meaning—conversion becomes "a faith
creating process, especially social falth, "'•'^^
As Coe views it, the conversion experience seems to
lend Itself very well in support of his social theory of
religion. VJhen Coe speaks of "a new scale of values"
arising out of conversion, it is really the same thing as
"revaluation of values." The conclusion which Coe reaches
in his analysis of conversion is that it is "a particular
instance of the differentiation of the individual con-
sciousness, which is also social consciousness • "-^"^^
Coe»s later writings on conversion lack the concrete
experimental evidence which characterized his earlier v;ork.
Although this later study is more theoretical, it also gives
105. Ibid., 173.
106. Ibid., 174.
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a broader and more inclusive viev/ of conversion. Also,
there is a stronger emphasis on the social aspects of con-
version* In The Spiritual Life , Goe gives considerable
attention to the role of suggestibility in the conversion
experience-^'^'^ as well as to temperament and the tendency to
automatisms.-^ ° In The Psychology of Religion , these factors
are included, but there is a greater emphasis upon instinct,
undoubtedly through the influence of Thorndike and IvicDougall
on Goe's thinking.
2. Religious Leadership
In studying the mental traits of religious leaders,
Goe warns against the fallacy of focusing attention upon
a few selected experiences which tend to yield a narrow
characterization of religious leaders as neurotics. Goe
states
:
The frequency of sexual interest and of neurotic
symptoms is not to be denied, but rarely does
either of these suffice to characterize a man or
woman v/ho attains a great religious influence .^^^
Goe finds three broad types evident in the evolution
of religious leadership: the shaman, the priest, and the
prophet. He shov/s the relation between the shaman type and
107. Goe, The Spiritual Life, 128-37.
108. Ibid., 136-40.
109. Goe, The Psychology of Religion
, 175.
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modern "psychics." Both, he states, use subjective processes.
Typical of shamanistic procedure is the trance and auto-
hypnosis induced hy dancing, monotonous music, and drugs.
In his trances the shaman sees visions and sometimes speaks
automatically, so that he is regarded as being possessed by
a spirit, all of v/hich forms the basis of his leadership in
the eyes of the tribe. According to Coe, his leadership is
due to three factors: (1) the impressiveness of the trance
phenomena itself; (2) his success in doing the things that
people desire; and (5) wisdom gathered from habitual deal-
ing with public interest. Coe maintains that to a lesser
degree Joseph Smith, Lrs. Eddy, and I,1r. Dowie, are examples
of cult leaders who have exhibited use of shamanistic pro-
cedures. He states that each of these "mixed shrev/d
calculation with v/hat gave itself forth as inspiration, and
none of them acknov;ledged the mixture, but claimed • super
-
individual authority for the whole . "HO
The priestly type of religious leadership, according
to Goe, attempts to conserve power over the group by insti-
tutional means. Historically, the priestly type is an
outgrov/th of the shaman type. The priest sees that cere-
monies are duly observed, and that traditions are handed
down and preserved. Priestliness is based on the "ever-
110, Ibid., 179.
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present assumption of the validity of the past."^ll Hov;ever,
Coe states that in spite of the opportunity for dead formal-
ism, mechanical routine, and lazy revenues, the priestly
mind has often shovra aggressiveness, resistance, and
organizing ability. It also makes for a certain stability
in the social order.
The third type of religious leadership, the prophetic,
is, according to Goe, continuous with shamanism, yet it
transcends it and stands in strong contrast v/ith both sha-
manism and priestliness . Unlike the others, it goes direct-
ly to the sources of religions. Coe points out how the
prophets of Israel broke with institutions and v/ent directly
to the primal sources of religious feeling. Coe maintains
that it was the prophetic, rather than the priestly, element
in Judaism that attracted Jesus. He states that the funda-
mental trait of prophetic leadership is "a broad intense
sociality that transcends mere institutionallsm because it
112individualizes men as objects of love . " This Goe regards
as the secret of Jesus' influence over men.
Coe strongly criticizes the attempt to explain the
influence of Paul, Jesus, Buddha, or I.:ohammed on the basis
that they v/ere more or less neurotic. He shows how they
111. Ibid., 181.
112. Ibid., 186.
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fall to fall into such a category according to the scien-
tific use of the term. "I'he ultimate test of mental
morbidity," says Goe, "is the ability to fulfill one's
functions in society. "^1^ Such men as Jesus dissented from
the existing social-religious order in the interest of a
wider and deeper sociality. Goe also rejects as unhistorical
the view that religion v;as invented by priestcraft or state-
craft, for the leader does not make religion—it is a
spontaneous process more or less guided by individual action. -^-^^
Goe's conclusion is that the religious leader is the product
of his time and his people, yet he makes an original contri-
bution of his own.
Ames, in his treatment of religious leadership,
emphasizes the importance of cultural and social influences .•^-'•^
Gutten seems to regard the religious leader as one particu-
larly susceptable to subconscious influences. Pratt
maintains that the prophet is guided more by intuition and
117feeling than by conscious reason. Although most of the
115. Ibid., 189.
114. Ibid., 191.
115. Ames, The Psychology of Religious Experience, 346.
116. Gutten, The Psychological Phenomena of
Christianity , 342-57.
117. Pratt, The Psychology of Religious belief
,
137-46.
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early writers in psychology of religion have, in one way
or another, touched on the various aspects of religious
leadership, none have given such a clear discussion of the
subject as has Coe. Kis treatment of the three types of
religious leadership appears to he unique and original. He
makes the psychological study of religious leadership as
such, a definite part of psychology of religion.
3. The Subconscious
Coe is cautious in dealing with the subconscious
because he does not regard it as an established empirical
fact, but only an inference. After discussing some of the
theories regarding the nature of the subconscious, Coe comes
to the conclusion that analysis of particular cases of the
suDconscious in religion "has tended with great regularity
to transfer more and more of the mysterious 'other' to the
account of the 'mine' or of the ordinary 'not mine . ' "-^^^
In other words, the particular content of inspiration
originates in the individual's background and is reproduced
or worked up in the same manner that he reproduces or works
up the things that he more readily recognizes as his own.-^-^^
Coe makes it clear that the subconscious is continuous
118. Coe, The Psychology of Religion , 211.
119. Ibid., 212.
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with consciousness. Although the facts of multiple person-
ality may suggest a detached subconsciousness, Coe maintains
that there is no such a break as is commonly supposed .-^^^
The conclusion which Coe reaches in his study of the sub-
conscious is as follows:
• • • religious experience tends to focalize
Itself where individuality is more pronounced, not
at its obscure outer edges; where self-control is
at its maximum, not its minimum; where the issues
are those of society as a deliberative (or
potentially deliberative) body.l^^
In an earlier article entitled "Religion and the
Subconscious , "122 Qoe raises objection to the view that man
should look for God in the dim outlying regions of conscious
ness, rather than at the focal points called "I" and "thou."
He firmly maintains that the focus of religious experience
should be in the self's interaction with society, rather
than in the self's continuity with nature, nere , as else-
where, Goe's emphasis is always upon the personal rather
than the impersonal.
Most of the early psychologists of religion, like
Coe, are cautious with regard to the subconscious. James
in his Varieties states: "there is actually and literally
120. Ibid., 210,
121. Ibid., 213.
122. Coe, "Religion and the Subconscious," American
Journal of Theology , 13 (April, 1909), 337-49.
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more life in our total soul than we are at any time aware
of, "123 Pratt says: "I can only suggest that from the focus
of attention (of the conscious personality, of course) there
stretches out an indefinitely extended field of psychic
stuff ."124
4. Mysticism
In dealing with mysticism, Coe finds that t'loe facts .
fall under the heading of either hallucinations or subcon-
scious phenomena. He maintains that the mere impression
that one is not the author of the ideas that come into the
mind during mystical experience, is not sufficient evidence
as to the facts. He states:
liThat seems to immediate consciousness to be
the very opposite of self-control may be the
product of self-control previously achieved, or
of habitual acts previously performed .125
Coe emphasizes the importance of former activities
and achievements v/ith regard to the mystical experience.
Poetic inspirations, for example, come only to those persons
who have previously read, studied, or attempted to write
poetry; musical inspirations come to musicians only, etc.
123. James, The Varieties of Religious Experience , 511.
124. Pratt, The Psychology of Religious Belief , 21.
125. Coe, The Psychology of Religion , 272.
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It is also pointed out that the mystical insights of any
religion are colored "by the teaching which the mystic has
already received. Coe maintains that in this manner every
religion confirms itself through the mystics v/ithin its
group.126 Because the content of the mystic's experience
is socially determined, "his experience can never be exhaus-
tively described in terms of a private relation to 3-od."127
Coe calls attention to the discrepancy in the utter-
ances of mystics of different faiths , even though all claim
to have immediate apprehension of truth and reality. Eov;-
ever, he does note certain generic similarities even among
mystics of contradictory faiths. Although there is general
agreement upon the noetic quality of the experience, it can
be explained psychologically, according to Coe, as hypnotic
self -identification with a situation. Likev/ise, the exper-
ience of bliss is explained by the relaxation of muscles
and removal of mental inhibitions. The same type of exper-
ience can be induced by the use of certain narcotic drugs.
Coe shows ths close relation between the mystical experience
and the psychophysical condition of the individual, as well
as with such conditions as hunger, fatigue, sexual desire,
etc •
126. Ibid., 273.
127. Ibid., 274.
....
- * f .
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After dealing with the structure of mysticism, Coe
endeavors to outline certain functional aspects. Although,
at first thought, one might think that because of the private
character of mystical contemplation the result would he
individual variation and social dissent, the fact is that
the mystic in placing himself under the influence of tradi-
tion reinforces its power, Coe states that except in a few
instances, the mystic has heen a scrupulous observer of
conventional morality. He says: "Taken as a whole, mystical
experience focalizes in an individual some existing social
idea or standard, and thus focalizing it reimpresses it upon
the group. "-^^^
Am.ong the qualities in mysticism which make it par-
ticularly attractive is that of a satisfying sense of
individual selfhood—the "wow I know for myself" experience.
However, Coe points out that this is not at all peculiar
to mysticism, since to accumulate, organize, and communicate
experience is fundamental in the functions of the human
129
mind. Coe states that another attractive quality of
mysticism, especially to a person suffering from a sense
of divided self, is that of mystical self-realization,
wherein a person finds unification and purpose.
128. Ibid., 279.
129. Ibid., 281.
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Goe includes discovery as one of the functions of
mysticism even though, for the most part, mystics give back
as personal experience the doctrines which they have
previously received. This idea is supported by the origi-
nality v/hich appears in great religious mystics, as v;ell as
the fact that "characteristic mystical doctrines arose in
the first place through experience, and not the experience
through doctrines • "•^'^ Coe denies, however, that mysticism
has any special method of mental invention or any special
tool of discovery.
Pratt, who has made an outstanding contribution to
the study of mysticism, approaches the subject quite
differently than does Coe. Ke defines mysticism as "belief
in God based chiefly on an imiriediate experience whose
dominant element is feeling . "^'^•^ Pratt accepts the mystic's
claim of intuitive and immediate apprehension of reality
without making any attempt to analyze it psychologically,
as Coe does. Pratt, unlike Coe, makes mysticism a unique
experience, quite different from other experiences involv-
ing inspiration and intuition* Furthermore, Pratt believes
that a quasi -mystical experience should become mormative
for the religious community if religion is to have real
130. Ibid., 282,
131. Pratt, The Psychology of Religious Belief, 155.
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vitality. 132 Coe, on the other hand, although recognizing
the values in mysticism, maintains that, in its more extreme
form, it involves "turning av/ay from the neighbor whom one
has seen, av/ay from the v/hole sphere in which love can
act. "133
5. The Future Life
Coe's case for a future life rests firmly upon his
"belief that personal life is sacred and also upon a system
of personal-social values which he emphasizes throughout his
writings, he points out that the instinct of self-preserva-
tion is not in itself the same thing as a desire for continu-
ance of personal life, and also that the idea that one's
spirit lingers around the place where one's body is buried
arose before there v;as any clear notion of personal life.
In time, hov/ever, conceptions of the future life began to
correspond v;ith growing discrimination of the social values
of this life.
It is within the process of social evolution that
Coe finds greatest support for the idea of a future life.
Ee holds that "we cannot isolate the question of survival
from that of the issues that we are fighting out in mundane
132. Ibid., 243-61.
133. Coe, The Psychology of Religion , 285.
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society . "-^^^ It is in the struggle for social v/elfare
rather than in mediumistic phenomena that the problem of
the future life should really center. Goe maintains that if
any social relations actually exist "between the dead and the
living, "they v;lll he realized "oy the living only in and
through social enterprises in which our own world of sense
is being made instrumental to social purposes . "-''^^
Coe asserts that the personal -social relationships
men value most they desire to see perpetuated. It is when
men reach a high level of social regard that they desire
immortality, if not for themselves, then for others who
better deserve it. ITie kind of Imm.ortallty v/hich they
desire is that of indissoluble fellowship between persons.
Viewed functionally, Coe sees at work a principle of
personal-social integration which uses the psychical condi-
tions of life for its own purposes, rather than being a
mere appendage of it. He sees the possibility of still
further integration, "which shall use death as a resource
136
rather than submit to it as a defect of life."
Coe asserts that social ideals are realized in
individuals. This leads him to disagree v;ith Hdffding's
134. Ibid., 293.
135. Ibid., 294.
136. Ibid., 301.
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view that the conservation of values has no relation to
conservation of persons ,157 Qoe maintains that "the
finality of social values inheres in the individual who
incarnates them."-^'^^ Thus it is that Coe argues for indi-
vidual immortality on the basis of social reasons.
#
6 • Prayer
Coe "believes that a history and psychology of prayer
v/ould be practically equivalent to a history and psychology
of religion, because prayer concerns the focusing of life's
values. Since this focusing takes a personal form, Coe
defines prayer as "talking to or v/ith a God . "-^^^ He shov/s
how prayer has developed out of earlier anthropomorphisms,
which have been mere exclamations of nai've emotions.
Coe has little to say regarding the objective reality
of prayer. His position regarding the presence of super-
natural factors in human life is that it cannot be proved
by the science of psychology. The experience of divine
response in prayer he interprets from the psychological
point of view as auto-suggestion. However, Coe believes
that the practice of prayer has valuable functions which
can be psychologically investigated. Among the many
137. Hdffding, The Philosophy of Religion , 259.
138. Coe, The Psychology of Religion, 297.
139. Ibid., 302.
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therapeutic effects of prayer, Coe lists: calming of the
distracted mind, poise and power, a way of pulling oneself
together, new insights obtained by means of sustained
attention.
Coe regards prayer as a process in which faith is
generated. It helps to cultivate the conviction that no
true value will perish. He states:
It is a mistake to suppose that men assure them-
selves of the existence and of the character of
God by some prayerless method, and then merely
exercise this ready-made faith in the act of pray-
ing, fio, prayer has greater originality than this.
Alongside of much traditionalism and vain repetition
there is also some launching forth upon voyages of
exploration and some discovery of lands fim enough
to support men v/hen they carry their heaviest
burdens .140
As with mysticism., Coe explains prayer psychologically
141in terms of norm.al mental processes. Strong, v/ho has
made an extensive study of prayer, agrees v/ith Coe that the
internal conversation that constitutes prayer is not some-
thing isolated, but merely a specific instance of a general
form, of mental procedure similar to thinking. Although Coe
accepts Posdick's viewl42 that prayer is dominant desire.
140. Ibid., 318.
141. A. L. Strong, The Psychol og;/- of Prayer .
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1909)
.
142. H. E. Fosdick, The Meaning of Prayer . (wew
York: The kacmillan Company, 1915)
.
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he also maintains that it is a way of securing "domination
over desire • "-^"^^ Coe believes that the end result of prayer
is more than desire, ile states: "It starts as the assertion
of any desire; it ends as the organization of one ' s own
desires into a system of desires recognized as superior and
then made one '
s
own. "144
The purpose of this chapter has been to present what
the writer regards as being the most significant and char-
acteristic views which Coe sets forth in his book The
Psychology of Religion
.
Although we have compared m-any of
Coe^s views v;ith those of other writers, a more critical
evaluation will be made in chapter eight. The next two
chapters will be an attempt to show how the fundam.ental
concepts of Coe's psychology of religion are applied to
religious education and social ethics.
143. Goe, The Psychology of Religion , 318.
144. Ibid., 318.

CHAPTER VI
THE APPLICATION OP PSYCHOLOGY TO RELIGIOUS EDUCATION
To appreciate fully the contribution which Coe has
made to psychology of religion it is necessary that we trace
the development of his psychology to its logical conclusions.
As one examines his writings, it becomes increasingly
evident that Coe is not content with a purely abstract or
academic analysis of religion from the psychological point
of view. His interest is more practical. From the very
first, Coe seeks to write a psychology of religion that will
be useful to religious workers, particularly to the religious
educator. In the preface to his first book. The Spiritual
Life , Coe states:
Vt/hile I have tried to approach the facts In the
spirit and by the m.ethods of science, I have not
hesitated to point out in each chapter some of the
practical uses to v;hich its material and results
may be put. I hope that these suggestions will
show where to look for a practical solution of
several of our most troublesome problems.-^
'The attempt to be both scientific and practical
leads Coe beyond mere scientific analysis to the direct
application of the results of his study to education,
ecclesiastical practices, theological ideas, and general
social issues. Throughout his writings there is an
1. Coe, The Spiritual Life , 8.
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unbroken continuity of thought from his fundamental concep-
tions of religion and his judgments upon the present practice
of it. Regarding this continuity, Goe writes:
V^hat I have attempted in my book [The Psychology
of Religion] is a functional psychology of religion.
It is a study of the treatment of values in prac-
tices commonly called religious. V/hen, therefore,
I v/rite about religious education, I am most likely
to discuss the manner in which current religion
treats some values. . . Similarly, there is complete
continuity between the main aspects of my psychology
of religion and the specific discussions of capital-
ism and the like .2
To trace the various lines of continuity betv/een Goe's
psychology of religion and his work in religious education
and social ethics is the primary purpose of this chapter
and the one that follows. .Such a study should give further
support to our thesis by showing that one aspect of Goe's
total contribution to psychology of religion is the demon-
stration of its applicability to other fields.
i^o attempt v;ill be made in this chapter to give an
analysis of all of Goe's writings in religious education.
In view of the large number of books and articles which he
has contributed to this field our study must be selective.
In general, vie will confine our study to his fundamental
concepts, and those which show a direct relation to his
psychology of religion.
2. Prom a letter written by George A. Goe to
Paul E. Johnson, February 16, 1948.
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A. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OP RELIGIOUS EDUCATION
!• Scientific Attitude
The close relationship between psychology of religion
and religious education in Coe's thinking is based largely
upon the scientific spirit in which he approaches religious
education. Coe firmly maintains that only when religious
experience is scientifically studied and understood is an
intelligent religious education possible. Shortly after
coming to Union Theological Seminary in 1909, Coe inaugu-
rated one of the first departments of religious education
and psychology. Ee has consistently maintained that the two
subjects are fundamentally interdependent.
In his inaugural address as a professor at Union
Theological Seminary, Coe makes clear his belief that a
psychological understanding of religious experience is vital
to an effective program of religious training. Ee states:
The approach as a whole must be psychological.
That is, we must seek in religious experience, and
especially the Christian experience, for universal
laws and functions of the mind. For teaching moves
wholly within such laws. It relies upon them as
the sower who goes forth to sow relies upon other
laws for the desired harvest. . . The psychology of
religion rather than the methods of religious teach-
ing requires prime emphasis.^
In order to put the attitude and methods of science
3. Coe, "Can Religion be Taught?" 25.
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to work in religious education, Coe started at Union an
experimental school of religion. In a Sunday School,
connected with the Seminary, Coe subjected his work to the
experimental test. He was also instrumental in starting
the Character Education Inquiry at Teachers College, Columbia
University, set up to conduct extended and thorough-going
scientific inquiry in the field of moral and religious
education* Through the Religious Education Association,
Coe has worked to promote experimental research in religious
education.
Believing that Christianity needs to assimilate in
its ov/n v/ork the scientific attitude and spirit, Coe dis-
plays in his v/ritings in religious education the same
scientific spirit which pervades his psychological writings.
Everyv/here he put science to work in clarifying, illuminating
and objectifying that which is hazy and undefined. His
basic supposition seems to be that only v/hen religious
education becomes a scientifically controlled process v;ill
it be able to attain the cosmopolitan view necessary for
it to play a significant role in social evolution.'^
Bringing the scientific attitude to bear in religious
education, and in religion generally, does not rob Coe of
any religious devotion or piety. Rather, he regards the
4. Coe, A Social The ory of Religious Education ,
(r^ew York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1917), 290.
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need for the sciontific spirit v/ithin the church as being
a religious need, Ee states;
We who resort to psychology, and biology, and
educational experiments in order to find out what
the church should do with its children, have no
desire to substitute devices of man for the opera-
tions of Grod in the souls of children. We seek
rather to test our devices by the laws of spiri-
tual growth, assuming that these laws are divinely
ordained. Vie stand for religious efficiency; that
is, God's will actually done.^
In 1909, Coe became president of the Religious Educa-
tion Association and has been instrumental in stimulating
a more scientific attitude and approach to religious education
problems. At the time of his retirement from teaching in
1927, B. S. V/inchester gave the following testimony of Goe's
influence in this regard:
The Religious Education Association has sincerely
attempted to be scientific, to provide a platform
v/here men of science may meet in a common and fear-
less search for truth. It has avoided entangling
organizational alliances. And Dr. Goe has been one
of the most steadfast advocates of this policy. He
himself has incarnated in his ovm personality the
scientific spirit. Ee has insisted that we look at
these urgent, intricate problems of religious educa-
tion, objectively, dispassionately, tracing back
effect to cause.
S
By taking a scientific attitude toward the work of
religious education, Coe has helped to open the door between
5. Coe, "The Scientific Point of View within the
Church," Religious Sducation , 10 (October, 1915), 449-54, 450.
6. B. S. Winchester, "Religious Education," Religious
Education, 22 (April, 1927), 433-35, 434.
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psychology of religion and religious education. Just what
specific points of contact exist betv/een these tv/o fields
we will now endeavor to explore.
2. Points of Contact
In the preceding chapter we noted that Cos regards
religious consciousness as consciousness of ends or values,
rather than a certain content of belief.' Religious
consciousness, he maintains, is not distinct from other
forms of consciousness, just as religious value is not
distinct from ethical value, or any other value. ^ Such a
viev/ has certain definite implications for the theory and
practice of religious education which Coe makes clear. He
regards faculty psychology to be so completely outmoded
that "any separation between religious and other conscious-
ness, religious development and other development, is in
principle impossible to present thought."^ Specifically,
this means that there can be no distinction between the
philosophy of education in general, and of religious educa-
tion in particular, since "both have reference to ultimate
7. See page 120.
8. Coe, The Psychology of Religion , 74.
9. Coe, "The Philosophy of the Iviovement for Religious
Education," American Journal of Theology, 8 (April, 1904),
225-59, 232.
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reality and ultimate good, and v/hatever controls one
controls the other also."lC) in an article entitled "Koral
and Religious Education from the Psychological Point of
View,"^-^ Goe takes the position that our life, as human, is a
more or less cons.cious search for the good, and that our
thinking of the good goes on inevitably to the notion of
unity, completeness, and permanence of the good. He main-
tains, therefore, that morals and religion, and moral and
religious education, are continuous.
The second point of contact between psychology and
religious education is the insight which psychology gives
to the specific laws of religious growth and development.
Goe feels that what is needed in religious education is
"a more strictly psychological approach; that is, we need
to ask what happens in the pupil's mind." This is the
more important v/hen the aim of education is, as Goe believes,
"not to impose truth but to promote growth. "•^'^ To conceive
of education as a growth process makes necessary a psychol-
ogical understanding of mental development so that the
10. Ibid., 227.
11. Goe, "Moral and Religious Education from the
Psychological Point of View," Religious Education , 3
(December, 1908), 165-79.
12. Goe, A Social The ory of Religious Education , 192.
13. Ibid., 64.
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educational program can be suited to the child's growing
needs. In his volume, lilducation in Religion and i..orals
(1904), Goe has a section entitled "The Child" in which he
deals with the psychological aspects of the problem of
religious education. Here he gives a sketch of the psychol-
ogy of childhood and attempts to trace what he terms "the
religious impulse" in its development through childhood and
youth. He regards this impulse as being "native to the
human m.ind."-^'^ He defines the religious impulse as that
which leads "tov/ard the progressive unification of man with
himself, his fellows, nature, and all that is."*^^
Regarding the theory of the religious impulse, Coe
maintains that in the infant consciousness there gradually
develops the notions of self and of the world as correla-
tive ideas. Out of this relationship grows by degrees the
conception of an ideal v/orld, coordinate, of course, with
the child's experience, and this eventually matures into
a definite religious impulse. He states:
The very first impressions that the child gets
of his world, his first glimmering sense of self,
his earliest sense of need, all these begin to
form his view of the world and his attitude toward
life
14. Coe, Education in Religion and Morals . (Chicago;
Fleming H. Reveil company, 1904) ,197
.
15. Ibido, 201.
16. Ibid., 206.
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At the time when Goe v/rote A Social Theory of
Religious liX^ucation (1917) he had ceased to speak of a
definite religious impulse. His more mature view is that
there is no specific religious instinct, intuition, or
impulse, rather "a general tendency to become personal selves
17in a society of such selves." Religious experience is
not apart from , but a part of our experience of one another.
His later emphasis is more radically social and follov/s the
general conclusions reached in his Psychology of Religion .
Although he still maintains that religion is natural to
man, he no longer holds that it arises out of an originally
endowed religious impulse as such. Religion is natural in
the sense that man has a tendency to organize and unify
those interests and values in life which are regarded as
18important
.
Psychology gives a sound basis for methods of
religious instruction by pointing out how the interests of
the individual change v/ith growth from infancy to maturity.
Goe states that the "changing social situations incident
to the pupil's grov/th, with their inevitable problems of
social adjustment, furnish a basis for the order and the
17. Goe, A Social Theory of Religious Education, 142.
18. Ibid., 141.
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use of the material."-'-^ The sort of curriculiJiti v/hich Goe
seeks Is a "socialized curriculum," based on a progressive
order of social development through family life, play life,
school life, civic life, occupation, and marriage.
A third point of contact between psychology and
religious education, in Coe's thinking, seems to center
around the evolutionary point of view. In his early writings
particularly, Goe lays great stress upon the importance of
evolutionary theory both for an understanding of religion
and for religious education. In 1904, Goe wrote:
So pervasive has the notion of development become
that nearly everything in our educational philosophy
could be included in an exegesis of this one term. . .
The grov/th of biology during the last half century
has added impetus to this movement. iJiducation has
been compelled to take account of the correlation
of mental with physical development, and of the
correlation of individual development with that of
the race .20
It is true that the evolution theory has given a
genetic view of the human mind which has great educational
significance. As Goe points out in A Social The ory of
Religious Education the theory of evolution has given
instincts a fundamental place in educational psychology .^^
19. Goe, "The Philosophy of the Movement for Religious
Education," 234.
20. Goe, "Religion as a Factor in Individual and
Social Development," biblical World , 23 (January, 1904),
37-47, 37.
21. Goe, A Social Theory of Religious Education , 32.
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V/hereas the older treatments of learning and teaching v/ere
concerned largely with perception, ideation, and reasoning,
the new view, according to Coe, includes a fundamental mass
of unlearned tendencies to action. Another influence of the
evolution theory upon education has been with regard to the
relating of the individual to a species. The result, as
Coe views it, has been to viev; education in terms of racial
processes and racial betterment. Although the idea of
progress has no place in the definition of evolution as a
mode of change, nevertheless, Coe maintains that "the
actual history of life cannot be contemplated in its en-
tirety without seeing that progress does occur under natural
law. "22
Although Goe's earlier writings place great stress
upon the instinct theory and the theory of evolution, his
later writings tend to focus attention more upon the control
which man is able to achieve over his instinctive nature.
In his book, \fhat is Christian Education? (1929) , Coe states:
In what persons do with nature they always
express themselves, '-i-'hey can change themselves
thereby, and thus acquire new needs for self-
expression. I'/hen I secure control of my body, I
secure at the same time control of my instinctive
impulses and the current of ideas. Attention
becomes voluntary, and I, the person, am to some
extent reorganized. • . I am changed thereby,
possibly enlarged and liberated by the increased
22. Ibid., 32
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and branching range of interest, discrimination,
and self guidance.
Although, as we will see in chapter eight, many
psychologists nov/ question the instinct theory it has served
a somewhat useful purpose in education oy calling attention
to feeling, impulse and desire, as being at least equally
basic with intellect. Coe believes that intellectual
training has been given a disproportionate emphasis because*
of the old definition of man as a rational animal and also
the influence of scholasticism. Ke states;
The old-fashioned school, assuming that instruc-
tion is the essential part of education, cultiva-
ted almost exclusively the memory and logical
reason. Religious education consisted in teaching
the catechism or the bible. But because an essen-
tial function of mental life was here ignored, the
practical outcome was that both the catechism and
the bible tended to become empty forms.
Although it would be possible to mention many other
points of contact between psychology and religious education,
those which have been mentioned are sufficient to indicate
the close relationship betv/een the two fields in Coe's
thinking. In the following section we v/ill discuss the
fundamental approach which Goe takes to religious education
and its continuity with his psychological views.
23. Coe, '.That is Clirlstian Education ? (iMew York:
Charles Scribner's Sons , 1929) , 104.
24. Goe, "The Philosophy of the Kovement for
Religious Education," 233.
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3. COE'S FUiNiCTIOiNiAL AND SOCIAL APPROACH IN
RELIGIOUS EDUCATION
!• Functional ism in Religious Education
In chapter four we discussed Goe's functional approach
in psychology of religion* We noted that his interest was
not so much with the content and structure of the mind as
with its functions. Religion is described in terms of value
seeking, rather than in terms of content of belief, We
might well expect, therefore, that v/hen such an approach is
applied to religious education, his interest would center
more on the purposes, aims, and objectives of religious
education, and less upon its intellectual content.
In a recent book entitled A Functional Approach to
Religious Education , Ernest Chave points out that today the
functional approach is regarded by religious educators as
being the most v/orthwhile. The emphasis is now upon growth
processes and the striving for the meanings and values of
life. In all areas of education, according to Chave, there
is a growing tendency to focus attention upon functional
analysis and methods than to testing accumulation of know-
ledge as a mark of culture and learning.
25. Ernest Chave, A Functional Approach to Religious
Education . (Chicago: The University of Chicago^ress, 1947)
,
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According to Ghave, modern religious education,
although recognizing the importance of theologies, creeds,
rituals, customs, etc., looks for the living spirit and
basic qualities of religion in the primary adjustment of
grov/ing persons. He states that today religious education
wants "to be able to identify the kinds of experiences in
which children, youth, and adults may find the religious
26
meanings and values of life." In the development of such
an approach to religious education, Goe has played an impor-
tant and significant role, '-'•'he following statement by
Hugh Hartshorne shows how at least one outstanding educator
appraises Goe's influence:
Dr. Goe, more than any other living man, has made
us think in terms of specific purposes. He has
small quarrel with educational thinking save at
this point that it is not sufficiently Interested
in the products of education. vVhat is the aim of
the school? No trite or vague answer will suffice
to inform us of the value of our methods. V/ith
regard to every curriculum, every course, every
project, every session it is essential to ask, what
is its object? In terms of skills? Yes. In terms
of information? To be sure. But primarily in terms
of the total social and personal results today and
twenty years, twenty generations, from today. ^''^
Goe regards education as both a molding of the indi-
vidual to social ends, and a development of t!te mind accor-
ding to its native capacities and its inherent laws, iv.ental
2b. Ibid., 19.
27. Hugh Hartshorne, "George Albert Goe," An Editor-
ial, Religious Education, 22 (April, 1927), 100-101, 100.
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life, he maintains, "is essentially an effort to attain ends,
an effort that is more or less obscure to itself in its
earlier stages, but one that defines itself as life goes
on. "28 When this concept is applied to mental processes
we have a functional view of the mind* 'i?he functional viev/
asks concerning every type of mental reaction in what need
it arises, and in what way satisfaction is sought.
Coe believes that it is in making choices and striv-
ing after values that individual personality is formed.
For this reason, he maintains thac "human life is per se
moral life because of the inevitable consciousness of ends
29 —
and the final self-determination of one's ideals." it
is the functional view which lays emphasis on the ends and
values which the mind seeks, rather than on the structure
of the mind itself.
To define religion, as Coe does, in terms of its
function, makes it almost impossible to drav; any hard and
fast line between religion and morals. Both religion and
morals, according to Coe, m.ove within the sphere of the
good. He believes that the race becomes religious at the
very point where it becom.es moral, nam.ely, "v/herever our
uncouth ancestors took a step beyond instinct by defining
28. Coe, "koral and Religious Education from the
Psychological Point of View," 167.
29. Ibid., 173.
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some object as their good and forming corresponding ideals. "^0
Although Coe finds it impossible to separate clearly morals
and religion, he does not hold that they are identical. On
this point he states:
VJhen we speak of the moral life, we have in mind
the good' in certain relatively simple forms which
we do \iot think of as complete, or unified, or
eternal. By morals we mean, for example, such re-
lations between men as honesty, justice and kind-
ness. . • On the other hand, when our thought does
move forward toward such a complete ideal, it is
religion or a religious object that we are thinking
about, however vie name it .31
Applying the functional approach to religious educa-
tion, Coe comes to the position that the educative process
is religious experience, rather than imparting dogma. 'I'his
represents a move away from intellectualism toward volun-
tarism which is characteristic of the pragmatic movement,
as well as of functionalism . Coe regards pragmatism as
having im.portant significance for religious education.
Regarding pragmatism., Coe states:
It undertakes to carry out the notion of cosmic
becoming, plasticity, potentiality. The glory of
human life, it teaches, lies not in the faithful
repetition of any prescribed program, but in fresh
impulses that have the vigor to test themselves in
action. 32
30. Ibid., 177.
51. Ibid., 178.
32. Coe, A Social The ory of Religious Education , 36.
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However, Goe is conscious of certain difficulties in
the pragmatic control of education, namely, hov; to avoid a
shallov/ pragmatism of immediate ends, "It does not appear,"
says Goe, "that we guide ourselves altogether by the satis-
factions that we have found achievable in the greatest
amount and with the greatest difficulty • "•^^ Goe points out
that some enterprises that achieve just v;hat they go after,
and are therefore successful from their ov/n point of viev/,
are nevertheless regarded in reality as dismal failures.
The pragmatic test alone, therefore, in Goe thinking, is
not enough. Our satisfactions must also be tested in terms
of social values, ihis will become clear v;hen we discuss
Goe's social theory of religion as applied to religious
education.
Coe's functional approach in religious education,
with its emphasis upon valuational experience, causes him
to reject all forms of dogmatism and an educational program
based on preconceived formulas and ends. Goe states;
Shall religious education shape the pupil to
ends derived from a preconceived formula, or shall
it help him (1), appreciate the values that already
are present in his experience; (2), add freely to
these values, and (3), then freely judge and formu-
late the meanings that life acquires in this process ?'^'^
33. lb id.,36.
34. Goe, "Pratt vs. Ames: The Dilemma of the Teacher
of Religion," Religious Education , 24 (iNiovember, 1929),
879-82, 880.
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Brightman takes exception to Goe's view that the
child should not be subject to the preconceived ends which
the teacher might set for him. He believes that Goe's
point of view tends to be rather extreme and one-sided and
if carried to its logical conclusions would lead to free
exercise of undisciplined desires. Brightman states:
If teachers are obligated to suggest no goals,
then they are absolutely forbidden to advocate,
in any way that will ever be found out, dem.ocracy
or world -peace or social justice, for these are
preconceived ends, I ask whether the abolition
of preconceived ends, even v/hen they are formu-
lated, would not reduce society to barbarism?"^^
Goe is misunderstood vdien his view is Interpreted
as a belief th^t the pupil should "remain in Ignorance of
the past and the present and create for himself laws and
principles of science •."36 in his inaugural address at
Union in 1909, Goe stated:
Formulated ideas we m.ust have, of course; they
are a necessary phase of any experience, religious
or other, that deliberately organizes and propa-
gates Itself. Only as v/e heed the v^isdom of the
past can we escape a narrov/ individualism or a
shallow 'up-to-dateness." ... A genuine connec-
tion with the past can be maintained only on
condition that beliefs generate themselves ever
anew within the present experience .37
35. Edgar S. Brightman, "Professor Goe's Dilemma,"
Religious Educati^ 24 (December, 1929), 973-74, 273.
36. Ibid., 273.
37. Goe, "Gan Religion be Taught?" 16.
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Coe's fear of dogmatism in religious education is
grounded in his belief that "religious ideas can he kept
alive, and religious confidence find a permanent ground,
only in an experience that can he ever renewed. "^^ Pie
maintains that when theological ideas are abstracted from
the values experienced or hoped for, then v/e no longer have
teaching religion, but rather teaching about religion.
In his book. Law and P'reedom in the School (1924)
Goe applies his functional point of view to general educa-
tion. V/hile he favors a maximum freedom for the pupil he
also recognizes the necessity for certain restrictions and
controls. Goe places a great deal of faith in the ability
of the pupil to educate himself through his own purposeful
acts, and through decisions v/hich he makes and executes by
himself. Hov/ever, such freedom is obtained only through a
recognition of the natural, common, and moral laws which
govern man. Goe states:
Ee [the teacher] leads society into freedom by
leading children into it, and this he does by
giving them practice in it. Pie lets free that
within us that is ready to rebuke our selfishness,
our partisanship, our institutionalism and dogma-
tism, our aloofness and classfeeling, and the
nationalism that stands in the way of the unifica-
tion of mankind. I'his means, not freedom from law.
38. Ibid., 17.
39. Goe, Law and Freedom in the School « (Chicago:
The University of Ghicago Press, 1924) f
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but freedom through law and through the making
of lav/. We grov/ free only as v/e extend and deep-
en the "bonds that unify us --only as we think,
plan, act, judge, and enjoy together ."^^
The method which Coe advocates for both general
education and religious education is the pro ject -method
•
It includes the theory of interest as well as the idea of
self-directed activity and social participation as a means
of growth. In two books, A Social The ory of Religious
Education (1917) and \7hat is Christian Liducatlon ? (1929)
,
Coe presents this method as the one best suited for effective
religious education. However, from the time of his earliest
writings in the field, Coe has emphasized the idea of educa-
tion through free self-directed activity. For example, in
Education in Religion and korals ^1904) , Coe wrote:
The notion of process has changed from that of
bestowing something upon a passive child to that
of providing means whereby the child m.ay actively
and freely express himself. The child is to
develop from within by his own activity •'^-^
Briefly stated, Coe's functional point of view as
applied to religious education is that the values of life
must be recognized and experienced by the child if they are
to have real meaning for him. Effective religious education
must provide social experience and participation whereby the
40. Ibid., 129.
41. Coe, Education in Religion and Korals, 83,
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child is helped to recognize, to organize, and to unify
tl^ values of life. Religious education, from the func-
tional point of view, is not the intellectual transmission
of doctrine or "oellef , but a grov/th experience toward
greater self-realization.
2. Coe's Social Theory of Religious Education
In the preceding chapter we discussed Goe's social
theory of religion as he develops it within the framev/ork
of psychology of religion. Yie v/ill now consider this social
viewpoint as he applies it to religious education.
In his Psychology of Religion
, Goe presents a view
of religion as an experience of personality and of relations
between persons, he believes that through the progressive
discovery and reorganization of life's values, we not only
develop our own personalities, but also achieve full social
realization. When this point of view is applied to educa-
tion, v/e have an educational theory and practice that is
thoroughly social.
To be religious, according to Coe's point of view,
is to be socially minded and socially efficient. This Goe
makes clear v;hen he says:
... the only test for the Christian education
of the will lies in increase of social efficiency
of our pupils. There can be no successful Christian
education that does not increase the amount of
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effective, not merely sentimental brotherhood in
the world. ^2
Elsewhere, Goe states that "the good of education
must be defined not as of old in terms of individual know-
ledge or power or salvation, but in terms of social adjust-
ment and social efficiency. "43 As pointed out above, he
completely rejects the idea that the purpose of religious
education is indoctrination of dogma or belief. The aim
of education is rather to help the individual to desire and
seek social values, which are at the same time, moral and
and religious values.
Coe appears to be greatly influenced by Dewey's
concept of education. In the preface to his book, A Social
Theory of Religious Education
,
Coe recognizes this debt:
"I am indebted most of all to John Dev/ey, who is foremost
among those v/ho have put education and industrial democracy
into a single perspective."'^'^ Both Dewey and Coe maintain
that the educational process itself is a social experience.
In M^; aducational Creed
,
Dewey states: "I believe . . •
that the process and the goal of education are one and the
42. Coe, A Social Theory of Religious "Education
, 56.
43. Coe, "Religion as a Factor in Individual and
Social Development," 38.
4 4. Goe, A Social The ory of Religious Education , x.
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same thing ."^^ Similarly, Goe makes the statement that
education "is not merely preparation for life (though it is
that), but rather life itself ."^^ Dewey and Goe hoth agree
that the purpose of the school is to introduce the pupil to
community life and give him a real function in it.
Goe defines education as "the contribution made by
society to the set of a mind."^''' Society then is the prime
educator within all educational enterprises. Individuals
who teach are acting as agents for society. It is through
his contact with social situations and social environment
that the child develops into a self -realizing personality.
As over against the imparting of intellectual content and
subject matter, Goe feels that education must provide for
the pupil concrete social experiences and participation in
specific social enterprises. He rejects the notion that
one must wait until the child is mature before confronting
him v/ith social issues. He feels that since the child is,
from the beginning, in contact v/ith society that he begins
very early to form his attitudes toward it. For this reason
Goe pleads for a curriculum that does not exclude vital
45. John Dev/ey, Mj; .educational Greed . (imov/ York:
E. L. Kellogg and Gompany, 1897), 13.
45. Goe, "I'he Philosophy of the L.ovement for
Religious Education," 230.
47. Goe, A Social The ory of Religious iziducation , 13.
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social issues, because "the pupil is in contact v/ith life
as it actually is."'^^
i^ot only does society act upon the individual, but
through education of the individual, society itself becomes
changed. "Education," says Coe, "aims at the progressive
reconstruction of society. "^^ Through education society
not only seeks to preserve itself, but also to pass judg-
ment on its own defects and to work for self improvement.
It is through social interaction between the individual
and society that critical revaluation of life, and of life's
values, takes place. Coe therefore believes that the old
isolation of school experiences from other experiences must
be overcome all along the line.^O The primary content of
the curriculum, therefore, is to be found in present inter-
action between persons.
It is through this educationally controlled inter-
action betv/een the child and society that real character
development takes place, rather than in placing an ethical
formula in the mind of the child. ViThat is necessary,
according to Coe, is a definite response and an act of will
48. Coe, "Loral iiaucatlon in the Sunday School,"
Religious jjducation , 8 (October, 1913), 313-19, 315.
49. Coe, A Social The ory of Religious j^jducatlon , 18.
50. Ibid., 21,
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on the part of the child. Ee states:
Moral training is onesided unless the pupil
not only makes a moral response to some situation,
experienced or imagined, but also formulates and
fixes for future use the principle involved. ^-^
iMor does Goe believe that true Christian character
is formed through the teaching and practice of a set of
virtues. Virtues, he maintains, are, for the most part,
abstract qualities, rather than concrete social purposes.
He objects to the idea that moral character is made up of
a combination of qualities or virtues, rather "it consists
in holding to a social end or purpose through a period of
time, and making the details of conduct all contribute to
this end."^^ Y/hereas a virtue is an abstract and static
thing, a person or group of persons performing a function
is concrete and dynamic, it is in this area that Goe feels
moral character formation takes place.
So thoroughgoing is Goe's social theory that he
denies that any individual can hold communion with God in
a merely individual capacity. He states: "It is in the
social losing of our individual life that v/e find our own
life, and also the heart of God."^*^ For this reason Goe
51. Goe, "Loral and Religious iMucation from the
Psychological Point of View," 172.
52. Goe, "Virtue and the Virtues," Religious
Education , 6 (January, 1912), 185-92, 187.
53. Goe, "The Idea of God," Religious Education
,
6 (June, 1911), 175-84, 183.
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feels that the only way for children to advance in the law
of love is to live out their lives in association with one
another. All the contingencies of ordinary social life
have their place in this development .54 in his Psychology
of Religion , Goe makes it clear that salvation, as he views
it, is not achieved through any private relation or harmony
with God, but only through the reconstruction of society. 55
Coe's social theory of religious education is
continuous with his views presented in his writings on
psychology of religion. His view of religion as "personal-
social self-integration"^^ when applied to religious educa-
tion means that religion and moral character must be
developed in the child through social interaction whereby
the child defines his desires and forms his personality.
Religion as revaluation of values implies that religious
education must help the child to appraise his social
experiences so as to seek and desire the right values.
Religion as discovery means that religious education must
come to regard interest, satisfaction, desire, etc., as
being just as much a part of the mind as idea, memory,
judgment, and thought system. Religion as social immediacy
54. Goe, Education in Religion and korals , 150.
55. Goe, The Psychology of Religion , 226.
56. Ibid., 243.
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means for religious education that the child must come to
realize that the real world is pre-eminently the v;orld of
persons, and that religious development takes place through
the exercise of social impulses,
The social point of view in religious education is
a relatively recent development, and in that development
Coe holds a place of honor. The significant role which
Coe has played in "bringing about the social view in reli-
gious education is suggested in the follov/ing statement
by A. J. V/. Iviyers:
It may surprise us to find how recent is this
social emphasis in religious education and v/hat
a large part Professor Coe has had in bringing
it in. Today everybody takes for granted the
social theory of religious education. But this
is very new.
... in the social emphasis in religious
education he stands supreme.^'''
C. COiil'S LATER YJRITINGS IN RELIGIOUS KDUCATION
in 1927, at the age of sixty -five, George A. Coe
retired from teaching. However, he did not cease to take an
active interest in the v;ork of religious education. Of the
four books which Coe has vn?itten since his retirement, two
are concerned specifically with educational matters. In
addition, he has continued to this day to contribute
57. A. J. W. liyers, "Social Realism," Religious
Education, 22 (April, 1927), 426-28, 427.
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niimerous articles dealing with various aspects of religious
education and education in general.
Coe's book, What is Christian Education ? published in
1929, is a re-examination of Christian education in terms of
the dynamic social principles which he finds in the teachings
of Jesus and in historic Christianity itself* Coe's view is
that Christian education has not been sufficiently Christian,
and that it needs to re-create itself along lines more
intimately personal, and therefore more intensely social.
In the preface, Coe states:
• • • the radicalism that has been implicit in
Christianity from its beginning is here applied to
Christian education. Our churches are ailing, and
our religious nurture is feeble, because they are
not Christian enough; and their influence upon world
-
events and the movements of society is disappointing-
ly small, not because of any unwillingness to put on
modern dress, but because old, obvious, and acknow-
ledged principles of our religion have not been
erected into a steady discipline of our spirits. ^8
The strongly social emphasis v/liich is apparent in
almost all of Coe's published v/ritings is here applied vvdth
even greator vigor. Goe shov/s increasing concern over the
relation between the school and society as he reveals his
grov/ing interest in political, social, and economic matters.
Communism, capitalism, economic justice, racial equality, etc
are discussed in terms of their relation to the educative
58. Coe, \That is Christian liiucation? vi.
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process and the role v/hich Christian education should play
in social reconstruction. He "believes that creative and
progressive Christian education should make the church a
fountain of social radicalism.^^
In general, the book presents a re-v/orking of Coe's
characteristic views concerning religion, education, and
interpersonal relationships. In analyzing the failings of
Christian education, Goe again hits hard at dogmatism, the
transmissive conception of education, and the disparity
between theory and practice. The solution, according to
Coe, lies in a greater recognition and emphasis upon "the
creative Christian principle of the worth of persons . "^"-^
This means "pupil-centered" teaching with its corresponding
emphasis upon interest and self-direction.
One of the most significant developments in Coe's
later thinking, so far as our discussion is concerned, is
the increasingly unfavorable viev/ v/hich he takes toward
theistic thought. In What is Christian Education? Coe comes
to the conclusion that theistic philosophy is religiously
Ineffective for three reasons; (1) Religious worship tends
to offer refuge from the actualities of the v/orld instead of
facing them; (2) The deities of metaphysics are religiously
59. Ibid., 249.
60. Ibid., 60.
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a-dynamlc and lack real warmth; (5) 'ilieistlc philosophy
employs an unproductive and defensive method of thought
that prevents us from perceiving potential religious values.
VJhat really concerns Coe is the "deadening effect"
of an apologetic approach to the problems of the spiritual
life. Ke claims that theistic philosophies are religiously
ineffective because "the opportunity of thought to take
part in re-creating religion is restricted by religion
itself ."^2 v/hlle we might agree with Coe that metaphysical
speculation does tend to lead away fron life's actualities,
his view that theistic philosophies have produced no
quickening of religious life whatever, may be subject to
question. .His generalization that "the philosophies that do
the most to lay a rational foundation for faith appear to
be religiously ineffective," appears to overlook the role
of reason in religious life and place, all the emphasis on
feeling and volition. Although Coe increasingly tends to
take an extremist point of view, his emphasis upon experienced
values as the basis of Christian social action is a healthy
counter-balance to those v;ho take a purely philosophical
and metaphysical approach to religion.
61. Ibid., 273-75.
62. .Ibid., 276.
63. Ibid., 272.
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Coe's latest book in the field of education. Educating
64for Citizenship , was published In 1932. Like his earlier
book. Lav; and Freedom In the School (1924), It Is an attempt
to deal constructively with the problem of authority in
relation to the task of education. In his preface, Goe
states the problem as follows:
• . . lack of thoroughness in dealing with
the fact and the implications of sovereignty
—
specifically failure to face the peculiar prob-
lem of authority in a government of the people
by the people—has produced neglect, weakness,
and misleading teaching all along the line of
civic education.^5
Goe views the task of educating for citizenship as
one wherein the child is given experience in the gradual
assumption of the responsibilities of sovereignty, since
In a democracy, obeying and ruling must be consciously fused
into one. Goe sets out to strengthen the public school
teachers' faith in democracy, as well as to warn them against
possible dictatorship under the nam.e and the form of popular
government. He conceives of a truly democratic state as one
that is based upon the worth of persons, and has as its
mission to protect this v;orth and make it grov^r through co-
operative action. Since the book is primarily concerned
64. Goe, Educating for Citizenship
.
(jMew York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932).
65. Ibid., viil.
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v/ith the political aspect of social living, rather than v/ith
character education or religious education as such, it might
well be included as part of his v/ritings on social ethics.
As has already been pointed out, it is difficult to
distinguish clearly Coe's psychological, educational, and
ethical writings, since the same approach and characteristic
views tend to appear and reappear in varying forms. Any
attempt to pigeon-hole Coe's writings under one field or
another is purely arbitrary and quite unsuccessful. In
recent years Coe has written a great many articles on the
relation between education and social issues and the function
of the school v/ith respect to society. Since these writings
reveal his views regarding social ethics they will be taken
up in the next section.

CHAPTER VII
THE APPLICATION OP PSYCHOLOGY TO SOCIAL ETHICS
Having played an important role in the development
of psychology of religion, Coe approaches religious education
and social ethics from a psychological point of view. In
Coe's thinking, psychology of religion, religious education,
and social ethics are not three separate interests, hut one.
Life, as Coe views it, is a unity. He makes no attempt to
draw any hard and fast distinction between religious con-
sciousness and other forms of consciousness, or between
religious experience and the rest of human experience. For
this reason, Coe seldom Virrites on any aspect of religious
thought and practice without relating it to concrete social
Issues and viewing it in terms of mental processes and func-
tions •
In the preceding chapter it was pointed out hov; Coe's
psychology of religion has definite implications for reli-
gious education. Coe's social theory of religious education
involves confronting the pupil v/ith social issues and pro-
viding an interpersonal, social experience in which the indi-
vidual grows through social relations, develops social
attitudes, and strives after social values, constantly test-
ing, criticizing, and revaluing his standards in the light
of his growing experience. In both psychology and education.
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Coe thinks in terms of specific purposes. He centers his
attention upon the products of religious activity, which
leads him directly into the field of social ethics.
A. THE RELATION OP SOCIAL El'HICS TO PSYCHOLOGY OF
RELIGION AMD RELIGIOUS EDUCATION
1. Coe's Early Interest in Social Ethics
Early in Coe's study of the psychology of religion,
certain conclusions begin to appear regarding the nature of
religious life--conclusions which embrace the field of social
ethics. The drive tov/ard being a person in a society of
persons, involving dissatisfaction with achieved values and
revaluation of values, emerges in his thinking as the most
characteristic religious activity. Through the process of
remaking ourselves, and striving after unprecedented values,
man participates in an objective cosmic process, namely, the
creation of man, society, and the moral order. Coe's
psychological analysis of religious consciousness shows that
it is not a particular sort of enterprise that rests upon a
special interest, independent of social^ political, and
economic experience and thought. Personality, as he viev/s
it, is not a compartmental structure, but a unity. Religion
is part and parcel with the whole of human experience, in-
volving both the individual and society.
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I'he tendency toward a social view of religion is
clearly indicated in many of Coe's early writings in the
psychology of religion. In the concluding chapter of The
Spiritual Life (1900) , Goe contrasts an introverted type
of piety with an active or extraverted type. Ee maintains
that organized religion fails to place sufficient value upon
the masculine, active, and practical aspects of goodness.
1
In his article on "The Sources of the Lystlcal Revelation"
(1908), Goe points out that the content of the mystic's
illuminations comes from the mystic's own background and
experience and is therefore a social product.^ The same year,
Goe wrote an article on "Religious Value" in v/hich he objects
to the separation of spiritual values from the values of the
common life. "The sphere of religious not less than of
ethical value," says Goe, "is social life."*^ In 1909, Goe
v/rote an article on "The iViystical as a Psychological Goncept"
in #iich he maintains that "there is no distinctive 'mystical
experience,' because the psychical factor in mysticism., the
automatic, is entirely general, and not a kind of experience
with a distinctive content of its own."^ Finally, in an
1. Goe, The Spiritual Life, 243.
2. Goe, "The Sources of the Mystical Revelation," 572.
3. Goe, "Religious Value," 256.
4. Goe, "The Mystical as a Psychological Goncept,"
Journal of Philosophy , 6 (April, 1909), 197-202, 202.
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article entitled "On Having Friends: A Study of Social
Values" (1915), Goe sets forth his concept of social imme-
diacy; the idea that we develop self-conscious individuality
through interpersonal associations .5
The point of view which Goe develops in these early
writings becomes crystallized in his Psychology of Religion
and forms his social theory of religion, discussed in chapter
five of this paper. It also forms the basis of his social
theory of religious education, and finally brings him into
the field of social ethics. Although it has been in more
recent years that Goe has come to give considerable atten-
tion to specific social issues, political and economic,
nevertheless, his earlier writings reflect a keen interest
in such problems as lie within the field of social ethics.
Goe states that it was in the early nineties that
his "notions of good and evil v/ere shifting tov/ards social
relations and the social order. "^ The social-settlement
movement led by Arnold Toynbee and Jane Adams influenced
Goe's thinking, as well as the writings of Canon Premantle
,
Shailer IViathews, and Rauschenbush.''' Goe actively participated
5. Goe, "On Having Friends: A Study of Social Values,"
Journal of Philosophy , 12 (Iv.arch, 1915), 155-61, 160.
6. Goe, "lv:y Ovm Little Theatre," 110.
7. Ibid., 110.
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in social-settlement work, as well as in local politics, and
discussed social questions v/ith his students. About the
same time, social psychology was coming into its own and
helped to give Coe a scientific basis for his social theory
of religion. He states:
Social psychology was, in fact, a new thing under
the sun, and an important one. Its proof that the
individual, qua individual, is already part and par-
cel of society, was an event second in significance
to none in the entire history of ethical theory.
There is no merely individual good or goodness, no
merely individual evil or badness, no merely indi-
vidual self-determination. The problem of religion,
then, from the bottom to the top, is a problem of
nature, history, outlook, and final significance of
pers ons -realizing -themselves -as -such-in-society.^
Following the lead of John Dewey, and other progres-
sive educators, Coe came to view education as a social
process. In 1904, Coe wrote:
The school is an instrument of society for social
ends. It must not merely train the intellect, im-
part knowledge, and develop pov/er; it must also fit
the individual for occupying his proper place in
the social whole. . . This implies respect for the
rights and interests of one's fellows, readiness to
co-operate for common ends, and a sense of political
responsibility, ihus the end of true education is
seen to fall v/ithin, not outside of, the sphere of
ethics
By rejecting intellectual dogmatism, in both religion
and education, Coe breaks the Y;ay for a concept of religious
8. Ibid., 111.
9. Coe, Jiducation in Religion and Morals, 17.
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education that is ethical both in end and process. lie
comes to view the school as a miniture society united by
the ethical bond of mutual regard, with each task performed
having an ethical purpose and inspiration. Such a view leads
to a vital Interest in social issues, for the sphere of
religion becomes none other than common social life. In
Coe's opinion, "the merely submissive citizen is a public
danger," and "the only safety [for democracy] lies in an
aggressiveness that springs from a keen sense of responsi-
bility for political and social conditions . "10 'I'his position,
clearly stated in Coe's early writings, permeates his v/ritings
on religious education, and comes to full fruition in his
later v/ritings on v/ar, communism, politics, economics, etc.
2. Psychology and Social Ethics
Before 1915, very little v/ork had been done upon
social motives, values, and what might be called the sense
of social reality, icuch attention had been directed by
psychologists to phenomena of instinct and impulse, such as
the action of gregarious animals, of young children, or
crowds, but more deliberate social acts and attitudes, had,
for the most part, gone unstudied, believing that it is
through our deliberate social acts that we define ourselves.
10. Ibid., 402.
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Coe set about to explore those values which may be obscure
or possibly lacking at more instinctive levels of conduct.
In his article, "On Having Friends: A Study of Social Value
Coe takes the experience of having a friend as a concrete
example of how persons are mutually present to one another.
"The significance of friendship," says Coe, "depends upon a
second experiencing, so that I actually value another's joy
I suffer another's pain."-^^ Coe applies his psychological
knowledge in exploring the underlying motives and values
which are at work in social relationships, and thus brings
psychology directly to bear upon the field of social ethics
In 1928, Coe v/rote his volume. The Motives of ken, 12
in which he explores the mental dynamics which underlie
human conduct. In attempting to identify good and evil at
the very springs of conduct, Coe employs psychological tool
Here was an area v/hich psychology, at that time, was just
beginning to enter. Coe states:
Until recently it fpsychologyj has been too
little interested in "mental dynamics; it has felt
a compulsion to generalize the human and subhuman,
the mental and the biological, the biological and
the physical, \7ith no corresponding concentration
upon the specific performances of the human mind;
it has been, tliat is to say, self -forgetting; and.
11. Coe, "On Kaving Friends: A Study of Social Value
156.
12. Coe, The kotives of Men. (l^ew York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 19287^
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even now tliat the dynamic problem is coming to
the fore, the question v;hat we human beings
specifically are, dynamically considered, has
only begun to be asked.
In attempting to get at the roots of human behavior,
Goe recognizes the values in the psychoanalytic method, and
at the same time, sees its limitations, lie believes that
although psychoanalysis has increased our knowledge of moti-
vation, "it has not proved the actual existence of the
diabolism that is pictured in 'the Unconscious.'"-^'^ Goe
regards as equally abstract an disillusioning the psychology
of motivation based on "an unworkable theory of instinct,"
behavioristic metaphysics, as well as a "decadent atomistic
point of viev/ and method. "-^^ The failure of much of psychol-
ogy, as Goe views it, to deal in an adequate way with human
behavior, lies in its failure to give due recognition to the
purposive aspect of human behavior. As we will see in the
next chapter, Goe's point of view is in keeping with the
current trend away from atomistic concepts toward a more
holistic, dynamic, and purposive viev/ of personality.
Seward Hiltner states that Goe's volume, 'The Iviotives of
Ken, "attempted to deal with all aspects of motivation
13. Ibid., vi.
14. Ibid., 88.
15. Ibid., 93.
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before this became common practice even among depth psychol-
ogists."!^
In attempting to explore the motives and purposes
which underlie the various problems confronting society, Goe
takes a decidedly psychological point of view. War, for
example, is viewed as "a state of mind . Goe shows how
habits of thought and sentiment may make for war while there
is yet peace. "They make it," states Goe, "not by hating
other nations, not by desiring war, but by adjusting the
whole mental mechanism so that, in certain situations, war-
favoring reactions will occur as a matter of course. "-^^
Goe rejects the instinct theory of v;ar. Iv:en are pugnacious,
not from instinct, but from habit and tradition. He finds
the psychological basis for v/ar in crowd and mass -action,
often postered by certain activities in schools and colleges.
Goe states:
Here we see our favored youth getting ready to
conduct business upon the dog-eat-dog basis; the
church upon sectarian basis; 'our set' or 'our
class' upon the basis of privilege; our political
affairs upon the basis of partisanship; our
foreign commerce upon the basis of imperialism;
our international relations upon the basis of
16. Sevirard Ililtner, Pastoral Gounseling . (wew York:
Abingdon-Gokesbury Press, 1949) , 252
.
17. Goe, "Shifting the ^lational Kind Set," Pacifisism
in the Lodern World , Edited by Devere Allen, (uev/ York:
Doubleday , Doran and Gompany, Inc., 1929), 221-28, 221,
18. Ibid., 222.
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national self-sufficiency, pride, and arrogance. 19
Goe believes that the deep-lying dynamics of war
reside in our economic system. War occurs because men strive
after possessions and economic power that affect internation-
al relations .20 v/ith regard to economic motivation, Goe
rejects the idea that there is such a thing as an "acquisi-
tive Instinct." The capitalist never pursues, according to
Goe, a single, narrovj gauage interest. Regarding the moti-
vation of the capitalist, Goe states;
In one and the same act several of the following
phases of his mental dynamics alv/ays can be detected:
family affection, fam.ily pride, and anxiety concern-
ing security and social standing; desire for recogni-
tion in the business world; the nursing of self-
conceit; loyalty to a partner; pugnacity towards a
rival; employment of power or of being a cause; the
exhilaration of a game; the thrill of originality;
pride of v/orkmanshlp; the glov/ of self -identifica-
tion with an institution, enterprise, or cause; the
taking of a customer's Interest as one's own; the
feeling of responsibility for the welfare of
employees; devotion to country. ^1
m a similar manner, the failure of organized religion
to deal successfully with the social problems of the day, is
given psychological treatment by Goe. Religion, he claims.
19. Goe, "Youth and Peace," Scribner ' s I-agazlne
,
78 (July, 1925), 8-15, 11.
20. Goe, "ilflucating for Peace and Hot for V/ar,"
V/orld Tomorrow , 14 (iiovember, 1931), 360-61, 361.
21. Goe, "Kotives for a wew Order," World Tomorrow
,
16 (April 12, 1933), 349-51, 350.
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is anxious about its future. Ee suggests that "possibly
piety is shrinking from some change v/ithin itself that the
growing experience of m.en makes imperative . "^2 He believes
that men are subconsciously wrestling with a factor of unreal-
ity in their lives and in their religion, evading the actu-
ality of experience. Because the readjustment required is
so difficult, they seek a substitute through being religious
in a general way, instead of being religious at specific
points v;here vital social issues are involved .23 He finds
that in business the profit motive, which is selfish and in-
human, operates alongside desires to be humane and of use
to mankind. Such a division brings sickness of the mind,
which Goe claims can be healed only by the expulsion of one
or the other of these incompatible motives, 'i'his duplicity
Goe finds in political life, morals, and education, and
therefore, comes into the churches also. In the last
analysis
,
religion is anxious because it cannot accommodate
itself to capitalism and Christian principles at the same
time. Goe states:
The current anxiety about religion is therefore
essentially a defense mechanism, a confused or
subconscious effort to be pious and safe at a
22. Goe, "V/hy Religion is Anxious," Vi/orld Tomorrow
,
15 (October,. 5, 1932), 326^27, 326.
23. Ibid, 326.
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cost less than the cost of social righteousness .'^^
Coe takes to task many religious practices for their
apparent failure to meet social needs, and he does so through
psychological analysis of underlying motives. Worship, for
example, is not an unmixed good, according to Coe, nor is the
genuine enricliment of worship necessarily a step forward.
"Before we are ready to approve," says Coe, "we must take
into account the whole setting, motivation, and tendency. "25
In some cases, Coe finds that the improvement in the conduct
of religious services might be incidents and even instruments
of social decadence. 'ITie test is always the end result that
is achieved. Coe attempts to appraise the social-ethical
significance of religious services on the basis of their
thought content, that is, what suggestions they bring con-
cerning everyday life, and also on the basis of the continuity
secured between Sunday services and week-day occupation. Coe
maintains that the "enrichment of v/orship" cannot be a sub-
stitute for the "enrichment of daily life."^^
With keen psychological insight, Coe shows how the
cutting-edge of Christianity is dulled and made ineffective
24. Ibid., 327.
25. Coe, "Who is Enriched by the Enrichment of
V/orship?" Journal of Religion , 3 (January, 1923), 22-33, 28.
26. Ibid., 53.
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for radical social action because conventional ethics have
become a part of our religious consciousness. Coe states:
Protestants are predominantly middle-class persons
who naturally desire to hold onto their usually
moderate economic privileges, achieved usually by
hard work. 'J?he conventional ethics that justifies
this desire has become a part of their religious
consciousness. Thus, at the crisis-point in present
society, a quasi-divine authority is bestoyed upon
conservative and reactionary policies .^"^
The effectiveness of Goe's writings in social ethics
appears to be due largely to his penetrating psychological
insight into human motives and human behavior. In his hands,
psychology becomes a useful tool in exposing the selfish
motives and desires which lie back of so much of human
activity, even religious activity, fiov/ever, the focus of
Goe's interest is selective. He becomes so absorbed in the
outgoing, social v/ork of the church, that he tends to over-
look possible values in the more mystical, reflective, and
perhaps individual aspects of religion. His sharp criticism,
of so much of religious v/orship, for example, while justifi-
able to a large degree, is nevertheless based on a one-sided
viev/ that worship should serve only one purpose, namely, to
stimulate greater social action. In the following chapter
v/e will give further consideration to this, and other criti-
cisms of Goe's basic point of view.
27,.Coe, "iicclesiastical Authority in a Democracy," The
Social Frontier, 4 (July, 1928), 512-16, 316.
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3. Education and Social fithics
In his book, Sducation in Religion and K orals (1904)
,
Goe sets forth a viev; of education conceived as a unit. Unity
in education, Goe maintains, is achieved through the ethical
view of life which is "an effort to introduce into life, or
to discover within life, organization, harmony, unity. "^^
Education is unitary, not merely because in the actual self
of the child there is no separation of faculties, but also
because the ideal of a complete unified self is an Implicit
principle of the whole development.
In A Social The ory of Religious Education (1917) , Goe
gives us both the theory and practice of a social-ethical
view of education, conceived as a unity. lie presents a viev/
of character that is dynamic, not a static combination of
elements, qualities, or traits. The social-ethical problem
with regard to education is again considered in vVhat Ails
Our Youth? (1924).^^ Goe finds that the great difficulty
with education lies in its failure to help pupils make the
necessary adaptation to a changing world through readjust-
ment, or re-creation, of purposes. Goe states that new
28. Goe, Education in Religion and Korals , 30.
29. Goe, What Ails Our Youth? (i\ew York: Gharles
Scribner's Sons, 1924T"i
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information and nev; skills are readily obtainable , but "ends
in-view are, on the whole, left to chance, to custom, or to
some sentimental proclamation of highly generalized or un-
sifted ethical formulas. "30 The relation of social ethics
to education is so important in Goe's thinking, that he
seldom fails to write about one without respect to the other
This relationship is again made clear in Goe's book,
V/hat is Christian Education? (1929) • Here, Goe emphasizes
the need for creative religious education, for a religious
education which seeks only to transmit something out of the
past is inadequate to human needs. Unless religious educa-
tion is itself in a process of creative reconstruction, it
will be unable to reconstruct society* In answer to the
question, V/hat is Christian Education? Goe states;
It is the systematic, critical examination and
reconstruction of relations betv/een persons, guid-
ed by Jesus' assumption that persons are of infinite
worth, and by the hypothesis of the existence of
God, the Great Valuer of Persons. 31
In his later writings on educational theory and
practice, Coe shov/s a great interest in the relation of the
churches to state education, and the relation of education
in general to changing social conditions. In Educating for
30. Ibid., 19.
31. Coe, Vaiat is Christian Education? 296.
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Citizenship (1932) , Coe points out how the public schools
can work for the improvement of life within present society,
and even help to affect a reconstruction of society. This
iDecomes possible, hov/ever, only when education becomes
ethical in both end and process. In this respect, the char-
acter-education movement, as Coe viev/s it, has had consider-
able influence. It has led av/ay from reliance upon abstract
form.ulae for goodness toward a direct facing of concrete
actualities, and has helped to foster social appreciation
and social integration. Through the character-education
movement, in which Coe has played an important role, an
inclusive concept of the good has been fostered, a concept
v/hich opposes the portioning of life into segments--economic,
political, and moral. '^^ 'Thus, in Goe's thinking, education,
v/hether religious or secular, involves a direct relation to
social-ethical life.
?/ith a growing interest in socialism and Marxism,
Coe has come to regard as the chief failure of religious
education a "lack of recognition of the nature of class
struggle. "'^S This, he believes, is due largely to the fact
that the churches of today are part and parcel of the
32. Coe, Education for Citizenship , 36.
33. Coe, "The i^ducational Frontier of the Churches,"
The Social Frontier , 2 (December, 1935), 80-82, 81.
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the Capitalist system, and yet, at the same time, "aspire
to teach the whole world an all-inclusive , unselfish way of
life,"*^^ He maintains that teaching bodies in* general are
supported by and conform, to a social system that counteracts
the ideals that are supposed to be taught. Coe firmly
believes that schools, religious and secular, should become
agents of social reconstruction, and he attempts by his
writing to awaken the responsibility of educators in this
regard. Teachers, he claims, have in their power to move
children rightv/ard or leftward by weighing the curriculum
one v/ay or the other, and at the same time be strictly
scientific. He states:
The practical upshot of the m.atter is this:
teachers could guarantee to move pupils either
rightward or leftv/ard by strictly scientific
study—rightward, for example, by study of a
'successful' business administration, leftward
by study of a Vaest Virginia m.ining town. . •
It follov/s that every curriculum is v/eighted;
its social facts are selected facts.
Coe is well av/are of the radical nature of his point
of view and he makes no effort to minimize the cost which
may be involved for one v;ho seriously attempts to follow
his lead. He states:
The summons to teachers is to take sides for
real democracy in the economic sphere --to take
34. Ibid., 80.
35. Coe, "Sducation as Social Engineering," The
Social Frontier , 1 (January, 1935), 25-29, 26,
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sides deliberately and to follov; out the democra-
tic principle to the end, whatever hardship this
entails--possibly revolution, and for the teacher-
leader probable calimny and Insecurity. All of our
economic resources' must be made to serve all of us,
not a privileged class.
Coe believes th^t the method by v/hich education can
help to bring about a classless society is that v/hich in-
volves the principle of freedom rather than indoctrination.
Indoctrination cannot be the method because that is the
method used by class -governed societies. Coe states: "If
the principle of freedom to v/hich progressive education is
committed be fully applied, it will of itself make the
school a protagonist of a classless society . "•^'^ Ten years
after this statement was made, hov/ever, Coe finds the
situation little improved, in spite of the fact that the
principle of freedom has received increasing recognition.
In 1943, Coe v/rote:
Our unpreparedness is greatest in respect to
tensions that are called (and miscalled) racial.
Neither our schools, nor our educational philo-
sophies, nor our religious faiths have really
tackled the problem that is presented by the
existence in this country of an allegedly su-
perior and an allegedly inferior race. The
schools of the state and the schools of the
churches have given it palliative treatment.
36. Coe, "Dare the School Build a New Social Order?"
Religious Education , 28 (February, 1933), 114-16, 116.
37. Coe, "Shall We Indoctrinate?" Progressive
Education, 10 (I.:arch, 1933), 140-43, 143.
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some of which has value, but none of v/hich
reaches the root of our grov/ing trouble .'^S
It is apparent from Coe's v/ritings in religious
education and social ethics, tiiat he looks to education for
the needed reconstruction of society. For this reason, his
educational and ethical v/ritings are so closely related.
Coe seems to grov; increasingly disparaging of the ability
of organized Christianity to radically change the social
order* This is largely because the churches, as he sees
them, are themselves too closely Ddentified with the existing
social situation, and not sufficiently inclined toward self-
criticism and the revaluation of present standards and values.
Although he recognizes that the same evils are present in
our school systems, he continues to place great faith in
progressive education, v/ith its emphasis upon freedom and
self-direction, to bring about the needed social change.
B. PSYCHOLOGY OP RELIGION AlsD E'lEIGAL THEORY
The views on the nature of religion which Coe presents
in The Psychology of Religion are further developed and given
specific application in his discussions on the economic and
political problems of the day. Certain characteristic views
reappear time and again as he attempts to deal in a dynamic
38. Coe, "Postv/ar Pupil Experience in Axis Countries,"
School and Society , 58 (September, 1943), 177-80, 179,

225
way with particular problems confronting society. iMOt only
does this give continuity to his various books and articles,
but it further demonstrates one of Goe's fundamental argu-
ments, namely, that life is a unity and cannot be segmented
and departmentalized. Vahat is true in psychology must be
true in social ethics, and any theory of social ethics m-ust
stand the light of psychological analysis and investigation.
'The manner in v/hich Goe brings the conclusions reached in
his psychology of religion into the area of concrete social
life, enhances the meaning and value of his contribution.
We v/ill now consider some of the characteristic views.in his
psychology of religion as he applies them, in the sphere of
social-ethical life.
1. The Value of Persons
In his Psychology of Religion , Goe makes it clear
that we becom.e persons and achieve self-realization through
interpersonal activity, particularly through ethical con-
flict and achlevement--the overcoming of hatred and indif-
ference toward each other, and the replacement of compulsion
with reflective loyalty and love.'^^ This is accomplished
through the process of revaluation which has as its central
tendency the placing of increased value upon persons. In
39. Goe, The Psychology of Religion , 227.
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Coe's ethical theory, this respect for persons is the very
root of ethical love. "i>iow, respect for persons," says Coe
,
"as distinguished from emotions of sympathy, can be practic-
ed not otherwise than as promotion of the functions that
distinguishes persons from the impersonal . ""^^ V/hen this view
is applied to social issues it challenges our thinking re-
garding many of our economic and political practices.
Coe believes in private property "because use and con-
trol of material things is essential to the development of
persons, but he argues against property for power oe cause it
has "no value for the development of personality, but on the
contrary involves dehumanizing of masses of men and social
disharmony . "'^^ 'J-'he criterion is alv/ays whether or not a
given act promotes or degrades the value and v/orth of
persons. Coe states:
If there is any religious conviction upon which
we are agreed it is that of the sacredness of
human life, particularly in the sense of ultim.ate
value of persons. V/hat, then, is the outlook with
respect to the value of persons? For our answer
we must consult the statistics of our v;ar dead; the
statistics of preventable sickness; the statistics
of preventable accidents; the list of 73 fsic^ labor-
ers killed last year fl935j in our industrial
accidents.
40. Coe, V/hat is Religion Doing to Our Consciences?
(i^ev/ York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1945T, 46.
41. Coe, "The Religious Outlook on the VJorld Today,"
Religious Education , 31 (April, 1936), 85-90, 89,
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Although Coe's figure of 73 laborers killed in 1935
in industrial accidents appears too low to be correct, the
view which he presents is nonetheless clear. As alv/ays , Goe ,
centers his attention upon practical results. The final test
of our belief in the worth and value of human personality lies
in the field of practical everyday life and coirjiion inter-
personal relations.
Regarding the use of compulsion, Goe would not be
regarded as a thorougl:igoing pacifist, since the question is
always one of ends rather than means. I'he reason for re-
coiling from the use of physical compulsion, according to
Goe, is th^t "it seems to place ultimate reliance upon what
is non-spiritual, non-ethical; it lends itself too readily
to selfishness and self-will; it sets person against person,
and thus tends to multiply the original evil."'^^ hov/ever,
he still m.aintains that respect for human personality, may,
under certain conditions, demand the use of coercion. Goe
states
:
He who oppresses his fellows depresses his own
self. Respect for his personality, therefore,
cannot be effectively exercised by permitting him.
to persist in his conduct. '^'^
Goe believes that at times the use of "mechanical
42. Goe, "vmat is Violence?" Y/orld Tomorrow , 15
(October, 1932), 378-80, 379.
43. Ibid., 379.
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action" against stubborn men is the only v/ay to demonstrate
complete respect for persons. Ethical judgments upon con-
duct, must not, m Coe's opinion, be based on "any mechanical
or bodily changes that it works, but on changes In personal
selves and in their attitudes toward one another. "^^4
Coe's criticism of the v;hole private profit system
is basically that of its m-echanization of human relations
and its lack of respect for human worth and dignity. Coe
objects to any system which has as its ideal of efficiency
the "ability to turn the services of men on and off at v/ill,
and to direct their powers hither and thither, much as one
manipulates the switches in a power house. "^^
One of the great ambiguities which Coe finds in
religion lies in the fact that on the one hand there is
assent to the worth and dignity of man, but on the other
hand there is also assent to a social order that is other-
v/ise based. To bring the two into harmony v/ill require,
if Coe is correct, something of the radical, if not
revolutionary element, v/hich historic Christianity contains,
and vAiich oi^anized religion nov; needs.
44. Coe, "Two Kinds of Coercion," Y/orId Tomorr ov/
,
16 (February 22, 1933), 177-79, 177.
45. Coe, "Capitalism Blinds ken," V/orld Tomorrow,
15 (i^ovember 23, 1932), 493-95, 494.
46. Coe, \7hat is Religion Doing to Our Consciences
?
, 39.
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2. The mature of Religious Consciousness
One of the important conclusions which Goe reaches
in his Psychology of Religion is that consciousness is a
unity and cannot be departmentalized. Religious conscious-
ness, he claims, is not distinct from ethical consciousness,
nor is religious value distinct from ethical value, or the
values of common life.^"^ Both ethics and religion operate
in the sphere of human relationships. However, Goe does
recognize that religion and ethics are not identical, fie
states that "ethics commonly limits its attention to certain
values, whereas religion is interested in all values, in the
v/hole meaning of life.'''^^ In Goe's thinking
,
religious life
involves the ethical, and when ethical value attem.pts ideal
completion in union with all other values, then we have
religion .49
The practical side of this concept of religious
consciousness is that religious beliefs have no segregated
life of their ov/n, independent of ethical, political, and
economic thought and expression. Goe states:
Religious conduct is not som^ething over and
above the working relations of human beings in
47. Goe, The Psychology of Religion , 74.
48. Ibid., 75.
49. Ibid., 74.
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families, neighborhoods, marts of merchandise,
police stations, halls of legislation, coal
mines, cotton fields, banks, bonds, unemploy-
ment, and doles .50
Coe's concept of the totality of consciousness en-
ables him to view more clearly the correlation which exists
between types of religion and types of social organization.
Y/arlike tribes, for example, have warlike gods, while mon-
archies and empires have kingly and imperial gods . Religious
customs and rituals reflect the dominant type of social
activity of the people. Coe's conclusion is that the
"'religious' conscience and the 'secular' conscience are so
affiliated that a man can pass from one to the other v/ithout
ringing any doorbell. "^^
In this osmosis between the religious and the secular,
Coe finds the reason for the apparent identification of
organized religion with popular economic and political con-
cepts of the day. He points out that churches are dependent
for their support upon economic processes that contradict
the principles that the churches profess, and also that the
churches and denominations are themselves business organiza-
tions since they buy and sell, invest, hire and fire, etc. 52
50. Coe, "The Religious Outlook on the ¥/orld , " 85.
51. Coe, ViiTmt is Religion Doing to Our Consciences
?
8.
52. Coe,"liThat Capitalism Does to Protestantism,"
V/orld Tomorrow, 16 (April 18, 1933), 374-75, 375.
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As already pointed out, this contradiction between belief
and action, according to Goe, accounts for the anxiety and
sickness m organized religion. Since consciousness is a
unity, this contradiction upsets the harmony. Coe states:
Christianity will not and cannot live a
vigorous life while it clings to its present
self-contradiction. If its aspiration for a
just society upon earth is valid; its accomoda-
tion to capitalism cannot "be valid; it is infi-
delity and unfaith. One or the other of these--
Christianlty ' s belief in a Christlike society and
its acquiescence in the ethics of capitalism
—
must yield.
It is apparent that if one conceives of religious
consciousness merely in terms of content or belief, or re-
gards it as being of a separate or distinct order, apart
from ethical consciousness, such a duplicity might not
arise* But the sphere of religious consciousness, as Coe
conceives it, embraces the ethical, and thus the contradic-
tion is brought into sharp focus. I'he solution v;hich. Coe
offers is the working-through the ambiguities by critical
revaluation of values. Religion must become dynamic, not
static. In order to re-create the social order, it must
begin by re-creating itself.
3. Religious Revaluation of Value
In his Psychology of Religion , Coe has much to say
53. Coe, "Why Religion is Anxious," 327.
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regarding the evolution of mental functions. K.e brings
religious experience, like all human experience, under the
notion of evolution. Human nature, according to Goe, is in
a process of change. Our motives and desires are different
from those of our ancestors. A dynamic view of religion,
such as Goe presents, takes into account the growing process
within religious life. Historically considered, the pro-
phetic spirit within Christianity has fostered this change.
In causing people to rethink, criticize, and revaluate their
present values, the prophet has led men into ethical conflict
out of which emerge nev; values. In this process of working-
over present values, facing conflicts, and meeting resistance
v/hich is the clearest sort of creative evolution.
Coe's most recent book, which he states will be his
last book, 7/hat is Religion Doing to Our Consciences? (1943)
,
deals primarily with this principle of religious revaluation
of values as applied to the social, economic, and political
conditions of our time. It represents Coe's attempt to re-
think and rework some of his earlier value judgments in the
light of changed conditions. In other v/ords, the book it-
self is an expression of how mental evolution is operating
in his own thinking. He states in the forev/ard of his book:
Changes that have occurred in almost the v/hole
54. Coe, The Psychology of Religion
,
215-24,
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of civilization within three decades have shifted
the position of all of us within the spectrum of
good and evil. Value judgments, made by most of
us only yesterday, contained assumptions that we
did not perceive and perhaps could not. Events for
which v;e were not prepared have brought into ques-
tion not only particular ethical attachments but
also scales of value that have had any v/ide accept-
ance in our part of the world .^^
Goe speaks of the various transfers of religious
sanctions from one area to another which have taken place
within the past generation. Ideas regarding family life and
the place of women in the home and society; concepts regard-
ing the positive value of sexual satisfaction within matri-
mony; ideas surrounding political movements and the functions
of the state; developments in our economic order and viev/s
regarding private profits; changes in the position of labor
and the working-man in society. Goe maintains that "not
nearly all the shifts that v/e have noticed have to do with
making old purposes v/ork better; what confronts us includes
also an admission, often tacit, that old religious purposes
and standards of value are and alv/ays have been inadequate."^
It is Goe's belief that every day brings problems of good
and evil that lie beyond the horizon of yesterday's moral
judgments. ?/hat is needed is a continuous nev/ creation of
conscience. "Unremitting revaluation of our values," says
55. Goe, \Vhat is Religion Doing to Our Gonsclences? viii.
56. Ibid., 20.
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Coe, "the only way in v/bich anything can have continuing
recognition as good . "57
Coe believes that the act of worship, whether private
or corporate, can play an important part in social recon-
struction. Eov/ever, Coe makes it clear that this can only
be done when it incorporates "a principle of religious self-
criticism and religious reconstruction."^^ Coe maintains
that the social function of the devotional life is not to
prevent change, but to stimulate us to attempt great changes.
Coe objects to a rigid, static, dogmatic concept of
religion. He believes tliat theology needs to plunge into the
inner, ethical dynamics of our social life; it needs to re-
construct itself in the light of changing situations, if it
is going to have real m.eaning and significance for our age.
Conservative religion, he claims, is defensive, uncritical,
static, unv/illing to reconstruct itself in order to meet
changing conditions of life and new social situations. 'j?his
does not mean that conservative religion remains unaffected
by changing conditions, but merely that without such revalu-
ation it is affected by events in a way that it does not
realize. In keeping with the principle of religious
57. Ibid., 43.
58. Coe, "The Social Value of Prayer and Worship,
World Tomorrow, 15 (June, 1932), 175-77, 175.
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revaluation of value, Coe takes a realistic viev/ of religion.
His particular brand of ethical and religious thinking might
well be termed radicalism.
C. GOE'S SOCIAL Ai© RELIGIOUS RADICALISM
The progression of Goe's thinking, as indicated by
his published articles and books, tends to show an increas-
ingly radical spirit. He interprets this, not as any degen-
eration into secularism, but rather as an increasingly
realistic view of spiritual concerns. 59 To be realistic
regarding religion, according to Coe, involves revolutionary
change. lie states:
i^jor do I think that the goal of religion or
of theology can be reached otherwise than by
deeper and still deeper immersion into the
concrete actualities of economic society with
a view to revolutionary change. ^'-^
Coe sees in many religious practices an attempt to
withdraw from the radical and revolutionary element inherent
v/ithin historic Christianity. Such attempts Include an
Increased emphasis on private mystical practices, the doc-
trine of human depravity, helplessness and dependence upon
God, adoration of an Absolute rather than a world -rmastering
faith, and also a reliance upon Ghristlike self-giving to
59. Coe, "iuy Own Little 'Theatre," 116.
60. Ibid., 116.
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do all that needs to be done. J^om Coe's point of view,
such practices lead away from radical social change, he
"believes that what is needed is that we "commit ourselves
to the active struggle for a classless society, including
the economic conditions without v/hich such a society cannot
come into being. "^iowever, Goe believes that something more
than our conventional Christian ethics is required to bring
about the sort of social revolution he regards as necessary.
In 1937, Goe wrote:
At the present moment I am wrestling with the
growing realization that our inherited ethical
principles, though they contain a premonition of
this goal [a classless society] are incapable of
guiding us to it. It is true that a profoundly
radical germ always has been harbored within
Cliristianity ; yet Cliristian ethics, like secular
ethics, never has concerned itself with how to
carry on a social revolution. 62
Goe seems to believe that a radical or revolutionary
view of religion is necessary if it is to be truly effective.
An ethics of mere giving-and-re ceiving is illusory, in Coe's
thinking, because it is ineffective. V/hat must be consider-
ed is the rights and needs of the masses •^'^
Goe believes that the most pressing need in the
psychology of religion today is to find a solution to the
61. Ibid., 117.
62. Ibid., 117-18.
63. Ibid., 118-19
•
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disparity which exists between the radical element in
Christianity and lack of effective social action. In a
letter to Dr. Paul Johnson, written in 1943, Goe states:
• • • in my opinion the most immediate need in
the psychology of religion is a solution to the
following paradox: Religion after religion, at its
inception, declares one or another sort of faith
that, if it were put into action, v/ould lead to a
social revolution of one or another sort. There is
a radical strain, I suspect, in anything that can
be called 'religion as such.' Certainly Christianity
is fundamentally radical if it is to be judged by
the bearing of its central concepts upon anything
that can be called the good society. Yet social
radicalism is not characteristic of the history of
any religion I 'i'races of radicalism remain in
verbal formiulae, to be sure, but the main use actu-
ally made of these formulae is to maintain good
sentiments as if they constituted the good life.
How does this come to pass? V/hat are the forces
that make both God and man into liberals instead of
radicals? And v;hat are the specific mechanisms
that check religion yet keep it alive. 64
With Coe there is a real difference between passing
resolutions and changing one's conduct. Coe looks at the
resolutions passed by ecclesiastical assemblies and then
inquires as to v/hat is their "cash value . "^^ he states
that it is generally recognized that ministers stand for
goodness in general, and against v/ickedness in general, but
ministers need to point out just wherein and how Christians
64. From a letter written by George A. Coe to
Paul Ji. Johnson, i\iovem.ber 18, 1943.
65. Coe, "Resolutions or Resoluteness?" World
Tomorrow, 15 (iJovember 2, 1932), 423, 423.
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should differ from others. Coe believes that ministers
need to be more direct, concrete, and clear in their aims
and methods. 'iTiey need to deal v/ith specific social issues
in a way that the populace can understand .^^ In other words,
sentiments are not enough; a realistic view of religion
demands the putting of belief into action.
Coe believes that the Church is at issue with the
basic principles of the existing social order, not merely
with its excesses, but also with v;hat It regards as of its
essence, he states:
For the church to disclaim the charge of harbor-
ing radicalism is to act foolishly. To the extent
that any church is Christian, it does harbor social
radicalism, and cultivates it, for it is inherent
in our assumption of the v/orth and dignity of per-
sons • Put into practice in our economic-political
relationships, it will 'put down the mighty from
their seats, and exhalt them of low degree. '^"7
Coe's social radicalism is further illustrated in
the v;ay in which he vlev/s Larxism. The revolutionary
violence involved in attaining the Marxian goal is looked
upon by Coe as "a bitter necessity." He shows the contrast
between the ethical quality of I.arxist revolutionary activity
and the ethical quality of capitalist v;ars . The former is
based primarily on respect for persons and aims at a classless
66. Coe, "The Religious Breakdown of the ilinistry,"
Journal of Religion, 1 (January, 1921), lB-29, 20.
67. Coe, Ylhat is Gliristian iiiiucation? 251.
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society, while the latter disregards human worth and dignity
and aims at political and economic control of persons
Such a viev/ is in keeping v/ith Coe's primary emphasis upon
ends rather than means.
In his Psychology of Religion , Goe states: "Where
-
ever men intensely identify themselves with something as
their very life, there you v/ill almost certainly find
'religion' the descriptive term#"^^ For this reason, Goe
regards the zeal of the citizens of the U.S.S.R. to be so
self -transcending and consuming that it is really religious.
He maintains that the social fervor of Iv.arxism is based on
the belief that "there is a nature of things that assures
the triumph of the principle, 'iiiach for all, and all for
each' (a nature of things that Christians call God).""^^
He further maintains that the religious consciousness it-
self is one of the chief agencies for promoting sympathetic
understanding of communists, and respect for the Soviet
regime.'-^ In Coe's opinion, the communist movement is
actively promoting the basic principles of Christianity,
the most important of v/hich is respect for the value of
68. Goe, "Miose Glass-Conscious Proletarians!"
Zion's Herald
,
(July 1, 1936), 632-33.
69. Goe, The Psychology of Religion , 69.
70. Goe, V/hat is Religion Doing to Our Consciences
?
102.
71. Ibid., 103.
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persons.
Throughout the whole of Goe's writings there is
great emphasis on the v/orth of persons. Religion at its
best becomes a progressive discovery of the v/orth of persons,
and growth in the self-realization of persons, in a society
of persons. We would expect, therefore, that Goe v/ould be
critical of that within present society, as well as religion,
which is a denial of this principle or fails to give it due
emphasis. His social radicalism represents an attempt to
apply to the fullest v;hat he regards as the fundamental
principle of Christianity. However, v/hile Coe is v/ell aware
of the indifference, the self-satisfaction, the apathy which
undoubtedly exists in organized Christianity, he fails to
show similar appreciation of the growing tendency on the
part of church organizations and their leaders to criticize,
revalue, and reappraise accepted standards and modes of
conduct, and to take a courageous stand for social, political,
and economic justice. Only a one-sided view of existing
conditions within organized religion would lead to the opinion
it expresses no social radicalism. If Goe believes, as his
writings v/ould seem to indicate, that the needed social
change can be brought about only by revolutionary activity,
involving violence if necessary, then v/e must admit that v/e
must look more to Marxism than to the teachings of Jesus.
But this is not to say that the teachings of Jesus are not
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radical. The teachings of Jesus are most radical at the
very point where method is involved. By substituting the
method of sacrificial love for revolutionary violence, Jesus
clearly indicated that his v/ay was not the way of the world.
By emphasizing ends, rather than means, Goe tends (unintention
ally perhaps) to minimize the needed change of heart which
must undergird any lasting social progress. Hov/ever, vie
should be cautious about criticizing Goe on the basis of
what he does not say lest v;e overlook the truth which his
statements contain. On the v/hole, his writings in social
ethics give a much needed emphasis to the more active aspects
of religion, and the responsibility of Ghristians for a
reconstruction of the social order.
In 1927, on the occasion of his retirement from
teaching, Goe made the follov/ing statement:
It seems to me, as I survey my experience, that
I have been most nearly right when I have leaned
most towards the radical side of any question, and
most nearly wrong when I have leaned towards the
conservative side . You may draw from this what-
ever inferences you like; I will draw none. But
at least you perceive here an expression of my
present attitude towards the great issues that
have agitated the churches, and society at large,
during a generation.
Undoubtedly, the same goal which led Goe into the
field of psychology of religion has nurtured his social
72. "Dr. Goe's Remarks," Religious Education
,
22 (April, 1927), 436-37, 436.
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and religious radicalism, namely, a desire to be realistic
and scientific v/ith regard to religion and the whole of
life.

CHAPTER VIII
THE STATUS OP COE'S PSYCHOLOGY OP RELIGION TODAY
The purpose of this chapter will be to analyze the
extent of Goe's influence upon later v/riters in the field of
psychology of religion, and to evaluate his conclusions in
the light of these later studies. ViThereas the previous
chapters have dealt with a discussion of Coe's psychology of
religion and its application to other fields, as well as a
consideration of the background out of which his studies
developed, the present chapter is an attempt to view the
results of his writings and the status of his psychology of
religion today.
Since the greater part of Coe's work in psychology of
religion as such was done prior to 1916 when he published his
Psychology of Rel iglon , we v/ill concern ourselves with
v/riters who have published books and articles in the field
since 1916* no attempt v/ill be made to reviev; all the liter-
ature in the field of psychology of religion which has
appeared since that date, but merely to point out, so far
as possible, some of the apparent influences which Coe's
work has had upon later investigators, and the extent to
which his ideas have been approved or disapproved by these
writers. We are particularly Interested in discovering how
Coe's psychology of religion has stood the test of time.
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A. COE'S INFLUENCE UPON LATER PSYCHOLOGISTS OP RELIGION
The first book of any great Importance for psychology
of religion to appear since the publication of Coe's work in
1916 was Pratt's volume. The Religious Consciousness appear
ing in 1920, Although Pratt's common schema is structural,
v/hereas Coe's is functional, there are many points of simi-
larity and many references to Coe's v/ork. For example,
Pratt adopts Coe's view with regard to the importance of
childhood influences in the religious development of an
individual. He gives Coe credit for pointing out how the
child begins early in life to form attitudes tov;ard God, even
though very indefinite and lacking in self-consciousness
He refers to Coe as giving an "excellent analysis" of the
indirect Influences of sex upon the brighter side of adoles-
cence. In his chapter on conversion, Pratt gives due
recognition to Coe's work on this subject, particularly the
way in v/hich Coe has shown the influence of the subconscious,'
As against Coe's strong emphasis on the social aspects
of religion, Pratt attempte to hold the scales evenly between
!• James B. Pratt, The Religious Consciousness » (iJew
York: The Macmillan Company, 1920)
T
2. Ibid., 92.
3. Ibid., 110.
4. Ibid., 161.
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the Individual and society. He claims that religion has
often been In part a product of the Individual.^ One of
Pratt's criticisms of Coe's Psychology of Religion Is his
failure to do "full justice by the individual's sense of
cosmic relations," as well as his failure to show "any real
difference between religion and morality."^ Goe, on the
other hand, criticizes Pratt's failure to deal with values in
a meaningful way. Regarding Pratt's work, Goe states: "Values
are indeed mentioned, but there is neither classification of
them, nor indication of their origins, or how they change
within our changing experience."'^ In spite of these various
differences, however, there is clear evidence that Pratt is
influenced by Coe's work and is fully conscious of the contri-
bution which he has made to the field
Since Goe wrote his Psychology of Religion , writers
in the field have more and more come to deal with the claims
and discoveries of the psychoanalytic school with regard to
religion. Goe recognizes the therapeutic values in psycho-
analysis, particularly In that "the bottling up of any
5. Ibid., 12.
6. James 3. Pratt, Review of Coe's Psychology of
Religion , Journal of Philosophy , 14 (August, 1917), 444-46,
445 •
7. Coe, Review of Pratt's Religious Consciousness
,
Journal of Philosophy, 6 (Karch, 1921), 160-163, 161.
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experience as merely private is morbid."^ He further realizes
that so often "the road to poise, freedom, and joy is that of
social sharing ,"9 Thus, Coe comes to recognize the values in
confession.
Everett D. Martin's hook. The Mystery of Religion , -^^
published in 1924, is a study of religion from the viewpoint
of social psychology with particular emphasis upon psycho-
analysis. Although he does not give direct recognition of
any influence by Coe, his book represents a similar attempt
to deal with religion from a dynamic and social point of
view. Lil© Coe, he is interested in getting at the dynamic
roots of behavior, and he gives full recognition of the
social quality of religion. Certainly it would be correct
to state that both Coe and Ames have made early contributions
to what might be termed the social psychology of religion to
which Martin and others have also contributed.
Strickland's Psychology of Religious Experience
,
published in 1924, has already been mentioned in the chapter
on functional psychology. He gives credit to Coe, along
with Pratt and McDougall, for laying the foundations for his
8. Coe, The Psychology pf Religion , 316.
9. Toid., 316.
10. Everett D. Martin, The Mystery of Religion., ,
(wew York: Harper and Brothers, 1924)
•
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personalis tic psychology of religion. -^^ Ke says of Coe's
Psychology of Religion that it is "most illuminating and
stimulating to thought. "12 Strickland adopts Coe's use of
the v/ord "function" in the sense of value, and in emphasizing
the idea of purpose as a necessary principle of interpretation
of human experience he shows kinship with Coe, and reflects
his basic point of view. Both Coe and Strickland take a
functional view to?;ard religion, both avoiding the fallacy
of a merely biological interpretation.
In 1925, Leuba wrote his third book on psychology of
religion entitled. The Psychology of Religious Mysticism .-^'^
He appears to be somev/hat influenced by Coe's article on
"The Sources of the Mystical Revelation," to viiich he makes
numerous reference, and which he regards as "an unusually
substantial paper ."^^ Leuba shov/s agreement v/ith Coe when
he states that "the clearness and certainty of that which
is experienced in trance-states bears no unequivoclal rela-
tion to truth or objective reality. "^^ Elsewhere he states:
11. Strickland, Psychology of Religious Experience , 12.
12. roid., 13.
13. Ibid., 68.
14. James H. Leuba, The Psychology of Religious
Mysticism
.
(jMev/ York: Earcourt, Brace, and Company, Inc., 1925),
15. Ibid., 311.
16. Ibid., 277.
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"Y/e find much satisfaction in being in agreement v/ith Henri
Delacroix and George A. Goe with regard to the illusory
nature of the mystical claim. "17
Willard L. Sperry's Reality in Worship,!^ appearing
In 1925, contains a chapter entitled, "The Social Value of
V/orshlp." The views which he presents in this chapter
correspond to much that Goe has written regarding the rela-
tion of worship to social life. Sperry claims that the final
effect of v/orshlp Is the discovery of a better approach and
access to the lives of other men, and although "it may be an
open question whether v/orship has a social purpose ... it
certainly has a social consequence . "^^ This interpretation
of worship in terms of its social function is in agreement
with Goe, and may have been inspired by him.
Frank S. Eickman in his Introduction to the Psychology
of Religion
,
published in 1926, makes twenty-one references
to Goe and gives a large place to the pioneering work which
he has done in the field of psychology of religion. Hickman
states that Goe has made clear the distinction between two
17. Ibid., 318.
18. Willard L. Sperry, Reality In Worship . (jNew York:
The Macmillan Gompany, 1925)
.
19. Ibid., 534.
20. Frank S. Eickman, Introduction to the Psychology
of Religion . (new York: The Abingdon Press, 1926TV
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main problems in the analysis of religious experience. One
of these problems is concerned v/ith the involved psychical
complex which appears in religious experience; the other,
with the evaluating quality of the religious mind, with its
ability to get at the meaning of things Besides making
clear this distinction between structure and function, Hickman
gives Goe credit, along with King, Pratt, and Durkheim, for
bringing in the genetic approach to psychology of religion.
Coe's study of the conversion phenomena, particularly
as presented in The Spiritual Life , referred to many times by
Josey in his book. The Psychology of Religion , 25 published
in 1927 • He uses Coe's study as a basis for his treatment
of the characteristics of adolescent conversion, as well as
for the relationship between the conversion experience and
temperament
Coe's view that there is no such thing as a religious
instinct, or a religious intuition, has found general
acceptance among most psychologists of religion, although
21. Ibid., 35.
22. Ibid., 37.
23. Charles C. Josey, The Psychology of Religion ,
(new York: The llacmillan Company, 1927) .
24. Ibid., 163.
25. Coe, The Psychology of Religion , 323.

250
many follow McDougall In arguing that religion has an
instinctive basis, Conklin in his volinne. The Psychology
of Religious Ad justmen
t
,^6 appearing in 1929, agrees with
Coe in rejecting the instinct theory of religion. ^7 Like
many other writers, Conklin also includes in his discussion
of religious conversion reference to Goe's early work on
temperament.^® He also cites the early contribution which
Coe made to the study of religious hjrmnology .^^
In Walter M. Horton's A Psychological Approach to
Theology (1931) there is no mistaking Coe's influence.
The dedication reads: "To George A» Coe, whose teaching
provided the initial stimulus to which this book is a belated
response • "'^^ The point of view which Eorton takes is both
functional and social. In the preface to his book he makes
the following statement:
Ever since Professor G. A. Coe introduced me to
the psychology of religion, I have been convinced
that its bearing upon theology is one of the most
crucial importance, and that the psychological
approach to theology is the most direct of all
possible approaches, for the central problem, as I
see it ... is the psychological problem--how
26. ISdmund S. Conklin, The Psychology of Religious
Ad just men t . (nev/ York: The Kacmillan Company, 1929) T
27. Ibid., 28.
28. Ibid., 107.
29. Ibid., 194.
30. Walter M. Horton, A Psychological Approach to
Theology . (i^ew York: Harper and Brothers, 1931).
31. Ibid., V.
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may personality be unified, energized, and directed
to worthTul ends
Although a behaviorist , Trout In his book. Religious
Behavior,33 published In 1951, recognizes the contribution
which Goe has made to the field of psychology of religion.
He has little In common with Goe since he regards religious
experience as epiphenomenal, and as a "subjective index of
intraorganismic processes which is approximately as useful
to the scientific student as the symptomatic introspections
of the patient are to the physician. "34 Although opposed
to the functional point of viev/. Trout gives the following
appraisal of Coe's Psychology of Religion ;
Coe's systematic treatise is valuable in sever-
al v/ays, (1) It opens v/ith a critical account of
the various schools of psychology, and v;hile it
Is vigorously functional, that point of view is
used guardedly. (2) Judicious reference is made
to practically all the significant contributions
to psychology of religion v/hlch had appeared up to
1916. (3) The comprehensive bibliography of
psychology of religion, and related fields has
made easier the work of subsequent writers. The
study is tinged v;ith the philosophical tendencies
inherent in the functional viewpoint, and suggests
the practical educational interests v/hich have
characterized most of his writings .35
32. Ibid., viii.
33. David M. Trout, Religious Behavior , (rjew York:
The Macmlllan Gompany, 1931TI
34. Ibid., vli.
35. Ibid., 429.
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The V/lemans in their Normative Psychology of Religion ,56
published in 1935, have a reference to Coe's work at the end
of almost every chapter. Like Goe, they are interested in
writing a psychology of religion "to serve the practical
interests of religious living and religious teaching. "'^'^
Their approach is normative and functional, and, like Goe,
religion is viev/ed in relation to the whole of life . They
state: "Religious living must be seen in functional connection
with all of the most deep and intimate interests of human per-
sonality and society. "^^
Selbie is another psychologist of religion who places
strong emphasis upon the practical aspects, particularly the
importance of psychology for religious education.^^ He
reflects many of Goe^s concepts with regard to the religious
and moral development of children and adolescents and is
impressed by Goe's observations v/ith regard to the manner
in which religion assists the development of self-conscious
individuality .^Q He credits Goe with making clear the role
36* Henry J^l , Y/ieman and Regina \7ieman, i^ormative
Psychology of Religion . (l>lew York: Thomas Y. Growell Gompany,
1935) .
37. Ibid., vii.
38. Ibid., viii.
39. F. B. Selbie, The Psychology of Religion . (Oxford:
Glarendon Press, 1924), 26.
40. Ibid., 142.
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of religion in the evolution of both society and the indi-
vidual.^-^ Selhie again quotes Coe at considerable length
regarding mysticism and the manner in which the mystic
brings his theological beliefs to the mystical experience
One of Coe's early contributions to the psychology
of religion was his study of the relation between tempera-
ment and types of conversion experiencei*^ Although Jung and
others have given a more refined description of personality
types and temperaments,^^ Coe's early attempt to treat
conversion in terms of the dynamics of personality has had
a great influence.
Another of Coe's influences in psychology of religion
has been his refinement of method. In The Spiritual Life,
Coe emphasizes the need for a more critical use of the
questionnaire than that shown by other investigators, such
as Starbuck. iiarlier researchers had placed an almost
nai've confidence in data obtained by the questionnaire
method. Coe used additional safeguards, such as personal
interviews v/ith friends and relatives to check reliability of
ansv;ers, hypnotic experim.ents
,
observations, etc. Since
41. Ibid., 147.
42. Ibid., 253.
43. Coe, The Spiritual Life , 90.
44. Carl Jung, Psychological Types . (new York:
Earcourt, Brace and Company, 1926)
.
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then, psychologists of religion, on the v;hole, have "been
more cautious in their use of this tool of research. Johnson
in his recent book. Psychology of Religion
,
gives a restate-
ment of the limitations of the questionnaire method as
suggested by Coe.^^ Pratt also considers the various limita
tions of the questionnaire method, and he agrees with Coe
regarding the need for various critical checks. Although
the questionnaire when used with certain safeguards has had
widespread and continued use in psychology of religion, few
have employed as many safeguards as v/ere used by Coe in his
early studies.
Having pointed out something of Goe's influence upon
other psychologists of religion and the extent to v/hich his
work is recognized by other writers, we will nov/ proceed to
an evaluation of his psychology of religion in the light of
more recent studies.
B. EVALUATION OP COE'S PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGIOJ^I IN THE LIGHT
OP RECENT STUDIES
1. Valid Conclusions
Seward Kiltner, in his historical study of psychology
45. Johnson, Psychology of Religion, 25.
46. Pratt, The Religious Consciousness , 52.
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of religion, regards Coe's v/ork as having weathered the
years comparatively v/ell, "The v/ork of no one else but
James," he states, "has stood the test of time so well as
that of Goe."^''' Eiltner regards James, Ames, Stratton, and
Leuba as being essentially philosophers* Starbuck, he states,
was a psychologist, but in a sense that we would now consider
narrow* Goe, however, was a true psychologist who did a
thorough piece of scientific investigation. This, no doubt,
accounts for the fact that so many of his conclusions are
generally regarded today as valid. Eiltner states:
It is not strange • • • that Goe, with personality
psychology at the forefront of his attention, and
with fine scholarship in theology and religious edu-
cation, should have written a psychology of religion
in a way which has stood up for thirty years.^6
Goe ' s contemporaries recognized the sound scientific
basis of his psychology of religion and the important
contribution which his book. The Psychology of Rel Iglon
,
made to the field. Leuba, for example, states: "Els book
is as thorough a piece of scientific investigation as the
nature of the subject permits. "4^ Regarding the contribution
which Goe's book made to the field of psychology of religion,
Pratt states:
47. liiltner, "The Psychological Understanding of
Religion," 9.
48. Ibid., 9-10.
49. Leuba, Review of Goe's Psychology of Religion, 398
•
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Ever since the psychology of religion came to
be recognized as a distinct field of Investigation,
a need has been felt for an adequate text-hook on
the subject, • • The long -felt need Is at last
filled in the admirable book from Professor Coe's
pen .50
Such a careful, systematic, and scientific study of
religion as Goe undertook has had an enduring quality. This,
Goe himself seems to recognize. In 1943 he vvrote: "Ivly
scientific work, which concerns chiefly the psychology of
religion, seems to me not to require any drastic revision. "^-^
Even his first book. The Spiritual Life (1900) , Goe regards
as having stood the test of time fairly well. He states:
Though the methods of research that underlay
this volume we now should call crude
,
they were
the best in use at the time in such fields, and
they yielded results which, at the most important
point, the dynamics of the experiences concerned,
still appear to be substantially valid .^^
Prom the very beginning of his psychological study
of religion, Goe recognized the one-sidedness of both the
behavioristic and structuralistic approach. This is most
significant v;ith regard to the validity of his psychology of
religion today in that these two schools of psychology are
now more or less in disrepute. Structuralism, although it
played an important role in making psychology a science.
50. Pratt, Review of Goe's Psychology of Religion, 398
•
51. Goe, What is Religion Doing to Our Gonsciences? vii.
52. Goe, "Hy Own Little Theatre," 94.
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failed to do justice to psychological material as it occurs
In experience. By turning all Its attention to concrete
facts. It closed the door to any recognition of value and
purpose—so important to any real understanding of religion
or of human personality. In spite of its many achievements,
structuralism is generally regarded today as "a gallant and
enlightening failure. "^"^
Also because of its abstractness , behaviorism is not
favorably regarded by most psychologists today. By excluding
conscious experience from its study, behaviorism makes a
totalitarian view of personality impossible, and is there-
fore one-sided and abstract. Miilller-Prelenfels states that
"behaviorism transforms the universe into a machine shop.
Consciousness does not exist, neither does pain or fear,
but there is also no joy, and no hope.'*^^ Coe found that
both structuralism and behaviorism v/ere inadequate for a
realistic psychology of religion becaused they failed to
take into account the totality of experience, which, for him,
was the true area of religious activity. Coe's critical
evaluation of these two schools of psychology and his rejec-
tion of them appears to be validated by most modern
53. Heidbreder, Seven Psychologies , 151.
54. luTHller-Preienfels , The Evolution of I.Iodern
Psychology , 247-48.
55. Coe, The Psychology of Religion , 17-19.
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psychologists of religion. Johnson, for example , states
that although behaviorism may be useful as a method (which
Coe also admits), "as a philosophy denying consciousness, it
is unscientific and nonpsychological • "^^ We might say,
therefore, that one reason for the general validity of Goe's
work lies in- his early rejection of a one-sided and abstract
approach.
Another, more positive, reason for the validity of
Goe's v/ork lies in his critical use of the functional
approach. Since we have already discussed Goe's functional-
ism at considerable length in chapter four, let us merely
examine the status of this approach today. According to
Eeidbreder, functionalism^ has been so successful in widening
the range of psychological investigation, and their problems
and methods have been so completely absorbed into psychology,
that it is no longer distinguishable as a separate school*^'''
Kotor psychologies, such as functionalism, have attacked
atomistic views of personality and have been generally
successful in discrediting attempts to deal with personality
as abstract segments or atoms. Although it has been criticized
as unscientific and tinged v/ith teleology, its basic concepts
have been accepted by most of modern psychology and it has
56. Johnson, Psychology of Religion , 22.
57. Eeidbreder, Seven Psychologies , 233.
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pointed the way tov/ard dynamic psychology. It has been
particularly useful in stimulating educational progress,
largely through the influence of Dewey in general education,
and Goe in religious education. In a recent book on religious
education, Chave states that in all areas of education "there
is a growing tendency to give more attention to functional
analysis and methods ."^^
As was pointed out in chapter three, Goe entered the
field of psychology of religion with an article entitled,
"A Study In the Dynamics of Personal Religion" (1899), which
attempts to show the Importance of temperament in religious
developr.ent . From that tim.e on, Coe's writings in psychology
of religion attempt to explore the dynamics of religion and
human personality. Goe's conclusions regarding the influence
of temperament have been substantiated by studies made by
Kretschmer59 and Sheldon,60 although Goe's later studies
dispel any suggestion of a m.echanlstic or deterministic
view of temperament, 'iloe dynamic view of personality which
Goe presents in his Psychology of Religion as something con-
stantly changing and evolving, capable of controlling its
58. Ghave, A Functional Approach to Religious
Education , 19.
59. Krnst Kretschmer, Physique and Character.
W. J. H. Sprott, translator (wew York: Harcourt, Brace and
Gompany, 1925)
.
60. V/illlam Sheldon, Varieties of Temperament . (new
York: Harper and Brothers, 1942)
.
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inner drives and energies, is supported by Allport's study
of personality. Allport views personality in its total
perspective, regarding it as adjustive, spontaneous, creative
behavior toward environment. His view, likjs Goe's, is
dynamic in that he thinks of personality as something constant
ly changing and evolving. ^-^
However, Coe would disagree with Allport *s view that
personality is psychophysical. At this point he is closer
to Bowne, Brightman, Johnson, and others who hold that per-
sonality is psychical only.^S Bertocci's concept of self
as a "multiform dynamic unity," is indeed similar to the
concept of self v;hich Coe gives in his Psychology of Religion .
Coe v/ould agree v/ith Bertocci's statement: "This knowing-
wanting self ... would supply the persistent, unifying,
active agent which, in its contacts v/ith the v/orld, adjusts
its powers and develops its unique personality • "^3 Stern
is another personalistic psychologist v/ith whom Coe's
psychology of persons seems to agree. Both emphasize the
61. Gordon V/. Allport, Personality ; A Psychological
Interpretation . (jMew York: Henry Holt and Company, 1937) , 48.
62. Compare Brightman, "V/hat is Personality?" The
Personalist , 20 (March, 1939), 129-38, 138, with Coe, The
Psychology of Religion , 196.
63. Peter A. Bertocci, "Personality," Encylopedia
'Psjoholosj f Edited by P. L. Harrlman, {Liew York:
Philosophical Library), 459.
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totality, uniqueness, and purposiveness of personality.
Stern defines personality in the following way:
The person is a living whole, individual, unique,
striving toward goals, self-contained and yet open
to the v7orld about him; he is capable of having
experience •^^
Although there is no general agreement among psychol-
ogists today regarding the nature of personality, it is possible
to say, however, that Coe's views on this subject are still
held by many, particularly personalistic psychologists, and
those who view personality as a dynamic whole.
Throughout Coe's writings there is a strong emphasis
upon the social aspects of religion. His social theory of
religion has been criticized by Pratt and others for failing
to give adequate recognition to that \*iich is individual in
religion. Hov^ever, social psychology and present day psychol-
ogy of religion seem to be giving increasing emphasis upon
the social nature of religion. Johnson in the preface to
his Psychology of Religion states: "Religion is a social
reference to social realities by social responses for the
sake of social values reinforced by social co-operation."^^
Elsewhere , Johnson states that religious behavior is "social
64. William Stern, General Psychology from the
Personalistic Standpoint . Howard D. Spoerl, translator
,
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958), 70.
65. Johnson, Psychology of Religion , 9.
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co-operation, human and divine, to attain value goals ."^^
Els Interpersonal psychology views religion as being primarily
a social experience. In reviewing the developments within the
field of psychology of religion, V/rlght states:
While agreement upon a psychological definition
has not yet been achieved, it is at any rate gener-
ally agreed that religion is mainly a social rather
than a purely individual experience. • • that it is
a process by v/hich the individual assimilates and
realizes within himself the values of the social
order and achieves a corresponding development of
his personality."'
I'.ore and more present day psychology is coming to see
that in order to truly understand a person he must be viewed
in relation to his social environment and his Interpersonal
relationships. It is safe to say, therefore, that Coe's
social theory of religion, in the main, is validated by
current psychological thought, even though certain specific
details have been criticized.
Coe's treatment of the origins of religion as arising
within the social group appears to be accepted as valid
today. Coe claims that the religious individual is a late
and high development out of the religious group. ®^ Regarding
this point V/right states that there is general agreement
66. Ibid., 23.
67. ?/. K. Wright, "The Psychology of Religion," The
Sncylopedia Americana , 23 (1936), 348-50, 349.
68. Coe, The Psychology of Religion , 76.
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among modern psychologists of religion. "It is certain
that religions always develop within social groups, and tlmt
they alv;ays attempt to conserve • • . values that are recog-
nized by groups to be desirable • "^^ Goe's treatment of
religious group conduct and the distinctions v/hich he makes
betv;een various types of religious groups from primitive
times to present institutionalized religion is most enlighten-
ing. Most psychologists seem to be in agreement with Goe in
holding that myths, dogma, rituals, and ecclesiastical
organizations are mainly products rather than causes of
religious activity. '^^
Although Goe is greatly influenced by McDougall's
theory of instincts, he seems to be in line with later studies
in psychology of religion in maintaining that there is no
religious instinct, as such. His view is that there is no
evidence of a religious intuition, no religious instinct, and
no specific attitude toward the divine or the human which can
be attributed to all individuals •'''^ That this conclusion is
valid in the light of other investigations is indicated in
the following statement by V/right: "It is now generally
agreed th-at there is no distinctly religious instinct. "72
69. Wright, "The Psychology of Religion," 349.
70. Ibid., 349.
71. Goe, The Psychology of Religion , 323.
72. Y/right, "The Psychology of Religion," 349.
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Coe seems to be in line v;ith the thinking of Freud,
Prince, and others when he regards the mystical experience
as the result of autosuggestion arising from the subconscious.
The Freudians have shovm hov; much may come into the subcon-
scious through the door of everyday consciousness and remain
there for years without its presence being suspected, and how
under favorable conditions this subconscious content may
arise into consciousness. Although Coe tends to oversimplify
the mystical experience, speaking from a psychological point
of view, he has helped to explain much that takes place in
the mystical trance, and other similar experiences.
2. Invalid Conclusions
The point at which Goe's psychology of religion has
received its greatest criticism, has been his attempt to
define religion in terms of value. Y/ith Coe, as we have
seen, the mind is always exercising a preferential function,
and the object of this function is alv;ays value, and value
is that which satisfies conation. Coe is emphatic in declar-
ing that religion is not a value in itself and that it creates
no new value. Religion is simply a valuation of all values
that emerge in the course of human history.
Pratt and Leuba have criticized Coe's definition of
73. Coe, "Sources of the Mystical Revelation," 372.
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religion as too wide and failing to mark religion off from
other things. Coe goes so far as to state that wherever men
"intensely identify themselves with something as their very
life, there you v/ill almost certainly find 'religion.'"'''^
Coe seems to feel that any reaction may be considered religious
which seeks to organize and conserve any value v/hatever. He
gives no differentia whereby religious consciousness may be
distinguished from ethical or any other form of consciousness.
The way in v/hich Coe makes religion connote every kind of
valuing consciousness tends to make the term scientifically
useless. This leads to an inability to distinguish clearly
between religion and morality. Religion in his thinking seems
to be about the same thing as social righteousness. Coe is
correct in relatfing religion to the whole sphere of living,
but there is real cause for questioning his equating religious
experience with all other forms of valuing consciousness.
Coe is not the only psychologist of religion to give
such an undifferentiated view of religion. Ames and Stratton
also define religion in terms of value. Ames defines religion
as "the consciousness of the highest social values, ""^^ while
with Stratton, religion is simply "the appreciation or sense
of value •"'76 Coe, however, goes further than either Ames or
74. Coe, The Psychology of Religion , 69.
75. Ames, The Psychology of Religious Sxperience , vii.
76. Stratton, The Psychology of the Religious Life , 345«
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Stratton in claiming that religion also Involves the active
discovery of values, and is also an attempt to unify values.
All three, however, seem to have overlooked the fact recog-
nized by many psychologists of religion, that all living
religions create new values, rather than merely conserving
and organizing those already present in society.
Wright claims that the attempt to define religion
vjholly in terms of values is "vague and unsuccessful*"'^''' His
own position is that religion can be differentiated more clear-
ly through the attitude assumed to the agencies by which
the values of life are believed to be achieved ."78 This is
also the position of Leuba who claims that to be religious is
to enter into dynamic relation with an unseen superhuman
company because we appreciate that the outcome of this relation
will be the conservation and augmentation of the values that
we seek,'79 Johnsoh's definition of religion is somewhat
similar: "Religion is personal co-operation with a trusted
Creator of Values. "^^ Religion is more than merely the
discovery and organization of values; it involves co-operation
with God, t.he Creator of Values.
77. Y/right, "The Psychology of Religion," 349.
78. Ibid., 349.
79. Leuba, A Psychological Study of Religion , 52.
80. Johnson, Psychology of Religion , 30.
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Thouless "believes that Coe has narrowed religion
and made it one-sided by regarding the moral element as the
only element properly belonging to religion. Y/hether this
is true or not> the effect of Goe's psychology of religion
has not been a narrowing of religious activity, rather it
is made to embrace every aspect of living. Coe feels that
religion is in no way restricted to any particular sphere of
life. In his social ethics, as discussed in the preceding
chapter, he makes it clear that religious individuals and
groups, because they are religious, must become active in
social affairs. The V/iemans believe that in some instances
the result has been a "flattening out of religion." They
state
:
There is much discussion as to how far religion
should go, particularly through its organized bodies,
into actual social movements and struggles. In some
instances this 'broading out' of the field of action
of religion, has become merely a flattening out of
religion into a third or fifth or tenth rate piece
of social v/elfare work, much better left to the
ministrations of trained social workers.
We do not mean to suggest that Goe's view that true
religion should involve the active participation of persons
in social affairs is invalid. It does seem, hov/ever, that
through his emphasis upon "good work" and morality (which is
81. Robert H. Thouless, An Introduction to the Psychology
of Religion . (jMew York: The Llacmillan Company ,~T925 ) , 15, 49.
82. The Wiemans, I^ormative Psychology of Religion , 13.
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important) he has tended to minimize religio^as faith as a
relationship betv/een man and God. Perhaps such a relation-
ship is beyond the realm of psychological investigation, yet
many psychologists of religion seem to have been successful
in exploring v/hat might be termed "God-consciousness," and
which might be something other than social, ethical, or moral
consciousness. The thing which Coe seems to overlook is th^t
to the religious man God is the source of all ideals of
truth, beauty, goodness, etc., and that God is both the
Creator and Sustainer of the supreme values of life.
Although Goe's rejection of any religious instinct is
valid according to most present day psychologists of religion,
the manner in v/hich he holds to the instinct theory generally
might be considered questionable • Coe is greatly influenced
by the work of McDougall^'^ and Thorndike84 on instincts and
quotes them frequently regarding the instinct theory. It is
noted that both reject the idea of a religious instinct,
although IvIcDougall holds that certain instinctive emotions,
such as fear and wonder, are basic in the evolution of religion.
Coe agrees v;ith IvIcDougall that religion has an instinctive
basis, for he states: "Basal to all that men do is instinct
83. William KcDougall, An Introduction to Social
Psychology . (Boston: J. W. Luce and Company, 1^08, 1918) .
84. Thorndike, 3ducational Psychology , I.
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action; it does not express an antecedent idea, but under
the stimulus of accompanying pleasures and pains it gives
rise to discrimination and so to ideas as patterns for future
conduct ."^^
Today the instinct theory generally is being brought
into question. For example, Johnson states:
The difficulty in every instinct theory is a
fallacy of abstraction. Instincts are not facts,
as popular thinking may assume, but theoretical
inferences from facts.°^
A recent book by Young, Emotion in Man and Animal
,
also places the instinct theory in question. He calls it a
"form of pseudoexplanation ... criticized by so many
writers tlmt it will be unnecessary here to point out its
limitations."^"^ It is clear that more and more modern psychol
ogy is coming to take a critical view of the instinct theory.
In fairness to Coe, it should be pointed out that in
his later v/ork on motivation he takes a more critical and
cautious view v/ith respect to instincts than that v/hich
characterized his earlier v/ritings. In The Kotives of Ken
,
Goe vn?ites:
The instincts, whatever they are, have been taken,
as a rule , as so many drives or impulsions not only
85. Coe, The Psychology of Religion , 78.
86. Johnson, Psychology of Religion , 41.
87. Paul T. Young, Emotion in Man and Animal , (new
York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1943) , 89
•
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rooted in our nature but also destined to express
themselves v/llly-nilly; and the totality of Instincts
has "been accepted as constituting the total drive of
man. But over and above the fact that the list of
instincts Is unstable , this theory of human drive
encounters numerous obstacles.®^
For our present purpose ... it is sufficient to
recognize the great range of human motivation, the
great plasticity of it (that is, the indefinitely
many possibilities of character for the same indi-
vidual) , and the organic character of it (that is,
the capacity for action from the standpoint of a
desired whole ^ .^^
In The Psychology of Religion Coe gives a view of
the distinction between religion and magic v/hich seems to
contradict anthropological research on the subject, and for
which he supplies little evidence. Ee holds tliat religion
is essentially social in its nature, while magic is distinct
ly individual and private. "Religion," says Goe, "organizes
life's values and seeks them socially; magic fixes upon any
particular value and seeks it individually or at least inde-
pendently of the larger social order. "^Q It is doubtful
whether such a rigid distinction betv\reen individual and
social actually exists, at least sufficiently to distinguish
religion from magic on that basis. Prazer cites several
examples of how magic has been employed for the benefit of
both individuals and the group, and how it may be either
8S« Coe, The Motives of Men , 83.
89. Ibid., 84.
90. Coe, The Psychology of Religion, 91.
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public or private. Ames also cites a number of Instances
where magic is a group act and used for group ends
Coe's attempt to explain mysticism in terms of auto-
suggestion may be considered valid by the depth-psychologists,
yet it might well be subject to the charge of oversimplifica-
tion. Coe tends to regard the mystic merely as being a person
who is skillful In the art of self -hypnosis .^^ He claims
that the process is the same as that of ordinary hypnosis.
Pratt has pointed out how the mystic's experience of the
presence of G-od has great intensity.^^ It is difficult to
account for the intensity of the mystical experience m.erely
in terms of suggestion. It may be one factor, to be sure,
but is Coe correct in r^arding it as the sole factor?
Probably the most general criticism to be made of
Goe's work In psychology of religion lies not so much in
what he says about religion, but in what he does not say.
In his effort to identify religion with the totality of human
experience, one has the feeling that Coe has overlooked some
of the deeper and more unique aspects of religion which might
serve to set it apart from every other phase of human experi-
ence. This may be due in part to the limitations of the
91. Prazer, The Golden Bough
,
Abridged edition, 61.
92. Ames, The Psychology of Religious Experience
,
Chapter v.
93. Coe, The Psychology of Religion , 275.
94. Pratt, The Religious Consciousness
,
451.
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psychological approach Itself. At the same time, Goe has
placed all the emphasis on religion as an outgoing social
experience, and failed to appreciate fully the more individual
and mystical aspects of religion. Coe has successfully point-
ed out the ways in wiiich religion is associated with the
totality of life and social experience generally, but he has
failed to show just hov/ religious experience is different
from the rest of experience. To he aware that Coe may have
overlooked something about religion that is highly significant,
we need only to read Rudolf Otto's book. The Idea of the Eoly .^^
Otto's viev; that God is completely transcendent and "wholly-
other"^^ leads him to make a radical separation between
religious consciousness and all other consciousness of mean-
ing and value. He believes that there is something In our
experience of the holy which goes deeper than anything which
can be described in rational terms. This so-called "non-
rational" element is what makes religion mystical and unique.
irVhile Goe takes an extremely broad viev/ of religion.
Otto's appreciation of religion is extremely narrow. One
needs to be corrected in terms of the other. Without going
into a critique on Otto's point of view, it is enough to
95. Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy . John W. Harvey,
translator, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924).
96. Ibid., 38-39.
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state that he gives sufficient evidence in support of his
interpretation of religion as mystical, unique, and non-
rational, to cause us to question the complete validity of
Coe's one-sided, broadly-inclusive, value -approach.^'''
Pratt has given a thoughtful criticism of the view
of spirituality v/hich Goe presents in the last chapter of
The Spiritual Life
,
yet it is a criticism which may well
apply to Coe's writings generally. In referring to Coe's
view that the word "spirituality" in its common usage has
come to mean soft, passive, or even unmanly, and that protest
should be made against such a sentimental and emotional view
of religion, Pratt states:
That Professor Coe's words apply very accurately
to a considerable amount of past and present talk
is not to be denied. Yet I for one cannot feel
that the danger of our becoming too emotional or
too contemplative is really very great. • • The
danger, in fact, seems to be chiefly on the other
side. In our laudable enthusiasm over action and
social morality and class equality and hygienic
conditions and international policies and tangible
results, we are beginning to forget the inner life .
of the soul, and the quiet turning of the spirit
back upon itself, which in the rhythmic life of man
is quite as important as is the outv/ard -going
impulse. In our safe and sane and sober fear of
emotionalism and sentimentality, v;e seem tempted
to dlsovm the spiritual nature v;hich is part of our
human heritage .^8
97. For a criticism of Otto's viev/, see Robert P.
Davidson, Rudolf Otto ' s Interpretation of Religion .
( Princ e t on: Princeton University Press ,""1947) .
98. Pratt, The Religious Consciousness , 478-79.
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Although Coe himself is a religious person, he
nevertheless attempts to approach religion with the cold
objectivity of empirical science. This attitude of emotion-
al detachment has enabled him to explore more carefully and
accurately than those whose writings are less scientific and
more apologetic. He has brought many new and fresh insights
into our understanding of the dynamics of religion. Yet he
seems to have overlooked some of the deeper, spiritual values
which one often finds in mystical experience, prayer, and
v/orshlp. "The quiet turning of the spirit back upon itself,"
which Pratt speaks of, is a phase of religion to which Coe
has given little attention. Els emphasis has been more on
"the outv/ard-going impulse." However, through his emphasis
upon the more active aspects of religion, Coe has made us
aware of the need for putting religion into daily action.
This In itself has been a valuable contribution.

CHAPTER IX
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. SUMMARY OF DATA
As indicated In chapter one, the purpose of this
study has been to discover and evaluate the contribution
which George Albert Coe has made to the psychology of reli-
gion. V/e have not confined the study to his v;rl tings in
psychology of religion alone. We have also explored his
work in the field of religious education and social ethics,
since Coe himself states that there is an unbroken continuity
betv/een the principle aspects of his psychology of religion
and his other writings.
We noted at the outset that to this date no extensive
study has been made of Goe's contribution to psychology of
religion. Brief histories of the developments in the field
of psychology of religion which bear reference to Goe's
work are available in many articles, and as chapters in
books, but as yet few psychologists of religion, with the
exception of V/illiam James, have been the subject of any
extensive research. The need for a critical evaluation of
Coe's v/ork has been increasingly apparent as we have noted
the value and extent of his contribution to the field.
Our method of investigation has been to examine Coe^s
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published writings, both in psychology of religion and
other fields; to compare his v/ork with studies which precede'
and follow his investigations; and to make a critical analysis
of his v/ork in terms of its validity and the unique and
original contribution which it makes to the field. Special
attention has been given to Coe's specifically psychological
writings, particularly The Spiritual Life and The Psychology
of Rel igion * In addition, examination has been made of the
general literature in the field, especially the v;ritings of
Coe's contemporaries in psychology of religion, in order to
discover his relation to other thinkers in the field. Use
has been made of critical book reviev/s
,
biographical and
autobiographical material, historical studies, and correspond-
ence...
Our procedure has been as follov/s: (1) To study the
beginnings in psychology of religion, its relation to the
other sciences of religion, and the significant work done
prior to Coe's first studies; (2) To analyze Coe's early
studies in psychology of religion in terms of their unique
contribution and their relation to similar studies; (3) To
examine Coe's functional approach in psychology of religion
and to compare his viev/s with those of other functionalists;
(4) To make a critical study of Coe's major v;ork in psychology
of religion and to compare his views with those of earlier
writers; (5) To examine the application of Coe's psychology
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of religion to religious education and to social ethics
and to show how his various v^ri tings are related; (6) To
evaluate Coe's psychology of religion in terms of his influ-
ence upon other psychologists of religion, and the manner in
which his writings have stood the test of time, 'He will now
summarize the material which this study has presented.
(1) Psychology of religion before 1900 « Theology and
philosophy have been largely speculative in their approach
to religion, although philosophy has used the methods and
results of science in obtaining its data. On the other hand,
the sciences of religion (history of religion, sociology of
religion, and psychology of religion) have sought to approach
religion from an empirical and scientific point of view.
Before psychology became a science, men sought to describe
the v/orkings of the mind and to explore the nature of
experience, even though their writings, for the most part,
were mixed vdth metaphysical and philosophical concepts.
Scientific psychology dates from 1875 when Wundt founded
the first psychological laboratory at Leipzig. Shortly after,
G. Stanley Hall and his students at Clark University under-
took extensive studies on the psychology of childhood and
adolescence with special attention to religious experience.
The work of Hall and his pupils gave great impetus to the
development of psychology of religion. In 1899 Coe entered
the field with an article entitled "A Study in the Dynamics
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of Personal Religion," and the following year, his first
book. The Spiritual Life
,
appeared. At the turn of the
century, psychologists of religion were greatly Interested
in the phenomena of conversion, the most com.plete study made
on the subject being Starbuck's volume. The Psychology of
Religion (1899)
.
(2) Coe ' s first studies in psychology of religion .
Although raised in the home of a Methodist minister, Coe
never underwent a conversion experience during his youth,
even though he soight it. ViQiile studying for the ministry,
his thinking was influenced by Personalism and higher criti-
cism, vfcich, accompanied v;ith a keen scientific interest, led
him to question conventional ecclesiastical doctrine and dogma,
and to undertake a scientific study of religion. His first
book. The Spiritual Life , is a study of conversion and reli-
gious awakening with reference to physiological change,
temperament, degree of expectation, tendency to automatisms,
and passive suggestibility. It also includes a study of
general adolescent problems, divine healing, and a psychol-
ogical study of spirituality. It represents a pioneer work
in the field of psychology of religion based on methods more
experimental and scientific than those used by other psychol-
ogists of religion at that time. The practical issue of his
study of temperament was the realization of the futility of
expecting all persons to undergo a similar religious
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experience. His study of mental healing was original and
"brought the subject within the scope of psychology of
religion.
(3) The functional approach in psychology of religion .
Coe adopted the general point of view of functional psychol-
ogy which rejected hehavlorism and structuralism and sought
to ask practical questions concerning m-ental functions.
Although accepting the basic tenets of this new school, Coe
rejected the emphasis on mechanistic biological adaptation
which characterized the work, of Angell. Coe emphasizes the
preferential nature of functions rather than the biological.
The object of preferential function is value. Coe adopts a
preferential, personalistic concept of mental function as the
most useful approach for psychology of religion, because
religion is found only when mental states function and
become organic in the lives of individuals and societies.
(4) Coe * s ma j or work in psychology of religion . Coe's
Psychology of Religion
,
published in 1916, was at that time,
the most systematic treatment of the subject, covering
almost every important aspect of the field. He utilizes in
the psychology of. religion a functionalism that is at once
more empirical and genetic, and more significant, than that
of earlier vrt*lters. Be regards religion as a genuinely
social experience whereby the individual through interpersonal
fellowship with others seeks greater self-realization and
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the discovery of new values by means of critical examination
of present standards. IJo clear division is made betv/een
religious consciousness and other forms of consciousness, or
between religious values and the values of the common life.
Religion becomes a process which seeks to complete, unify,
and conserve the values of life. It is a movement of valu-
ation within all values. The outstanding characteristic of
religion is the revaluation of values which has as its
central tendency the placing of greater value upon persons.
The real world for Goe is the world of persons and persons
are immediately present to one another. Goe shows how
religion developed v/ithin the social group as men sought to
complete, unify, and conserve the values they recognized.
In tracing this development he distinguishes three types of
religious groups; the crowd, the sacerdotal group, and the
deliberative group. The deliberative group represents the
highest form because it recognizes the value of persons and
makes possible the discovery of new values through critical
revaluation. He discusses conversion in terms of its social
value and the manner in which it brings about a revaluation
of life on the part of the individual. Goe's discussion of
the various types of religious leadership places greatest
value on the prophetic type because it fosters a wider and
deeper sociality. Goe maintains that the subconscious is
continuous with consciousness but he emphasizes the point
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that the focus of religious experience belongs in the self's
interaction with society rather than in the self's continu-
ity with nature. Mysticism is psychologically explained as
autosuggestion and mystic utterances as the result of social
conditioning. The value of mysticism is the attainment of
unification and purpose. Coe's argument for the future life
is based on his view of the v/orth of persons and the idea
that social values inhere in the individual who incarnates
them. Prayer is explained in terms of normal mental processes
akin to thinking. However, Coe emphasizes the value which
prayer holds for both the individual and society.
(5) The application of psychology to religious educa-
tion . Coe brings the scientific attitude to bear in reli-
gious education with a strong emphasis upon ends and values
and the best methods of achieving them.. Applying his view
of the unity of consciousness, Coe objects to any separation
between religious development and other development. He
seeks to apply psychology in determining the laws of growth
v/ith its relevance for a sound religious education. Educa-
tion Itself becomes a social experience v/hich seeks to help
the child make choices and seek values whereby both he and
society can find greater self-realization. The pragm.atic
test which Coe applies to religious education Is whether it
increases the social efficiency of its pupils. He rejects
the viev; that religious education is for the indoctrination

284
of dogma or belief. Moral character must be developed in
the child through social 'Interaction whereby the child
defines his desires and foims his personality. Goe's writings
in religious education have a strong psychological orientation
and his views are continuous with those presented in his
expressedly psychological \'yritings.
(6) The application of psychology to social ethics .
Goe's interest in social ethics appears to be a natural
expression of his social theory of religion and his belief
that there is no fundamental difference betv;een religious
and ethical value. Coe applies his psychological knowledge
in exploring the underlying motives and values which are at
v/ork in social relationships and thus he brings psychology
directly to bear upon the field of social ethics. Among the
characteristic views which Goe develops in his psychology of
religion and applies in his social ethics are: religion as
the discovery of persons; religious consciousness as involv-
ing ethical consciousness; religion as revaluation of value.
Goe's social radicalism represents an attempt to apply to
the fullest what he regards as the fundamental principles
of Christianity.
(7) The status of Goe ' s psychology of religion
today . Examination was made of the evidence which indicates
a recognition on the part of other psychologists of religion
of Goe's work. The numerous references to his v/ritings in
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"books and articles on psychology of religion is one indica-
tion. The manner in which many of his concepts have been
accepted and utilized "by later psychologists of religion is
another. It is clear that Coe has had an influence upon
other writers in the field* A study was then made of the
various conclusions reached by Coe in his psychology of
religion with a view to their validity on the basis of more
recent studies. Among the aspects of his psychology which
are generally recognized today as valid, the follov;lng were
noted: (1) The functional approach and the recognition of
the one-sidedness of structuralism and behaviorism; (2) The
importance of temperament in determining the nature of
religious experience; (3) The dynamic view of personality
as something constantly changing and evolving; (4) Emphasis
on the social nature of religion; (5) The origin of religion
as arising within the social group; (6) The view that there
is no religious instinct or intuition; (7) The importance
of suggestion and social conditioning in religious experi-
ence. Among the conclusions regarded by many as invalid,
the follov/ing were noted: (1) Religion as valuation; (2)
Religion creates no nev/ values; (3) The instinctive basis
of all action; (4) The view that religion is social while
magic is individual and private; (5) The view that mysticism
is merely autosuggestion; (6) Over-emphasis on the active,
outgoing aspects of religion.

B. CONCLUSIONS
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The purpose of this study has been to discover and
evaluate Coe's contribution to psychology of religion. On
the basis of our reaearch we are now ready to state our con-
clusions—7/hat we have discovered to be Coe's contribution
to psychology of religion.
(1) Coe did important and significant pioneer v/ork
which helped to establish psychology of religion as an
independent field of research. This conclusion is based on
the fact that Coe entered the field of psychology of religion
at an early date; at a time when it was struggling to gain
recognition and status. The Spiritual Life represents one
of the earliest volumes on psychology of religion to be
written by an American. Most of the historical surveys on
psychology of religion regard Coe as one of the leading
pioneers in the field.
(2) Coe helped to make psychology of religion more
scientific through the use of critical and empirical methods
of research. Starbuck and other investigators had used the
questionnaire method without safeguards of any kind, where-
as Coe employed several critical checks in his use of the
questionnaire which enhanced its validity. Ee was one of
the first investigators to point out the dangers involved
in the uncritical use of the questionnaire method. In
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addition, Coe employed psychological experimentation, such
as hypnotic experiments, which made his early study more
scientific.
(3) Coe was the first American psychologist of reli-
gion to demonstrate the importance of temperament as a factor
in religious conversion. Although Starhuck had miade reference
to the possible importance of temperament, Coe was the first
to make an objective investigation of the subject with regard
to religious experience. He was successful in calling atten-
tion to the fact that temperament plays an important part in
determining an individual's mode of religious expression, and
that all individuals cannot be expected to experience the
same type of religious conversion.
(4) Coe enlarged the field of psychology of religion
to include subjects previously given only slight attention.
The first American psychologists of religion concerned them-
selves almost exclusively with the religious experiences of
childhood and adolescence, and the phenomena of conversion.
In The Spiritual Life , Coe includes a study of divine healing
and a study of spirituality. In The Psychology of Religion
,
he brings the study of group dynamics and the study of
religious leadership definitely within the framework of
psychology of religion.
(5) Coe v:rote the first general textbook on psychol-
ogy of religion. Before 1916, books on psychology of religion
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had given treatment to only a limited portion of the field.
The Psychology of Religion by Coe was recognized as the most
complete and systematic study of the subject at that time.
It covered almost every important aspect of the field. Its
value as a textbook was further enhanced by an alphabetical
bibliography of 320 items , and a topical bibliography giving
the outstanding work which had been done on various topics
within the field. The book also contains extensive footnote
references.
(6) Goe helped to bring a dynamic point of view to
psychology of religion. By his emphasis upon mental functions
and processes, cause and effect relationships, purposiveness
,
etc., Coe prepared the way for the increasingly dynamic point
of view v;hich has come into psychology of religion. He gives
attention to the whole man and his environmental relations,
thus avoiding the abstractness which cliaracterized the v/ork
of many of his contemporaries. By emphasizing the preferen-
tial nature of mental functions he avoids the biological
and mechanistic determinism found in other functional points
of view.
(7) Coe's treatment of religion in terms of value
may be regarded as a contribution to the field insofar as
he has given extensive treatment to what is nov/ regarded
as at least one important aspect of religion—its integra-
tive and valuational aspect. In making religion a process
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of discovery, reorganization, and revaluation of values,
Coe has given emphasis to the dynamic rather than the static
quality of religion* The various criticisms of the point
of view have heen treated in the preceding chapter. Coe
has brought together an abundance of psychological evidence
to support his view. The fact that he has overlooked some
of the more mystical and metaphysical aspects of religion
may be due more to the limitations of science than to a lack
of adequate research.
(8) Coe 'Nvote one of the first psychologies of religion
to be based on personalism. A student of Bowne, Coe sought
to Incorporate the personalistic point of view in writing a
systematic psychology of religion. For Coe, the real world
is the world of persons. Adjustment is alv;ays to persons,
not to things, for even things have personal reference. The
focus of religious experience is always on the personal,
rather than the non-personal or sub-personal. V-Tiether the
personalistic view is held as valid or not, the fact remains
that Coe played an important part in bringing this point of
view into psychology of religion.
(9) Coe has brought new and original insights into
psychology of religion through his study of group dynamics
and religious leadership. Today, the study of group
dynamics is an important subject in psychology of religion.
Coe made one of the earliest contributions to this subject
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to be made by an A^nerican psychologist of religion. Th©
manner in which he contrasts the three types of religious
groups appears to be original. Also, his treatment of the
three types of religious leadership appears to be a unique
contribution.
(10) Along with Ames, Coe has played an important
part in giving a psychological basis to the nov/ generally
accepted view that religion is a social experience and not a
purely individual one. In his Psychology of Religion , Coe
consistently applies the social theory to every aspect of
religion and religious experience. With Coe, individual
self-consciousness and social consciousness are inseparably
joined, since we achieve self -consciousness only in relation
to others. His studies on social immediacy and religion as
individual conduct have supported this point of view.
(11) Coe has helped to make psychology of religion
a valuable tool subject for religious educators, and religious
workers generally. As early as 1900, Coe sought to make
psychology of religion serve the practical needs of religious
workers. The Spiritual Life was written with th^t aim in
mind and in almost every chapter he gives practical sugges-
tions for religious v/ork. Without practical application,
psychology of religion becomes irrelevant. In his extensive
work in religious education, Coe has utilized the conclusions
reached in his psychology of religion, wiiich has resulted in
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a theory and practice of religious education that is psycho-
logically based. As a pioneer in both psychology of religion
and religious education, Coe was instrumental in bringing the
two subjects into close relationship. Just as Coe played an
important role in bringing the social point of view into
psychology of religion, so also he is recognized as the
leading advocate of a social emphasis in religious education.
Coe, perhaps more than any other writer in the field, has
shown how psychology of religion can be both practical and
scientific
•
(12) Coe further extends the concreteness and practi-
cality of his psychology of religion by applying its results
in the field of social ethics. The unbroken continuity v/hich
exists between his psychology of religion and his social
ethics adds further support to his social theory of religion.
By taking a psychological approach to vital social, political,
and economic issues, Coe has been successful in revealing
the sometimes hidden motives, purposes, and desires which
underlie human behavior.
(13) At many points, Coe anticipates the modern trend
in psychology of religion to give greater emphasis to the
therapeutic value of religion. It is within the framework
of functional and dynamic psychology that this maovement has
developed. In The Spiritual Life , Coe points out hov/ the
Christian attitude of love rather than hate has hygienic and
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therapeutic value, and that "the Christian mode of life
tends directly toward health." In The Psychology of Religion
,
he points out the therapeutic values to be found in prayer,
mysticism, worship, and confession.
We do not suppose that the above conclusions complete-
ly exhaust the depth and scope of Coe's contribution to
psychology of religion. They are presented, however, as
being what we regard as the most significant on the basis of
this study.
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(2)
This study arose from the fact that although
psychology of religion, as a distinct field of investigation,
is nov; more than fifty years old, little has been done in the
way of critical evaluation of the contributions which its
leading pioneers have made to the field. It was the purpose .
of this study to discover and evaluate the contribution
which George A. Coe has made to the psychology of religion*
The study is based on a critical examination of Coe's
published writings in psychology of religion. His extensive
ViTPitings in religious education and social ethics are surveyed
to discover the continuity between the central aspects of his
psychology and its specific application to other fields. The
general literature in psychology of religion is used to
establish Coe's relationship v/ith other investigators.
Although George A. Coe is better known for his work
in religious education, he played an important and significant
role in the development of psychology of religion, and his
v/ork has stood the test of time better than that of most early
investigators. Early in his youth, Coe encountered the con-
flict between the spirit and methods of science and that of
traditional, conservative religion. Rejecting authoritative
and dogmatic concepts, he came to espouse the scientific
approach and to apply it to an understanding of religious
experience. Having obtained extensive training in theology,
philosophy, and psychology, Coe was well equipped to make a

(3)
significant contribution to the psychological understanding
of religion.
During the closing years of the nineteenth century,
investigators, such as Hall, Burnham, Lancaster, Leuha, and
Starbuck, made psychological studies of various aspects of
religious growth and experience, with particular attention
given to the conversion phenomena. Although their methods
would now be considered as crude, they were successful in
amassing considerable data which led to new psychological
insights in religion. In 1899, when psychology of religion
was still in its infancy, Coe made an important study of the
relationship between temperament and types of religious
experience, •^^'•e found that striking transformations are fre-
quent among persons in whom sensibility is predominant, but
rare among persons of predominant will and intellect. Coe
was one of the first psychologists of religion to explore the
dynamic apsects of religious experience. Also significant,
is the fact that he utilized methods more critical and
empirical than those of his predecessors. Starbuck and other
investigators had used the questionnaire method without safe-
guards of any kind, whereas Goe employed several critical
checks which enhanced its validity as a tool of research.
In subjecting his subjects to hypnotic experiments to deter-
mine their degree of suggestibility, Coe became one of the
first investigators to employ psychological experimentation

(4)
in the study of religion. His first book. The Spiritual
Life
,
published in 1900, studies religious growth and con-
version from a more thoroughly scientific point of view than
that of earlier studies, and at the same time reflects the
practical interest which becomes characteristic of Goe's
work and enhances its value for religious workers and educa-
tors.
In 1916, Coe wrote The Psychology of Religion , v/hich
is his major work in the field* It was the first adequate
textbook in the field and treats almost every important aspect
of religion--the general nature of religion, religious con-
sciousness, anthropological problems, interrelations between
the individual and society, special problems, such as, prayer,
mysticism, the subconscious, the future life, and religious
leadership. JMone of the earlier treatises on religious
consciousness, such as those by James, Leuba, King, Ames, and
Pratt, had attempted to treat more than a limited portion of
the field.
Coe rejects behaviorism and structuralism as abstract
and seeks to make his psychology practical and dynamic by
taking the functional approach. Pie maintains that if psychol-
ogy is to have anything of significance to say about religion
it must advance beyond mental states and mental mechanisms,
as such, and deal with persons in relation to the society of
which they are a part. Although influenced by Angell and

(5)
Dewey, Goe avoids a mechanistic determinism by placing
emphasis upon the preferential, rather than the biological,
nature of mental functions. Goe regards the mind as more
than an adjustive mechanism, for it has a creative function
in terms of personal -social self-realization. By emphasizing
the purposive, creative, and integrating aspects of conscious
life and its essential dependence upon social relationships,
Goe prepared the v;ay for the increasingly dynamic point of
viev/ which has come into psychology of religion. Strickland
and Johnson have written psychologies of religion which
support Coe's personalistlc and functional point of view.
Goe takes a broadly-inclusive, value-approach to
religion. He accepts without reservation the social view
of the individual and consistently applies it to all aspects
of religion. He interprets religion as originating in the
social group and as being a genuinely social experience. It
is a movement of valuation within all values which seeks to
complete, unify, and conserve the values of life. l\io
separation is made between religious consciousness and ethical
consciousness, or between religious values and ethical values.
?/hile Goe's value -approach to religion is similar to that
of Edffding and Ames, his view is broader and more inclusive
in that religion is not limited merely to conservation of
values, or to the highest social values. His emphasis is
always upon the dynamic, evolving aspects of religion and
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approach is more empirical and genetic than that of most
earlier writers.
Although in later years Coe permitted his interest in
psychology of religion to wane in favor of religious education,
his numerous writings in religious education possess a strong
psychological orientation* Believing that sound and effective
religious training must be based upon a psychological under-
standing of personality, Coe has been instrumental in bringing
about a closer relation betv/een psychology of religion and
religious education. Prom the very first, Coe sought to make
psychology serve the needs of the religious educator
by exploring the psychological laws of mental growth and the
dynamics of religious experience. He is recognized as the
leading advocate of the functional and social point of view
in religious education, and his work and emphasis correspond
in large measure to what Dewey has achieved in general educa-
tion. Coe's writings on social, political, and economic
issues also show a workingout in specific situations of the
central aspects of his psychology of religion. His fundamen-
tal emphasis is upon the v/orth and dignity of human personality.
By taking a psychological approach to social ethics, Coe is
successful in revealing the motives, purposes, and desires
which underlie human behavior.
An examination of literature in psychology of religion
produced since 1916, reveals a general recognition of Coe's

m
work by later investigators. Kis influence is particularly
apparent In the increasing emphasis which is being placed
upon the social and interpersonal aspects of religion. In
view of present trends in psychology away from atomistic
concepts toward more holistic viev;s, the functional and
dynamic aspects of Coe's psychology of religion appear to
be valid. At many points, Coe anticipates the present
emphasis in psychology of religion by pointing out the
therapeutic and integrative aspects of religion. His signif-
icant treatment of religious groups and religious leadership
appears to be a unique and original contribution. Eis greatest
contribution to the field is his consistent interpretation of
religion as a genuinely social experience, and the abundance
of empirical evidence v^hich he gathers in support of his
position. The greatest criticism of his work is his failure
to appreciate fully the more individual and mystical aspects
of religion, as well as his failure to distinguish clearly
between religion and morality.
The conclusions reached in this study, are: (1) Coe
did important pioneer work in establishing the field of
psychology of religion. (2) He helped to make psychology
of religion more scientific. (3) He was the first American
psychologist of religion to demonstrate the importance of
temperament as a factor in religious experience. (4) He
enlarged the field of psychology of religion to include
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subjects previously given only slight attention, such as,
temperament, group dynamics, religious leadership, divine
healing, and subconscious factors. (5) He wrote one of the
first psychologies of religion to be based on personalism.
(6) He was instrumental in bringing the dynamic point of
view into psychology of religion, (7) He played an important
part in bringing about the social emphasis in religion, (8)
He wrote the first adequate textbook in psychology of religion.
(9) He makes psychology of religion practical by utilizing
its methods and results in religious education and social
ethics
•
•
David Henry Bremer, the son of Otto A. and Camilla
Jenkins Bremer, was born in Spokane, Washington, November 12,
1919. He attended the public schools of Seattle, Washington
and received the A. B. degree from V/ittenberg College in
1943. In 1945 he received the B. D. degree from Chicago
Lutheran Theological Seminary. During his seminary years
he served as student supply pastor in various churches in
Illinois and Indiana. While attending college and seminary
he spent six summers as a park ranger naturalist in Yellov/-
stone National Park. After coming to Boston University in
January, 1946, he has served three years as a graduate

assistant to Professor Paul E, Johnson in the Department of
Psychology of Religion. He has also served for three years
as a part-time youth director, and later as assistant minis-
ter, at Park Avenue Congregational Church, Arlington Heights,
Massachusetts. During the summer of 1946, he received
clinical training at the Institute of Pastoral Care at
Massachusetts General Hospital. Additional clinical train-
ing was had at Charles tov/n State Prison and as an assistant
in the Class in Applied Psychology at the Boston Dispensary.
In 1946 he was married to Betty Jean Pridgeon of Fort Wayne,
Indiana.







